Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05WARSAW4030
2005-12-13 10:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:
POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MELLER'S VISIT TO
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 004030
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS ECON PL
SUBJECT: POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MELLER'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe, reasons 1.4b,d
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 004030
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS ECON PL
SUBJECT: POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MELLER'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe, reasons 1.4b,d
1. (C) Summary: Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Meller travels
to Washington next week as the representative of a new
center-right government that pledges continuity in foreign
policy and sustained engagement in support of democracy
throughout the world. Meller is expected to bring a positive
message on Poland's Iraq deployment, with or without a formal
Polish government decision. He will highlight Poland's
interest in advancing reforms in Eastern Europe and will seek
assurances that his government will remain an integral part
of common efforts there. Meller will be looking for signs of
movement on U.S. visa policy, including a more
forward-leaning statement from us on Poland's visa waiver
aspirations and a response to Polish President Kwasniewski's
suggestion of no-cost visas for students. Energy security,
strengthened defense and security cooperation, and Polish
representation in international organizations are among his
other expected themes. Your discussions with him should
include reference to upcoming Strategic Dialogue talks and
the first post-inaugural visit of President Lech Kaczynski to
Washington. End summary.
New Polish government
--------------
2. (C) Meller represents a country whose political landscape
has been dramatically altered since your visit here in
February. Poland has once again performed its post-1989
ritual of alternating post-communist and post-Solidarity
governments. Control of the government, very soon the
presidency and, to a lesser degree, the parliament is now in
the hands of the center-right Law and Justice (PiS) party.
The new PiS-led minority government of PM Kazimierz
Marcinkiewicz and President-elect Kaczynski were elected this
fall on promises of sweeping domestic reforms aimed at
rooting out corruption, "de-communizing" public life, and
expanding government social programs. The new government
will seek to show that it is defending Poland's interests
more vigorously than its predecessors, with consequences for
relations with us and Poland's EU partners (as we have seen
on the EU budget),but Marcinkiewicz and others have stated
clearly that they will preserve the country's Atlanticist
orientation. The government will be forced to depend in
parliament, however, on the votes of fiercely nationalist
opposition parties such as the populist Self-Defense and the
right-wing League of Polish Families (whose electorates PiS
also hopes to capture),and this is bound to complicate
policy making. Although its position is secure, the
government could well seek new elections in 2006 if its
legislative agenda stalls. PiS would stand to improve its
strength in parliament, judging by recent opinion polls.
3. (C) The new Polish government hopes to highlight its close
relations with the United States, particularly on strategic
issues, as it approaches its stated objective of
strengthening Poland's position in Europe and the wider
world. For all the Euroskepticism of many of PiS's leaders
and despite pressure from outright opponents of the EU in
parliament, this government recognizes that Poland's
prosperity and its future development depend on EU
membership; moreover, public support for EU membership
remains very high, as the material benefits became apparent
even in the first months following accession. The Kaczynski
brothers' barely-concealed antipathy towards Russia and
Germany is likely to be held in check, in recognition of the
importance of improved relations with those neighboring
states, but long-standing strategic concerns and historical
memories underscore, for many, the need for a strong alliance
with the U.S. -- not only as a potential counterweight to
Brussels.
FM Meller a career diplomat, Russia expert
--------------
4. (C) By its selection of professionals for the foreign and
defense portfolios, PiS has sought to reassure international
partners who might be concerned that its populist reform
agenda will extend to foreign affairs. However, the
conservative and relatively inexperienced President-elect
Lech Kaczynski and, behind the scenes, his twin brother
Jaroslaw are widely expected to want to exert direct control
over foreign policy. Foreign Ministry officials have
privately reacted with concern to plans to strengthen the
foreign affairs departments of the prime minister's office
and the presidential chancellery, although their real impact
will not be clear until after the new president takes office
December 23. A well-regarded career diplomat (most recently
Poland's ambassador to Moscow),FM Meller lacks both
political standing and a personal relationship with the
Kaczynskis. We do not yet have a sense of how he views his
role within the government, but one of his key advisors
confided that the MFA intends to try to stay "fifteen minutes
ahead" of party officials and guide policy through better
preparation. You will find Meller a cordial and professional
interlocutor.
