Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05YEREVAN2062
2005-11-23 13:12:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

ARMENIA: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY, 2005-2008

Tags:  EAID KDEM PHUM PREL AM 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

231312Z Nov 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 YEREVAN 002062 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, DRL, EUR/ACE
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID KDEM PHUM PREL AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY, 2005-2008


--------------------------------------------
MOVING THE ARMENIANS FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM
--------------------------------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 YEREVAN 002062

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, DRL, EUR/ACE
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID KDEM PHUM PREL AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY, 2005-2008


--------------
MOVING THE ARMENIANS FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM
--------------


1. (SBU) Armenia is at a crossroads in its democratic
development. While the political landscape has remained
relatively consistent since the last elections, the next two
years will test the government's commitment to its reform
agenda. As Assistant Secretary Fried said during his
October visit to Yerevan, the next two years could push
Armenia ahead of the pack in terms of democracy or could
pull the country significantly backwards. Slippage could
have negative consequences at home (as the country prepares
for parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 and
2008) and abroad (as talks over the Nagorno-Karabagh
conflict enter a crucial phase). Armenia's impressive
economic performance could be accomplishing much more for
the country were it not for widespread corruption that
threatens the integrity of democracy in Armenia. Most
businesses and government leaders now recognize this fact,
but need to act soon in order to maximize the benefits of
the country's double-digit GDP growth.


2. (SBU) Progress in our bilateral relationship depends on
Armenia's progress on democracy. During the September 2005
U.S.-Armenia Task Force on Economic Cooperation, we called
on the Armenians to recognize the link between maintaining
macroeconomic growth and strengthening democratic
institutions. EUR/ACE's Tom Adams reminded the Armenian
side that our USG assistance can only work to its maximum
potential when democracy is allowed to grow. As another
element of our bi-lateral relationship, the Millennium
Challenge Account process relies on a concrete set of
indicators that will determine Armenia's continued
eligibility for the program and help us push the country in
the right direction.


3. (SBU) The GOAM recognizes that the revolutions in 2004
and 2005 in Georgia and Ukraine have heightened
international interest in democracy -- and free and fair
elections -- in this region. After flawed elections in 2002-
2003, there is considerable pressure at home and abroad for
transparent balloting during the next parliamentary and
presidential elections (scheduled for 2007 and 2008). All
eyes are currently on the November 27 referendum on the
proposed constitutional amendments as an indicator of the
GOAM's commitment to free and fair elections. The
referendum serves as an important starting point for our
strategy and will help identify those areas where special
interventions are necessary to help Armenia to make the

necessary reforms.

-------------- ---
OUR STRATEGY: MPP GOALS, SPECIALIZED ASSISTANCE
-------------- ---


4. (SBU) Strengthening democratic institutions in Armenia is
an integral part of Post's MPP goals. We have convened a
special working group from membership of Post's Assistance
Coordination Group (ACG) to look at how we can better
achieve these goals during the run-up to parliamentary and
presidential elections in 2007 and 2008. Free and fair
elections in 2007 and 2008 are our target. The Democracy
Strategy Working Group (chaired by the DCM) studied the
experience of the 2002-2003 elections, the findings of
various international observer missions, and the conclusions
of the USAID-funded political party assessment as part of
its brainstorming exercise. We have identified ten areas
where USG interventions can help make a difference. USAID,
the Public Affairs Section and Political/Economic Section
will play key roles in carrying out these activities. USAID
has developed a proposed strategy of core programs that will
shape the majority of our interventions.

--------------
I: DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
--------------


5. (SBU) We will continue to keep democracy at the top of
our bi-lateral agenda with the Armenians, maintaining the
momentum of recent high-level visits (including those of A/S
Fried and Congressional delegations). A consistent message
by the USG that our partnership with Armenia depends on real
commitment to democratic strengthening will help maximize
the impact of our democracy promotion strategy. We should
not be shy about citing the USG's robust levels of
assistance (USD 1.6 billion since Armenia's independence) as
an investment in democracy that must reap dividends in order
for us to justify it to Congress and the American people.
Post will openly share our democracy promotion strategy with
the GOAM and point to it as a prime opportunity to enact
long-overdue reforms.

