POLAND: UPDATED INFORMATION ON AVIAN AND PANDEMIC

UNCLAS WARSAW 003903 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/NCE DKOSTELANCIK AND MSESSUMS, DEPT FOR G, OES/IHA, OES/IHA FOR DSINGER AND RDALEY, DEPT FOR INR RLESTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO SENV ECON EAGR EAID PREL PL SUBJECT: POLAND: UPDATED INFORMATION ON AVIAN AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPARATION REF: A. STATE 209622 ¶B. WARSAW 3830 ¶C. WARSAW 3632 ¶D. WARSAW 3364 ¶E. WARSAW 3212 ¶1. Summary. Post has reported extensively on our positive relationship with the GOP in its effort to prepare for a potential avian influenza outbreak (see refs b - e). Polish officials are actively preparing for the appearance of the disease, which they expect will occur in the Spring. Rather than restate information from Warsaw reftels, post provides additional requested information here on a point by point basis. All of the information provided in ref B remains valid. End Summary. -------------- Preparedness/Communication -------------- ¶2. Post is certain that GOP reporting on a potential disease outbreak will be both swift and truthful. The GOP is committed to protecting its interests and ensuring the safety of its populace. GOP officials have repeatedly stressed a willingness and ability to detect, contain, and eradicate any AI outbreak. In addition, post believes the Polish media will also monitor AI developments when bird migration season begins again in the spring. ¶3. In the event of an AI outbreak, the GOP would work closely with EU officials. Ministry of Agriculture officials might also seek assistance from USG animal health experts as a result of recent emergency management training conducted in Poland by specialists from the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Post also believes GOP officials would consult with the appropriate international organizations. ¶4. Ministry of Agriculture officials have reported that Poland is not producing a poultry vaccine for avian influenza. -------------- Surveillance/Detection -------------- ¶5. Poland could identify avian influenza, as well as the serotype and pathogenic strain, in the event of an outbreak. Post assumes that GOP officials would seek confirmation from the OIE reference laboratory in either Italy or Germany. Post estimates confirmation would take approximately three to five days from the time samples were sent. ¶6. Under current law, there could be a time lag between detection of an outbreak by regional officials and official notification to national officials. However, local veterinary officials have the authority to order the immediate eradication of suspect flocks without first notifying national officials. Also, response structures rely on existing resources in each county. There are no mobilization plans to take resources from one part of the country and apply them to the source of the outbreak. This could lead to the disease spreading before it can be brought under control. ASHE