Meller's Agenda: Iraq, Eastern Policy, Visas, Respect
-------------- --------------
5. (C) Foreign Minister Meller intends to deliver a clear
message that our strategic relationship will continue
uninterrupted by the change in government. Your remarks
should welcome the new government's declared interest in
deepening this relationship and underscore our determination
to sustain a true partnership with the Poles. Sensitivities
and perceptions that we have not responded adequately to
Polish support in Iraq (whether in terms of military
assistance or of less directly related things, such as visa
policy) remain widely felt here, but the new government is
keen to work with us to come up with demonstrable evidence of
the U.S.-Polish partnership.
6. (C) Although it is not yet clear whether the Polish
government will make a formal decision on its Iraq mission in
advance of Meller's visit, Polish MFA officials maintain that
Meller will provide you, at a minimum, with the general
outlines of the Polish approach. Meller's staff suggests that
we will get to a good outcome concerning extension of the
Polish deployment into 2006 and that the foreign minister
recognizes -- without undermining Polish Defense Minister
Sikorski's recent requests in support of Polish deployments
and defense transformation -- that conditioning such a
decision on increased U.S. assistance will not be viewed
positively by us. Meller will be interested in hearing your
assessment of December 15 parliamentary elections in Iraq and
their impact on next year's mission.
7. (C) Long an active partner in the promotion of democratic
and economic reform in Eastern Europe, Poland under the new
center-right government can be expected to step up its
engagement, particularly in neighboring Belarus and Ukraine.
FM Meller will want to exchange views on further
coordination, and may seek to ensure that Poland not be left
out of joint U.S. and European efforts. MFA officials told
us that they had heard that Washington intends to encourage
Germany to take a leading role in the east, and they
apparently fear being sidelined. Given your respective
backgrounds, Meller may wish to discuss developments in
Russia as well, although it is worth noting that his focus at
this point appears to be repairing bilateral ties, which had
deteriorated badly over the past year. The MFA was unwilling
to approach the Russians on the draft NGO law, for example,
suggesting that they already had enough on their plate as it
was.
8. (C) On visa policy, FM Meller can be expected to take
account of our road map process, but also press further for
some new signs of progress. Specifically, the Polish
government is looking for an unqualified statement
articulating a clear, shared vision of visa-free travel for
Poles, and for some gesture from us in response to President
Kwasniewski's proposal that we waive application fees for
students and other young travelers.
9. (C) As noted above, one recurring element in the Polish
approach to these issues is the assumption (widely shared,
especially among PiS officials) that Poland's contributions
are undervalued and that the country has somehow not been
given its due. Former PM Belka's unsuccessful OECD candidacy
has contributed to that view, and we understand from MFA
officials that Meller would like to highlight Polish concerns
about the lack of high-ranking Poles in international
organizations.
Other strategic issues
--------------
10. (C) While in Washington, Foreign Minister Meller intends
to review Polish interest in energy security policy in both
the EU and NATO context (the Russian-German gas pipeline
project remains a source of great consternation here),
non-proliferation, defense transformation and other strategic
issues that are certain to be addressed in more detail in
upcoming Strategic Dialogue talks. The Poles view PSI as a
great success, for example, and would like to exchange views
on the possibility of expanding it. Meller's approach to
defense cooperation will contrast with Defense Minister
Sikorski's in style if not in substance. He will not seek
immediate commitments or major initiatives requiring FMF but
will underscore Poland's need for support in defense
modernization. Meller will look for ways to achieve this,
perhaps including more PSI exercises.
11. (C) FM Meller might also raise missile defense, as Polish
officials are keen to obtain a definitive review of our MD
planning, and remain very interested in further discussions
concerning a Polish site. PM Marcinkiewicz was forced to
backpedal publicly from his government program's explicit --
and premature -- position seeking an MD site, but there is no
question that the Poles want to pursue this; they are
especially keen that Poland not be overlooked in favor of
another state in the region. An MD site, in the GOP's view,
would be a symbol of U.S.-Polish defense cooperation.
12. (C) Meller's staff expects that the renditions and "CIA
prisons" issue will continue to dog the Polish government,
despite our and the Poles' best efforts to put this story to
rest. In response to sustained media pressure, PM
Marcinkiewicz announced December 10 that his government will
order an internal probe "to close the issue." Meller
anticipates being asked about renditions by the Polish press
while in Washington, and the MFA has asked that we remain in
close contact to coordinate our public stance.
13. (C) Finally, President-elect Kaczynski's plans to visit
the U.S. early in the new year should be more clear by the
time of Meller's meetings, and we have recommended that the
foreign minister use his discussions to preview the new
president's agenda and to discuss Polish objectives for that
visit.