6. (SBU) We offer our strategy as another way the USG can
help move the country toward its stated goal to integrate
with Western structures as a modern democracy. The
Ambassador will repeat this message with GOAM interlocutors
and the press and we will stress this theme during the
upcoming sessions of the U.S-Armenia Task Force on Economic
Cooperation (USATF). Discussions regarding Millennium
Challenge Account funding should continue to focus on
democratic reforms and the need to register continued
progress on the MCC's democratic indicators. As
parliamentary and presidential elections approach, carefully
timed visits by Department and Congressional delegations
will offer useful public diplomacy opportunities to spread
this message beyond the political elite to the Armenian
population.

--------------
II: A BETTER VOTERS' LIST -- THE CORNERSTONE
--------------


7. (SBU) The Problem. Inaccurate voters' lists were the
most notable technical problem of the 2002-2003 elections in
Armenia. Considerable movement of people due to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, high emigration rates over the past 15
years and inadequate monitoring systems exacerbated the
problem. Lingering doubts over the list are a source of
political contention, contribute to voter apathy and are
used by all segments of the political establishment --
either to justify boycotting elections or to justify
imperfect balloting. During the 2002-2003 elections,
international monitors noted that some voters were
registered in more than one precinct, or were not included
on the list; the voters' lists even included the names of
people who had died.


8. (U) Our Involvement to Date. In 2003, USAID (in
partnership with the OSCE, a local NGO and the Eurasia
Foundation) supported the development of software to convert
the local state registries to voters' lists and to identify
inaccuracies in the voters' lists. In the 20 communities
where they used the software, observers cited significantly
fewer problems. While effective for limited use, there were
some problems with this software and it was not applied
nationwide. In 2002 and 2003, USAID (through IFES)
supported Voters' Lists Advisory Committees (VLACs) to work
with local authorities, election officials and the media to
check local voter lists for inaccuracies. The work of the
VLACs resulted in over 32,000 edits to the voter lists in
sixteen communities.


9. (U) Our Intervention. An accurate national voter
registry will offer Armenians a reliable foundation for
elections. With proper registration of voters, every person
who is entitled to vote will have a chance to have his or
her voice heard and the GOAM will reduce the possibility of
fraudulent voting. USAID is prepared to support GOAM
efforts to establish a national voter list in advance of the
2007-2008 elections by helping to design, develop and
implement a national voter registration initiative. Our
assistance will include the development of the voter
registry system as well as procurement of necessary
equipment to training personnel tasked with every aspect of
the voter registry. The Voters' Lists Advisory Committees
will continue to play an important role in this effort and
will help ensure that the process is transparent. A
reasonably accurate national voter registry will offer all
Armenians (the voters, politicians and civil society
monitors) an even playing field and will help increase
confidence in the integrity of the democratic process.

--------------
III: BETTER ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
--------------


10. (SBU) The Problem. Weak electoral administration has
plagued previous elections in Armenia. Despite the
existence of clear regulations, election authorities are
unable to administer elections in a fair and transparent
manner. This has negative consequences for both the
integrity of election results in Armenia as well as for
voter confidence and participation. The Central Election
Commission does not have the technical ability to provide
all lower election commissions with copies of the electoral
code, CEC decisions or other documents about how to conduct
a free and fair election.


11. (U) Our Intervention. Post will supplement ongoing UNDP
training for election commissions and will support the
publication and nationwide distribution of all necessary
technical documents so that commissions have the proper
tools to administer elections fairly. USAID will design
study tours for election commission members to observe
elections in other countries. The Public Affairs Section
will send groups of 5-6 election officials on International
Visitors programs to observe the administration of the 2006
elections in the United States. USAID will also consider
commodity support for election administration (similar to
the procurement of transparent ballot boxes that USAID co-
funded in 2003).

