IRAQ: POLES SIGNAL READINESS TO STAY, BUT PRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 004037 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS MARR IZ PL SUBJECT: IRAQ: POLES SIGNAL READINESS TO STAY, BUT PRESS FOR AID REF: A. WARSAW 051427ZDEC05 ¶B. WARSAW 03044 Classified By: Polcouns Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Polish officials and parliamentarians who met with Robert Deutsch, Deputy Senior Advisor for Iraq, on December 8 in Warsaw suggested that Poland will likely remain in Iraq past January 2006, but in reduced numbers, and with an eye to withdrawing by the end of 2006. Because Polish public support for the war in Iraq has shifted from 60 percent pro in 2003 to 84 percent con today, these officials said, the GOP must demonstrate some measurable benefit from its presence in Iraq or "face reality." Most interlocutors expected the GOP to make a decision on the Polish presence in Iraq in late December, after the visits to Washington of their Defense Minister (December 4-6, ref A) and Foreign Minister (December 19). No one expected Polish troops to withdraw completely, but their exact number and the nature of their mission were yet to be determined. Several suggested that the CIA prison issue could make things more difficult. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Robert Deutsch visited Warsaw December 8 to discuss continued US-Polish cooperation in Iraq. During his meetings, Deutsch briefed Polish officials and opposition leaders on the current political, economic and security situation in Iraq, listened to Polish concerns and provided information on plans for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq. He stressed the global security benefits of defeating terrorism in Iraq and acknowledged that as Iraq,s security forces stand up, we will be able to stand down. However, he cautioned against arbitrary timetables. Deutsch underscored the success of Iraq's electoral process and noted the need to move from "identity" to "issue" politics. -------------- GOP: High Costs, Falling Public Support -------------- ¶3. (C) In a meeting at the MFA, senior officials asked for commercial assistance, hinted at a drawdown and described growing frustration with what they see as a lack of tangible results from Poland's Iraq engagement. Jacek Stepinski, Deputy Director for Middle East and Africa and Head of the Iraq Task Force, stressed that Poland wanted to realize the economic and commercial benefits of a relationship with Iraq. He asked for US help in entering Iraq's oil and gas market �0A;and noted Poland's desire to subcontract to US firms there. He said that Poland had spent $270 million on equipment and $220 on personnel in Iraq and therefore needed financial help with defense modernization at home. His colleague Slawomir Smolen reported that the Polish contingent in Iraq would shrink from 1400 to 1000 in 2006. MFA Americas Department Director Henryk Szlajfer noted some stress in US-Polish relations over the BUMAR scandal - a commercial dispute between Poland's biggest defense firm and the government of Iraq. ¶4. (C) At MOD, Under Secretary for Defense Policy Stanislaw Koziej described falling public support, over-extended budgets and a need for a military exit. Koziej's staff noted the dramatic shift in public support for Polish deployment in Iraq, from 60 percent in favor in mid-2003 to 84 percent against today. Koziej asserted that the GOP had spent almost $600 million in Iraq to date, and had sacrificed its air force modernization plan to stay there. He observed that the military had won the war and could now leave, while other agencies stayed behind to win the peace. While expressing hope that the government would decide to extend Poland's presence in Iraq past January 2006, Koziej's team warned that Poland could not maintain its current posture in Iraq and simultaneously prepare for the planned takeover of the rotating ISAF command in Afghanistan in August 2007. ¶5. (C) In a meeting with Ryszard Schnepf, Secretary of State for International Affairs in the PM's Chancellery, explained the GOP's desire to change Poland's role in Iraq while still honoring its commitment to complete the mission. Schnepf reported that although the US covers 60 percent of Poland's expenses in Iraq, the GOP had spent nearly $600 million there to date, a severe strain on the defense budget. He noted the GOP's need to find tangible benefit from the mission to gain public support for a continued Polish presence in Iraq. Schnepf also suggested that media reports about alleged CIA prisons in Poland might further undercut this public support. -------------- Opposition: Ready to Exit NOW -------------- ¶6. (C) Deutsch met separately with Former Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski of the Civic Platform (PO),currently Deputy Speaker of Parliament. Komorowski suggested that it was time to consider handing over security responsibilities in the Polish zones in Babil, Wasit and Diwaniya provinces to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Although he acknowledged that the Iraqi Government had to participate in the assessment of ISF readiness before accepting the handover, Komorowski warned that Coalition Forces had to be a key element in such deliberations because "the Iraqis would naturally want to extend the presence of foreign troops for security." Komorowski noted that the previous Polish Government had led its people to believe that a handover was near and that the newly elected government had only to negotiate terms and conditions. He suggested that a timetable for withdrawal, taking into account conditions on the ground as necessary, would alleviate some of the growing Polish public's anxiety over Iraq. He lamented that the US had only a "tactical" view of US-polish relations because it focused on getting Polish assistance in Iraq at the expense of the larger "strategic" relationship. He complained, for example, that Iraq deployment was consuming Polish funds intended for defense transformation. ¶7. (C) Deutsch also met with Jerzy Szmajdzinski, parliamentary floor leader of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Defense Minister until last month. It was Szmajdzinski who implemented the original GOP decision in 2003 to join the Coalition and deploy to Iraq, but then in 2003 began speaking regularly in public about a Polish withdrawal by the end of 2005. He stated bluntly that he wanted Iraq's 8th Division to take over security responsibility for the Polish sector as soon as possible, and that this was the time to declare victory and transfer control. Szmajdzinski saw the Multinational Division Center-South (MND-CS) unraveling, citing the imminent departure of the Ukrainians and Bulgarians. In his view, a handover shortly after Iraq's December 15th elections would legitimize the new Iraqi government and bolster Polish public opinion. He warned that the GOP needed some sort of tangible benefit now to stop the erosion of public support for Iraq deployment, or it would have to "face reality." He felt the CIA prisons scandal had dented the GOP's credibility at home. As if to sum up Polish frustration over the perceived lack of US gratitude, Szmajdzinski asked how many Mexicans are in Iraq, an allusion to US support for the Mexican candidate for OECD Secretary General over former Polish PM Marek Belka, who had previously served in a senior capacity in the CPA. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Both officials and opposition figures indicated readiness for Polish troops to stay in Iraq past January 2006, albeit in reduced numbers and with a different mission, but expressed serious concerns over the costs, both material and political, of Poland's continued presence in Iraq. However, in the end it appears that the GOP is prepared to maintain a contingent of at least 1000 troops on the ground at least through the 6th rotation of MND-CS ending roughly in August 2006. It may well be difficult for the Poles to remain beyond that time, as they will have only one year to prepare for the significantly greater organizational challenge of commanding the entire ISAF operation in Afghanistan. END COMMENT. ¶9. (U) Deputy Senior Advisor Deutsch cleared this cable. ASHE