ARMENIA ENACTS ELECTORAL REFORMS, BUT DOES NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000901

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA ENACTS ELECTORAL REFORMS, BUT DOES NOT
GUARANTEE FAIR ELECTIONS

Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In an extraordinary session May 19, the Armenian
Parliament voted to increase the number of its seats
apportioned on the party list basis, to nominally curtail
President Robert Kocharian's authority to directly appoint
members of electoral commissions, and to reform the way the
government draws up voter lists. The changes were part of a
package of amendments to the Electoral Code that respond to
recommendations of the Council of Europe's (CoE) Venice
Commission. Along with detailed reforms that, for example,
change the layout of voting booths and the posting of voter
lists, major reforms balance the President's political power
base (the coalition government) with his extra-political
power base (non-partisan oligarchs) and do little to balance
the interests of the government and the opposition. Whether
these changes will, as the government claims, "complicate
vote-rigging" is more a question of overall political will to
have fair elections than the specific changes that the
parliament passed yesterday. End Summary.

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PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION INCREASED
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2. (SBU) The most notable amendment, and one not called for
by the COE, raised from 75 to 90 the number of parliamentary
deputies who will be elected under the system of proportional
representation (by party list) in the next elections. The
increase will come at the expense of single-mandate
constituencies that will be reduced from 56 to 41. Prime
Minister Andranik Markarian (Republican Party) brokered the
redistribution between junior coalition partners Orinats
Yerkir and the Armenian Revolutionary Faction (ARF) Dashnaks
who wanted greater proportional representation and the
Republican Party, backed by the People's Deputy group of
non-partisan lawmakers, who opposed change in existing
distribution. (Note: The People's Deputy group is a "who's
who" of Armenia's oligarch businessmen, who typically contest
and win the single mandate seats. Only loosely, if at all,
affiliated with the parties in parliament, these truant MPs
seldom appear in parliament or participate in political
activities, but do form a large non-partisan power base for
the government and the president. End Note.)


3. (C) Since a seat in parliament, and the criminal immunity
that goes with it, became de rigueur for Armenia's tycoons,
oligarchs have found it easier to buy-off electoral
commissions and otherwise cheat on the single mandate seats
than to purchase a spot on a party list. These elections are
thus the most corrupt, and even the Central Election
Commission invalidated the results of a tainted oligarch
run-off in Kotayk region last August. Reducing the number of
single-mandate seats may arguably reduce the number of the
most unfairly contested elections, but it also increases the
strain on popular candidates without party support who must
compete with the oligarchs who buy elections. In all,
greater proportional representation is better for the
coalition and opposition parties alike, who will have more
places on the party list to dole out or sell to tycoons.

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PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS LIMITED?
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4. (SBU) The other important amendment changed from 3 to 1
the number of members that Kocharian can appoint on the
Central Election Commission and its territorial divisions, a
response to the COE's recommendation to establish more
balanced representation on the electoral commissions. In the
2007 elections, the Court of Appeals and the non-partisan
group of parliamentary deputies, People's Deputy, will now
each appoint a member in place of two of the President's
appointments on the Central Election Commission. In a May 19
briefing, the Chairman of the Central Election Commission,
Garegin Arzizyan, told us that after 2007 the Council of
Court Chairman (made up of the chairmen of the various
courts) would appoint one member on each commission in place
of the People's Deputy group. The other six seats on
election commissions will continue to be distributed among
the parties in parliament, giving the coalition three seats
on each commission. Commenting on the changes, opposition
parliamentarian Viktor Dallakian told us that these changes
look good on paper but amount to no change at all, as six
seats will remain in control of the government.


5. (C) Until now, the President's three seats together with
the governing coalition's three seats meant that
pro-government members had a controlling majority of each
Electoral Commission. We agree with Dallakian that these
changes will not bring significantly more balance. The
People's Deputy group of oligarchs are intensely loyal to the
executive with whom they have cut the deals that maintain
their power bases. The ostensibly independent judges on the
Court of Appeals owe their jobs to the pro-government
Minister of Justice, who, with the President's approval,
appoints them to their terms from which they can be recalled
by the President.

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POLICE TO CONTROL VOTER LIST
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6. (SBU) Another amendment, supported by the OSCE, gives the
national police and OVIR, the passport office, the
responsibility for drawing up and maintaining Armenia's voter
lists. The OSCE had supported this change because OVIR has
centralized information about the comings and goings Armenian
citizens. While local authorities have done a poor job
maintaining voter's lists, OVIR is a centralized agency under
firm executive control and rife with corruption. While we
recognize that moving responsibility for voter lists to OVIR
increases the opportunity for large-scale political
corruption, even if (or, maybe, because) it is more effective
at assembling national voter lists and provides us and other
donors a potential target for technical assistance.

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PROXY POWERS INCREASED
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7. (C) Opposition party member Viktor Dallakian told us that
the most positive change in the election code was an increase
in powers for candidate's proxies during vote counts.
Proxies would now take an active role in the count, and have
the right to physically examine questionable or discarded
ballots during the count, whereas before they had to keep a
distance from the counting and could not handle the votes.

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COMMENT: FAIR ELECTIONS A QUESTION OF POLITICAL WILL
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8. (C) The Council of Europe's recommendations for electoral
change notwithstanding, Armenia could have had free and fair
elections under the old electoral code. While the government
has enacted changes that meet the letter of some CoE
recommendations, there is little sign of significant change
in spirit. The redistribution of parliamentary seats is a
compromise between two of the government's political power
bases rather than between the government and opposition. The
government ostensibly changed the composition of election
commissions but did not, in fact, make them more balanced.
Moving the responsibility to maintain voter lists to OVIR
gives the government more opportunity to manipulate in their
favor, but also more opportunity to ensure their fairness and
accuracy. Much depends on the government's political will to
have fair elections, rather than on the composition of the
electoral commissions or the ownership of the voter lists.
EVANS