--------------
IV: ELECTORAL ADJUDICATION AND THE JUDICIARY
--------------


12. (SBU) The Problem. The uneven adjudication of electoral
grievances undermines the democratic process in Armenia.
Courts do not always act in a transparent manner and often
base their decisions on political pressures rather than
clear guidelines. A change in the composition of election
commissions to include members of the judiciary (a mostly
positive step) will create a staffing shortage in the
judiciary during the upcoming elections. There will be a
need for legal professionals trained in electoral
adjudication to fill this gap.


13. (U) Our Intervention. We have increased our support to
the judiciary in recent years and will deepen our engagement
around electoral adjudication. USAID will provide
specialized election adjudication training (keyed to the new
election law, related violations and how to address them) to
judges, lawyers and proxies. We will support legal rights
awareness programs related to administrative detentions and
provide resources for those who report violation of
electoral rights. International Visitors programs will be
timed to give Armenian judges and lawyers opportunities to
observe election adjudication procedures (and best
practices) in the United States. ABA/CEELI will continue to
implement cross-cutting programs for USAID and INL on a wide
range of issues to complement these efforts.

--------------
V: PARTICIPATION AND VOTER INFORMATION
--------------


14. (SBU) The Problem. Experience has shown that the public
is passive, even apathetic in the run-up to elections.
Following flawed elections, however, voters have taken to
the streets to protest in relatively high numbers. The
public's engagement in the election process is uneven and
can be easily manipulated. Part of the problem stems from a
lack of information about issues and electoral rights.
There are few opportunities for Armenians to get involved
with elections or informed about issues beyond highly
politicized rallies or spotty media reports which tend to be
skewed toward a particular candidate. The active
participation of an informed and engaged public prior to the
2007-2008 elections will increase pressure for free and fair
elections and make it harder for authorities to commit
violations.


15. (U) Our Intervention. We will support voter education
campaigns utilizing a variety of mechanisms including
televised debates, radio programs, town hall meetings,
public service announcements, newspaper and billboard
campaigns, election observation, parallel vote tabulation
and Rock-the-Vote events with NGO partners. Democracy
Commission Small Grants programs will also be keyed to these
themes and will target hard-to-reach parts of the
population. Ongoing civic education programs will include
electoral rights as part of a nationwide curriculum for
young Armenians who have proven effective in sharing
information with heads-of-household throughout the country.
Post's impressive array of NGO, alumni and exchange networks
will ensure broad-based participation in these programs.

-------------- --
VI: POLLING AS A RELIABLE POLITICAL WEATHERVANE
-------------- --


16. (SBU) The Problem. Polling is underdeveloped in Armenia
and the lack of reliable national polls leaves the public
and political parties out of touch with important issues and
attitudes. The absence of reliable polling data means that
irresponsible claims by the media or parties can go
unchecked. Political parties are less likely to concentrate
on substantive policy issues if they do not know what
matters to Armenians today.

17. (U) Our Intervention. USAID will develop the capacity
of local survey organizations and will help stimulate the
(apparently ripe) market of political client-based polling
in Armenia. Working with polling firms to develop
appropriate techniques and procedures, we will engage
reputable organizations who can provide world-class
technical assistance on the appropriate role of polling in a
democracy. USAID may also directly support the conduct of
some polls, thus shaping the political debate.

--------------
VII: STRONGER POLITICAL PARTIES
--------------


18. (SBU) The Problem. The 2005 Political Party Assessment
noted that political parties in Armenia are weak and
underdeveloped. The report found that USG assistance to
political parties to date had produced limited results and
needed a fresh approach in order to be effective. Parties
often do not allow for the active participation of certain
parts of Armenian society (including women and young
voters). Parties do not have neither the technical capacity
nor interest to effectively communicate with their
constituencies and develop issue-based platforms or
discussions. Instead of deepening political culture,
political parties are often personality-driven entities with
shallow internal structures that mutate with regularity.
The role of political parties is therefore often confusing
for voters and contributes to confusion and/or political
apathy.


