POLISH RESPONSE ON BELARUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 003762

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2010
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV BO EUN
SUBJECT: POLISH RESPONSE ON BELARUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

REF: STATE 201513

Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)


1. (C) Acting Polcouns delivered reftel demarche to Beata
Kolecka, Deputy Director of the EU Department of the Polish
MFA. Kolecka welcomed the U.S. perspectives, which she said
very closely paralleled Poland's own policy on Belarus. She
noted the ongoing excellent bilateral and regional
cooperation with the U.S. on the Belarus problem and agreed
that U.S.-EU partnership and solidarity was particularly
important in dealing with the Lukashenko regime.


2. (C) Kolecka agreed that Lukashenko should be given the
clear message not to run for a third term. However, she
worried that there was not a practical method available to
deliver that message, given the ban on high-level contacts
with the GOB. She ruled out any public statements in this
regard, as they would only "insult" Lukashenko and harden his
resolve. She said that there was a possibility of EU High
Rep Solana's meeting with the Belarusian FM, perhaps
accompanied by the FMs of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, but
this would depend entirely on the results of the November 7
GAERC discussion.


3. (C) Regarding the appropriate reaction should Lukashenko
indeed manipulate the presidential election and win a third
term, Kolecka said that many EU member states were undecided,
although all admitted that some form of strong reaction would
be necessary. One school of thought was consistent with the
U.S. approach of not recognizing such election results and
declaring Lukashenko illegitimate, while the other felt that
this would shut off all avenues for dialogue and render aid
to civil society virtually impossible. The U.S. and the EU
definitely had to be prepared to take appropriate steps, but
there was still no consensus on what those steps should be.
For example, other EU member states had still not responded
to Poland's call for a visa ban on the key individuals
responsible for the ongoing persecution of the Polish Union
in Belarus.


4. (C) Kolecka said that the GAERC communique would include a
public call for free, fair and transparent elections and
unfettered media access, but not necessarily any concrete
further steps. Poland would continue to push at the GAERC,
the PSC and in other EU fora for a coherent and pro-active
policy on Belarus.


5. (C) Regarding Russia, Kolecka said that the GOP had been
trying for months to establish a bilateral dialogue on
Belarus. However, the Russians simply dismiss the issue as
"interference in Belarusian domestic affairs" and refuse to
discuss it. Kolecka added that there were signals that the
Russians were looking to deepen the nature of the
Russia-Belarus relationship, which would make such a dialogue
all the more difficult to launch.


5. (C) COMMENT. Embassy consults extremely closely with the
GOP on Belarus, and they have been very pro-active and
cooperative at all levels.
CURTIN