POLAND: UPDATED INFORMATION ON AVIAN AND PANDEMIC

UNCLAS WARSAW 003903

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE DKOSTELANCIK AND MSESSUMS, DEPT FOR G,
OES/IHA, OES/IHA FOR DSINGER AND RDALEY, DEPT FOR INR
RLESTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO SENV ECON EAGR EAID PREL PL
SUBJECT: POLAND: UPDATED INFORMATION ON AVIAN AND PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA PREPARATION

REF: A. STATE 209622


B. WARSAW 3830

C. WARSAW 3632

D. WARSAW 3364

E. WARSAW 3212


1. Summary. Post has reported extensively on our positive
relationship with the GOP in its effort to prepare for a
potential avian influenza outbreak (see refs b - e). Polish
officials are actively preparing for the appearance of the
disease, which they expect will occur in the Spring. Rather
than restate information from Warsaw reftels, post provides
additional requested information here on a point by point
basis. All of the information provided in ref B remains
valid. End Summary.

--------------
Preparedness/Communication
--------------


2. Post is certain that GOP reporting on a potential disease
outbreak will be both swift and truthful. The GOP is
committed to protecting its interests and ensuring the safety
of its populace. GOP officials have repeatedly stressed a
willingness and ability to detect, contain, and eradicate any
AI outbreak. In addition, post believes the Polish media
will also monitor AI developments when bird migration season
begins again in the spring.


3. In the event of an AI outbreak, the GOP would work
closely with EU officials. Ministry of Agriculture officials
might also seek assistance from USG animal health experts as
a result of recent emergency management training conducted in
Poland by specialists from the U.S. Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service. Post also believes GOP officials would
consult with the appropriate international organizations.


4. Ministry of Agriculture officials have reported that
Poland is not producing a poultry vaccine for avian influenza.

--------------
Surveillance/Detection
--------------


5. Poland could identify avian influenza, as well as the
serotype and pathogenic strain, in the event of an outbreak.
Post assumes that GOP officials would seek confirmation from
the OIE reference laboratory in either Italy or Germany.
Post estimates confirmation would take approximately three to
five days from the time samples were sent.


6. Under current law, there could be a time lag between
detection of an outbreak by regional officials and official
notification to national officials. However, local
veterinary officials have the authority to order the
immediate eradication of suspect flocks without first
notifying national officials. Also, response structures rely
on existing resources in each county. There are no
mobilization plans to take resources from one part of the
country and apply them to the source of the outbreak. This
could lead to the disease spreading before it can be brought
under control.

ASHE