POLISH RESPONSE ON BELARUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 003762 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2010 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV BO EUN SUBJECT: POLISH RESPONSE ON BELARUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION REF: STATE 201513 Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) Acting Polcouns delivered reftel demarche to Beata Kolecka, Deputy Director of the EU Department of the Polish MFA. Kolecka welcomed the U.S. perspectives, which she said very closely paralleled Poland's own policy on Belarus. She noted the ongoing excellent bilateral and regional cooperation with the U.S. on the Belarus problem and agreed that U.S.-EU partnership and solidarity was particularly important in dealing with the Lukashenko regime. ¶2. (C) Kolecka agreed that Lukashenko should be given the clear message not to run for a third term. However, she worried that there was not a practical method available to deliver that message, given the ban on high-level contacts with the GOB. She ruled out any public statements in this regard, as they would only "insult" Lukashenko and harden his resolve. She said that there was a possibility of EU High Rep Solana's meeting with the Belarusian FM, perhaps accompanied by the FMs of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, but this would depend entirely on the results of the November 7 GAERC discussion. ¶3. (C) Regarding the appropriate reaction should Lukashenko indeed manipulate the presidential election and win a third term, Kolecka said that many EU member states were undecided, although all admitted that some form of strong reaction would be necessary. One school of thought was consistent with the U.S. approach of not recognizing such election results and declaring Lukashenko illegitimate, while the other felt that this would shut off all avenues for dialogue and render aid to civil society virtually impossible. The U.S. and the EU definitely had to be prepared to take appropriate steps, but there was still no consensus on what those steps should be. For example, other EU member states had still not responded to Poland's call for a visa ban on the key individuals responsible for the ongoing persecution of the Polish Union in Belarus. ¶4. (C) Kolecka said that the GAERC communique would include a public call for free, fair and transparent elections and unfettered media access, but not necessarily any concrete further steps. Poland would continue to push at the GAERC, the PSC and in other EU fora for a coherent and pro-active policy on Belarus. ¶5. (C) Regarding Russia, Kolecka said that the GOP had been trying for months to establish a bilateral dialogue on Belarus. However, the Russians simply dismiss the issue as "interference in Belarusian domestic affairs" and refuse to discuss it. Kolecka added that there were signals that the Russians were looking to deepen the nature of the Russia-Belarus relationship, which would make such a dialogue all the more difficult to launch. ¶5. (C) COMMENT. Embassy consults extremely closely with the GOP on Belarus, and they have been very pro-active and cooperative at all levels. CURTIN