ASHE
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS ECON PL
SUBJECT: POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MELLER'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe, reasons 1.4b,d
1. (C) Summary: Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Meller travels
to Washington next week as the representative of a new
center-right government that pledges continuity in foreign
policy and sustained engagement in support of democracy
throughout the world. Meller is expected to bring a positive
message on Poland's Iraq deployment, with or without a formal
Polish government decision. He will highlight Poland's
interest in advancing reforms in Eastern Europe and will seek
assurances that his government will remain an integral part
of common efforts there. Meller will be looking for signs of
movement on U.S. visa policy, including a more
forward-leaning statement from us on Poland's visa waiver
aspirations and a response to Polish President Kwasniewski's
suggestion of no-cost visas for students. Energy security,
strengthened defense and security cooperation, and Polish
representation in international organizations are among his
other expected themes. Your discussions with him should
include reference to upcoming Strategic Dialogue talks and
the first post-inaugural visit of President Lech Kaczynski to
Washington. End summary.
New Polish government
--------------
2. (C) Meller represents a country whose political landscape
has been dramatically altered since your visit here in
February. Poland has once again performed its post-1989
ritual of alternating post-communist and post-Solidarity
governments. Control of the government, very soon the
presidency and, to a lesser degree, the parliament is now in
the hands of the center-right Law and Justice (PiS) party.
The new PiS-led minority government of PM Kazimierz
Marcinkiewicz and President-elect Kaczynski were elected this
fall on promises of sweeping domestic reforms aimed at
rooting out corruption, "de-communizing" public life, and
expanding government social programs. The new government
will seek to show that it is defending Poland's interests
more vigorously than its predecessors, with consequences for
relations with us and Poland's EU partners (as we have seen
on the EU budget),but Marcinkiewicz and others have stated
clearly that they will preserve the country's Atlanticist
orientation. The government will be forced to depend in
parliament, however, on the votes of fiercely nationalist
opposition parties such as the populist Self-Defense and the
right-wing League of Polish Families (whose electorates PiS
also hopes to capture),and this is bound to complicate
policy making. Although its position is secure, the
government could well seek new elections in 2006 if its
legislative agenda stalls. PiS would stand to improve its
strength in parliament, judging by recent opinion polls.
3. (C) The new Polish government hopes to highlight its close
relations with the United States, particularly on strategic
issues, as it approaches its stated objective of
strengthening Poland's position in Europe and the wider
world. For all the Euroskepticism of many of PiS's leaders
and despite pressure from outright opponents of the EU in
parliament, this government recognizes that Poland's
prosperity and its future development depend on EU
membership; moreover, public support for EU membership
remains very high, as the material benefits became apparent
even in the first months following accession. The Kaczynski
brothers' barely-concealed antipathy towards Russia and
Germany is likely to be held in check, in recognition of the
importance of improved relations with those neighboring
states, but long-standing strategic concerns and historical
memories underscore, for many, the need for a strong alliance
with the U.S. -- not only as a potential counterweight to
Brussels.
FM Meller a career diplomat, Russia expert
--------------
4. (C) By its selection of professionals for the foreign and
defense portfolios, PiS has sought to reassure international
partners who might be concerned that its populist reform
agenda will extend to foreign affairs. However, the
conservative and relatively inexperienced President-elect
Lech Kaczynski and, behind the scenes, his twin brother
Jaroslaw are widely expected to want to exert direct control
over foreign policy. Foreign Ministry officials have
privately reacted with concern to plans to strengthen the
foreign affairs departments of the prime minister's office
and the presidential chancellery, although their real impact
will not be clear until after the new president takes office
December 23. A well-regarded career diplomat (most recently
Poland's ambassador to Moscow),FM Meller lacks both
political standing and a personal relationship with the
Kaczynskis. We do not yet have a sense of how he views his
role within the government, but one of his key advisors
confided that the MFA intends to try to stay "fifteen minutes
ahead" of party officials and guide policy through better
preparation. You will find Meller a cordial and professional
interlocutor.