19. (U) Our Intervention: USAID will provide political
parties with technical assistance and training about the
utility and advantages of issue-based strategies, message
development and dissemination, platform formulation and
campaigning tactics. Our programs will include a focus on
women's involvement in parties and the engagement of first-
time voters and university students. Training for women
candidates, NGOs and youth wings will feature prominently in
our programs. (Note: Assistance of this kind will continue
to be offered equally to all democratic political parties in
Armenia. The USG will continue to assure GOAM authorities
that the purpose of this assistance is not to secure the
election of a particular candidate or party. We will be
careful to include parties who are part of the governing
coalition and opposition. End Note.)

-------------- -
VIII: CONTINUING OUR FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
-------------- -


20. (SBU) The Problem. As in many countries of the former
Soviet Union, a culture of corruption in Armenia threatens
to de-stabilize those democratic institutions that can help
ensure a free and fair election. Recent studies point to
the cultural and institutional roots of corruption in
Armenia and indicate that no part of society or the
government is protected from corruption's negative effects.
The perception of widespread corruption contributes to voter
apathy and empowers those officials who view electoral
violations as an accepted part of the political culture.


21. (SBU) Our Intervention. Post's on-going anti-corruption
programs will include increased emphasis on how corruption
undermines the integrity of elections and democratic
institutions. USAID is in the initial stages of design for
a dedicated anti-corruption activity that will feature
prominently as part of our strategy. All USG assistance
activities in Armenia include some aspect of anti-corruption
in their programming. The Assistance Coordination Group has
compiled an exhaustive inventory of anti-corruption
activities and will continue to highlight this document as
part of outreach activities and during discussions with
implementers and GOAM counterparts. We will encourage
partners in the diplomatic and donor community to follow
this example as a way to increase political pressure on the
GOAM to move from rhetoric to actual implementation of its
2004 anti-corruption strategy.

--------------
IX: A REAL ROLE FOR THE MEDIA
--------------


22. (SBU) The Problem. The media's bias and partiality
become more evident during election cycles in Armenia. It
is common practice for politicians to pay for newspaper
articles and media spots that favor their candidacy or blast
their opponents. The public is unlikely to look to the
local media as a source of unbiased information regarding
political issues or campaigns.


23. (U) Our Intervention. USAID-funded media programs
already include technical assistance devoted to journalistic
ethics and management during election. We will increase our
focus on campaign reporting and political advertising. The
Public Affairs Section will organize an International
Visitors program for journalists and editors on the role of
the media during elections in the U.S. Digital video
conferences at the Embassy will connect Armenian journalists
with U.S. specialists on the subject of the role of media
during elections. An International Speaker program focused
on issues of free and fair elections will include a
component on the media and journalistic ethics.

--------------
X: MONITORING AND THE INT'L COMMUNITY
--------------


24. (SBU) The Problem. Not all parts of Armenian society
appreciate the importance of election monitoring in the
democratic process. Some election officials at the local
levels view monitors with suspicion and have reportedly
meddled with their activities. At the highest levels, the
GOAM still needs to realize that election monitors, both
local and international, help underscore legitimacy when
elections are free and fair.


25. (SBU) Our Intervention. Continued technical assistance
to the It's Your Choice (IYC) NGO will ensure that
nationwide observation will take place during balloting in
2007-2008. USAID will support pre-election assessments,
media monitoring and observer training. Post will
participate in OSCE-ODIHR international observer missions
and will contribute actively to seminars and roundtables
devoted to these topics as part of our public diplomacy
strategy leading up to the elections.

--------------
COORDINATING WITH THE DEPARTMENT
--------------


26. (U) Post appreciates Department support for these
initiatives and looks forward to discussing ways we can
maximize this golden opportunity. We will continue to
maintain close contact with EUR/ACE, DRL, ECA and USAID
through our points of contact and EUR Desk Officer. USAID
is already busy developing its plan to implement these
programs and has prepared two versions of detailed outlines
of possible programming that it will forward to Washington
as this dialogue continues.
EVANS

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -