NEW ZEALAND WANTS TO MOVE AHEAD ON HSPD-6

C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000880 SIPDIS STATE FOR CA/P/IP, EAP/ANP, DS/IP/EAP AND DS/CR/CIL SINGAPORE FOR MATT KING (ICE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015 TAGS: PTER ASEC CASC CVIS PGOV PREL PINR NZ SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND WANTS TO MOVE AHEAD ON HSPD-6 INITIATIVE REF: A. STATE 200695 ¶B. WELLINGTON 758 ¶C. WELLINGTON 739 ¶D. STATE 173539 ¶E. WELLINGTON 718 ¶F. STATE 158827 (U) Classified by Political-Economic Counselor Katherine B. Hadda. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The New Zealand government remains eager to move quickly toward bilateral sharing of terrorist lookout information. To move forward, however, the government needs to know more about how the information it supplies to the United States would be used, details on how such an information-sharing system would work, and specifics on the technical requirements. New Zealand officials expressed hope that U.S. experts could visit Wellington soon to provide detailed information on the Terrorist Screening Data Base and how New Zealand could participate in the sharing of terrorist information. Post believes such a visit would be necessary to make progress toward an HSPD-6 agreement. End summary. ¶2. (C) As requested in ref A, post officers met November 7 with Mike XXXXXXXXXXXX, manager of the counter terrorism branch of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed his government,s continued interest in the HSPD-6 terrorist lookout information sharing initiative. "We are happy to move as fast as the U.S. is happy to move,8 he said. ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said, however, that his government seeks additional information on the initiative to determine how it might be able to participate. His questions included: would the information that New Zealand provided ever be made public by the U.S. government; would the United States restrict the use of information it provided to New Zealand; who on each side would have access to the information and how much would be classified; and, would the source of the information be identified. ¶4. (C) His questions also focused on technical aspects of the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB): Would New Zealand have to install a dedicated computer terminal, or would access be provided via internet? How much encryption would be involved; would it be commercial- or high-grade? ¶5. (C) In essence, XXXXXXXXXXXX said his government wants to move ahead on the initiative but, before it could do so, needs more details on what would be required of New Zealand and whether it has the technical capability to participate. He asked whether U.S. experts could visit Wellington to help provide such details and assess New Zealand,s capabilities. A visit could be accommodated before Christmas or after the first two weeks of January. ¶6. (C) Meanwhile, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was conferring on the initiative with other relevant New Zealand agencies, including New Zealand Customs, Immigration Service, Police, Government Communications Security Bureau and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. All have expressed interest in exploring the initiative. ¶7. (C) As also requested in ref A, post officers met November 10 with Arron Baker, national manager of border security and compliance operations of the New Zealand Immigration Service. The officers discussed the information-sharing initiative and Baker,s request for possible access to TSA,s no-fly list (ref B). He was informed of the USG,s preference for sharing information under the HSPD-6 rather than through an ad-hoc sharing of the no-fly list. Baker supports his government,s preference for an agreement to obtain data from the entire TSDB. ¶8. (U) Post believes a visit by U.S. experts would help move this initiative forward and welcomes Department guidance on the next steps it should take. McCormick