Meller's Agenda: Iraq, Eastern Policy, Visas, Respect
-------------- --------------
5. (C) Foreign Minister Meller intends to deliver a clear
message that our strategic relationship will continue
uninterrupted by the change in government. Your remarks
should welcome the new government's declared interest in
deepening this relationship and underscore our determination
to sustain a true partnership with the Poles. Sensitivities
and perceptions that we have not responded adequately to
Polish support in Iraq (whether in terms of military
assistance or of less directly related things, such as visa
policy) remain widely felt here, but the new government is
keen to work with us to come up with demonstrable evidence of
the U.S.-Polish partnership.
6. (C) Although it is not yet clear whether the Polish
government will make a formal decision on its Iraq mission in
advance of Meller's visit, Polish MFA officials maintain that
Meller will provide you, at a minimum, with the general
outlines of the Polish approach. Meller's staff suggests that
we will get to a good outcome concerning extension of the
Polish deployment into 2006 and that the foreign minister
recognizes -- without undermining Polish Defense Minister
Sikorski's recent requests in support of Polish deployments
and defense transformation -- that conditioning such a
decision on increased U.S. assistance will not be viewed
positively by us. Meller will be interested in hearing your
assessment of December 15 parliamentary elections in Iraq and
their impact on next year's mission.
7. (C) Long an active partner in the promotion of democratic
and economic reform in Eastern Europe, Poland under the new
center-right government can be expected to step up its
engagement, particularly in neighboring Belarus and Ukraine.
FM Meller will want to exchange views on further
coordination, and may seek to ensure that Poland not be left
out of joint U.S. and European efforts. MFA officials told
us that they had heard that Washington intends to encourage
Germany to take a leading role in the east, and they
apparently fear being sidelined. Given your respective
backgrounds, Meller may wish to discuss developments in
Russia as well, although it is worth noting that his focus at
this point appears to be repairing bilateral ties, which had
deteriorated badly over the past year. The MFA was unwilling
to approach the Russians on the draft NGO law, for example,
suggesting that they already had enough on their plate as it
was.
8. (C) On visa policy, FM Meller can be expected to take
account of our road map process, but also press further for
some new signs of progress. Specifically, the Polish
government is looking for an unqualified statement
articulating a clear, shared vision of visa-free travel for
Poles, and for some gesture from us in response to President
Kwasniewski's proposal that we waive application fees for
students and other young travelers.
9. (C) As noted above, one recurring element in the Polish
approach to these issues is the assumption (widely shared,
especially among PiS officials) that Poland's contributions
are undervalued and that the country has somehow not been
given its due. Former PM Belka's unsuccessful OECD candidacy
has contributed to that view, and we understand from MFA
officials that Meller would like to highlight Polish concerns
about the lack of high-ranking Poles in international
organizations.
Other strategic issues
--------------
10. (C) While in Washington, Foreign Minister Meller intends
to review Polish interest in energy security policy in both
the EU and NATO context (the Russian-German gas pipeline
project remains a source of great consternation here),
non-proliferation, defense transformation and other strategic
issues that are certain to be addressed in more detail in
upcoming Strategic Dialogue talks. The Poles view PSI as a
great success, for example, and would like to exchange views
on the possibility of expanding it. Meller's approach to
defense cooperation will contrast with Defense Minister
Sikorski's in style if not in substance. He will not seek
immediate commitments or major initiatives requiring FMF but
will underscore Poland's need for support in defense
modernization. Meller will look for ways to achieve this,
perhaps including more PSI exercises.
11. (C) FM Meller might also raise missile defense, as Polish
officials are keen to obtain a definitive review of our MD
planning, and remain very interested in further discussions
concerning a Polish site. PM Marcinkiewicz was forced to
backpedal publicly from his government program's explicit --
and premature -- position seeking an MD site, but there is no
question that the Poles want to pursue this; they are
especially keen that Poland not be overlooked in favor of
another state in the region. An MD site, in the GOP's view,
would be a symbol of U.S.-Polish defense cooperation.
12. (C) Meller's staff expects that the renditions and "CIA
prisons" issue will continue to dog the Polish government,
despite our and the Poles' best efforts to put this story to
rest. In response to sustained media pressure, PM
Marcinkiewicz announced December 10 that his government will
order an internal probe "to close the issue." Meller
anticipates being asked about renditions by the Polish press
while in Washington, and the MFA has asked that we remain in
close contact to coordinate our public stance.
13. (C) Finally, President-elect Kaczynski's plans to visit
the U.S. early in the new year should be more clear by the
time of Meller's meetings, and we have recommended that the
foreign minister use his discussions to preview the new
president's agenda and to discuss Polish objectives for that
visit.
ASHE