C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 001036

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KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: TENTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING GROUP


Classified By: POL/ECON Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. The tenth meeting of the International
Working Group (IWG) produced a somewhat bolder than usual
communique challenging the African Union (AU) and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to devise
new, better transition arrangements to take effect after
October. The communique indirectly blames the current
impasse on ambiguities in UN Security Council resolution 1633
and legal contradictions between the resolution and the
Ivoirian constitution, giving President Gbagbo too much
leverage to impede the peace process for his political gain.
The communique also calls for the Security Council to approve
new, better institutional arrangements to take effect after
October 31, including a stronger mandate for the UN High
Representative for Elections (HRE) . At this meeting, Prime
Minister Banny repeatedly pledged his determination to find
and punish all those responsible for the recent dumping of
toxic wastes around Abidjan, but he sidestepped questions
about whether President Gbagbo is shielding his own cronies
from punishment. Banny also evaded questions about exactly
where the blockages to the peace process are and what the
international community can do to help clear them. The HRE
estimates that it could take as long as 18 months to complete
the current, initial phase of the identification process;
registration of voters can begin only after that. UN and
French peacekeeping force commanders report that the security
situation in the country is volatile and dangerous, with
serious potential for an explosion of violence. End Summary.


2. (C) The tenth meeting of the IWG was held in Abidjan
September 8, co-chaired as usual by Congolese Foreign
Minister Rodolphe Adada and UN Special Representative of the
Secretary General in Cote d'Ivoire (SRSG) Pierre Schori. In

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attendance were French Cooperation Minister Brigitte
Girardin; Ghana Foreign Minister Nan Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo;
South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini Z

uma; AU
Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit; ECOWAS
Executive Secretary Mohamed Ibn Chambas; UN High
Representative for Elections in Cote d'Ivoire (HRE) Gerard
Stoudmann; and representatives from Benin, Guinea, Niger, the
United Kingdom, the United States, the EU, the World Bank,
and the International Organization of French Speaking
Countries.


3. (C) Prime Minister Banny briefed the IWG on progress in
implementing the peace process road map since the last IWG
meeting July 20. As successes he cited the partial return of
civilian administration to the North and the holding of exams
there for the 2005-2006 school year. On what he called the
"darker side," he acknowledged that both the Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process and the
military-to-military talks between the rebel FN (New Forces)
and the FANCI (Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire) have been
interrupted, and that the identification process, to register
the 2-3 million undocumented Ivoirians and foreigners, is
moving very slowly. He further acknowledged that it was the
revised procedures that he himself introduced under pressure
from President Gbagbo, requiring Ivoirians to go to separate
courts for their birth registration and their certificate of
nationality, which had significantly slowed the
identification process down. Banny said that at the
September 6 meeting of the five principal Ivoirian political
leaders in Yamoussoukro, the other four accepted in principle
his proposal to expedite the issuing of certificates of
nationality by increasing the number of courts and making
them mobile, like the courts that are issuing birth
registrations. However, Banny indicated that consensus was
not reached at Yamoussoukro on how to revise the current law
to make this possible, and that opposition political leaders
made clear that these measures would not be enough to
overcome their rejection of the revised identification
procedures. Nevertheless, he underscored his determination
to keep looking for ways to revise the procedures, within the
law, so that all who are entitled to a certificate of
nationality can receive one within 2-4 months.


4. (C) Banny strongly condemned the recent illegal dumping of
toxic wastes around Abidjan and repeatedly pledged his
determination to identify and punish all those responsible.
However, he sidestepped questions about reports in that
morning's local press that President Gbagbo is refusing to
allow Banny to fire the Director of the Port of Abidjan,
Marcel Gossio, for his part in the scandal. (Note: Gossio is
widely believed to be funneling a significant portion of the
port's revenues into the coffers of Gbagbo's FPI --Ivoirian
Popular Front -- party.) Banny also staunchly defended his
decision to submit the resignation of his entire government

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over the scandal, to send the strongest possible signal to
the Ivoirian people that such negligence and greed will not
be tolerated. He acknowledged that technically perhaps he
should have consulted with the international community before
taking this action, because of the international community's
role in his selection as Prime Minister, but in this case
substance was more important than form -- when the suffering
of the Ivoirian people was at stake he would be prepared to
resign 1000 times if necessary.


5. (C) Banny expressed frustration at what he called
"professional blockers" -- politicians deliberately throwing
up obstacle after obstacle to keep him from making progress
toward elections. However, as has happened at several
previous IWG meetings, when he was asked directly three
separate times where the blockages are and how the
international community can help him to overcome them, Banny
refused to answer. When Congo Republic Foreign Minister
Adada pressed him particularly hard on this point, Banny
responded that he is a central banker, and for central
bankers some things must remain unsaid.


6. (C) UN HRE Stoudmann briefed the group on the lack of
progress in the electoral process. Taking into account that
in the first six weeks of the identification program, birth
registrations and/or certificates of nationality were issued
to only about 90,000 of the estimated 2-3 million who need
them, Stoudmann estimated that it would take 18 months to
complete this part of the identification process, not 2-4
months as Prime Minister Banny hoped. After that, holders of
certificates of nationality will still have to be issued
actual identification cards, but Stoudmann said this would be
done simultaneously with voter registration. He noted that
the technical problems with the electoral process are
surmountable, but the political problems cannot be overcome
as long as there is a lack of will to do so. Instead,
whenever any progress is made, these political obstacles will
increase. Stoudmann called for a complete change in the
electoral modus operandi. In particular, he asked for a
stronger mandate to arbitrate procedural disputes, and
ultimately, after elections have been held, to certify
whether they were truly free, fair and transparent.


7. (C) General Fernand Amoussou, newly apointed Force
Commander for ONUCI (the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire), and
General Antoine Lecerf, Force Commander for the French
Licorne peacekeeping force, gave a very pessimistic
assessment of the security situation. General Amoussou
called the situation dangerous and volatile, susceptible to
exploitation by radical elements from all sides. He noted
that, against the backdrop of stalled DDR, broken off
military-to-military talks, and a dismantling of western
militias that was only a masquerade, the issue of dismantling
the armed militias in Abidjan has never even been raised. He
said that undisciplined behavior and disregard for the law
among government security forces also must be addressed.
General Lecerf called the security situation precarious, with
serious and real potential for an explosion of violence.
Lecerf said there are weapons everywhere -- the population is
arming itself and is far more accepting of the possibility of
violence than it was six months ago. Like Amoussou, he also
deplored racketeering by members of the defense and security
forces.


8. (C) After these briefings, the mood of the IWG was grim as
the group approached the drafting of a communique. There was
strong consensus that, as SRSG Schori put it, if things are
allowed to go on as they are, a year from now the
international community will find itself right back in the
same place. The drafting session was long, and somewhat
contentious, but not because of any disagreement about the
seriousness of the situation, the nature of the problems, or
the urgent need to address them. Rather, some delegations,
most notably South Africa, felt that it would be more
appropriate for the IWG to detail its concerns in a private
report to the Security Council, rather than in a press
communique. This idea foundered in part because the
co-chairs could not propose a workable procedure for fully
consulting all the members about the contents of such a
report, but also because many IWG members felt strongly that
the group should make its serious concerns a matter of public
record.


9. (C) In the end, the communique is indirectly critical of
President Gbagbo on a number of key points. It blames
"institutional duality and conflicts in legal interpretation"
for causing the current impasse, by preventing Prime Minister
Banny from being able to exercise the powers envisioned for

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him by the AU and the Security Council, by blocking the peace
process, and by distorting the neutrality of the electoral
process. France wanted this to be an explicit reference to
the imbalance of power between the President and the Prime
Minister, arising from ambiguities in UNSCR 1633 and legal
contradictions between UNSCR 1633 and the Ivoirian
constitution, and giving Gbagbo too much leverage to impede
the peace process for his political gain. All agreed that
this was indeed true, and a key reason for the current
impasse, but most did not want to be so directly critical of
Gbagbo, or to imply that the international community wants to
suspend the Ivoirian constitution, so the wording was made
more oblique. The communique also calls the establishment of
a new voters' list a "precondition" for the holding of
elections, another indirect criticism of Gbagbo who has been
insisting that the voters' list from the 2000 elections must
be used. It further reasserts that the Independent Electoral
Commission (CEI) has exclusive responsibility for the
electoral process, even citing South African President Mbeki
on this point, and it makes no mention of the National Bureau
of Statistics (INS), which Gbagbo insists is solely
responsible for preparing the voters' list and which is
controlled by his cronies.


10. (C) The communique is not entirely one-sided. It calls
on all Ivorian parties to cooperate with the Prime Minister
to quickly form a new government, thus brushing aside the
previous day's statement from the G-7 grouping of opposition
parties, rejecting any new government and calling for the
international community to replace Banny. It also cites the
interruption of disarmament, which came from the rebel FN
side, as one of the key causes for the current impasse.


11. (C) After some debate, the IWG decided not just to report
in the communique on the reasons for the current impasse, but
also to make recommendations for the way forward after
October. Accordingly, it calls on the United Nations to
consult with the AU and ECOWAS to devise new, better
institutional arrangements to take effect after October 31,
and it calls on the Security Council to adopt a new
resolution that eliminates the ambiguities of UNSCR 1633,
reinforces the powers of the Prime Minister, and also
reinforces the mandate of the HRE. The communique also calls
for UN sanctions against individuals who block the peace
process. The next IWG will be on October 6.


12. (C) Comment. This is a bold communique by IWG standards,
in effect challenging the AU and ECOWAS to meaningfully
improve on the current arrangements after October 31, and
making it more difficult for them to simply roll these
arrangements over for another year. However, relatively
strong words are about as far as this group can go. It
remains on the margins of the peace process, little more than
an observer of the peace process here and little more than a
kibitzer in the international process of deciding on a way
forward after October. It is much easier for the IWG to call
for bold changes than it will be for African leaders to agree
on them and get the Ivoirians to accept them. End Comment.

Hooks