WHAT'S AT STAKE IN POLISH ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 003360

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PL
SUBJECT: WHAT'S AT STAKE IN POLISH ELECTIONS

REF: A. WARSAW 3298


B. WARSAW 2479

Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: With just a few weeks remaining in the Polish
parliamentary and presidential election campaigns, all signs
indicate that the new government and head of state will be
ones committed to advancing long-standing principles of
Polish foreign and economic policy. September 25
parliamentary elections will determine which of the two
likely coalition partners -- the centrist Civic Platform (PO)
and the center-right Law and Justice (PiS) -- will dominate
the government and shape its key policies. The choice
between the more liberal PO and the more nationalist,
populist PiS is particularly sharp in economic policy, but
differences in emphasis exist in their foreign and defense
policies as well. In October 9 presidential elections,
meanwhile, voters will choose from among two main candidates,
whose presidencies would be defined largely by their
different personalities and their partisan political
relationship with the government. Both could be counted on,
if elected, to sustain Poland's strategic partnership with
the United States and its active engagement in Europe and the
wider world. End summary.

PO vs. PiS
--------------


2. (SBU) For more than a year, it has been widely assumed
that PO and PiS would form the core of a new coalition
government, and for some time the only issue was whether they
would require a third coalition partner to reach a
parliamentary majority. With their combined support in
recent polls topping sixty percent, the question is no longer
whether PO and PiS will govern alone but which of the two
parties will finish in first place and thereby dominate the
coalition. After months of surveys indicating a rough parity
in support for PO and PiS, the Civic Platform has in the
closing weeks of the campaign surged to a formidable lead
over its rival (ref A),supporting that conventional wisdom
about Jan Rokita (PO) as the next prime minister and PO's
control of key ministerial portfolios.


3. (SBU) With large numbers of likely voters still undecided,
however, we cannot exclude the real possibility that PiS can
manage a close showing or even outpoll PO in the end. It is
also possible, but less likely, that protest parties, such as
the populist Self-Defense and the right-wing LPR, could do
well enough to deny PO and PiS a parliamentary majority (in
such a case, the margins would probably be small enough that
PO and PiS could cut a deal to form a minority government,
without a formal third partner). What, then, are the stakes
in looking ahead to PO-led government versus one dominated by
PiS?

Foreign policy
--------------


4. (C) Rokita and PO presidential candidate Donald Tusk have
been at pains lately to insist that PO and PiS have
comparable and compatible visions for Poland, but certain
differences are evident in the two parties' approach to
foreign policy issues. Both PO and PiS can be expected to
seek to establish their government as a more vigorous
defender of Polish national interests than the outgoing
government, particularly within the EU, but also in relations
with the United States. Both were relieved by the apparent
demise of the draft EU constitution, which they opposed as
ceding too much authority to the "major powers" and as
ignoring Europe's Christian heritage. PiS is decidedly more
EU-skeptic than PO, however, and PiS rhetoric frequently
casts Germany as an adversary (whether leading the charge
against "historical revisionism" or condemning Schroeder's
relationship with Putin). Tusk, meanwhile, has stated that
he views improvement of relations with Germany among his top
priorities (German elections this week may do a great deal to
get that process moving). PiS members will press for a more
aggressive approach toward Russia and Belarus, although in
both cases the party's rhetoric is not likely to be matched
in practice, given the need to maintain constructive
relations with Russia and the challenges of the political
situation in Belarus. Whether led by PO or PiS, however, the
next government will almost certainly accelerate Polish
efforts to support democracy and civil society in its eastern
neighbors.


5. (C) We can count on the support of both PO and PiS to
sustain Polish engagement in Iraq, and the next government
will likely be more open to discussing a variety of post-2005
options than the outgoing GOP. Both parties supported the
2003 intervention and subsequent stabilization missions, and
PO and PiS leaders have defended Polish involvement in Iraq
during the campaign (although they have been careful to avoid
raising the issue's profile). That said, leaders of the two
parties have also signaled their dissatisfaction with the
levels of support the current government was able to secure
from us, suggesting that not only would they have done it
differently but that Poland's participation in future
missions will be based on new arrangements with the United
States including requests for increased military assistance.


6. (SBU) Although Rokita has been generally reluctant to
discuss possible cabinet configurations, he has confirmed
publicly that Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (former Polish EU
integration chief, currently an MEP) is his choice to be
foreign minister. PiS officials have not yet conceded the
MFA to PO, and this is one key ministry whose leadership may
well be decided by the relative strength of PO's and PiS's
performance September 25. Among the leading PiS candidates
for the foreign minister position are former culture minister
Kazimierz Ujazdowski and former deputy FM and deputy Defense
Minister Radek Sikorski (lately of AEI in Washington).

Economic policy
--------------


7. (SBU) The differences between PO and PiS are perhaps most
clear in their approaches to economic issues (ref B). Both
parties regard reducing Poland's chronically high
unemployment as their government's top priority, but PiS
focuses on creating employment incentives to address the
problem, while PO argues that the most effective way to
reduce unemployment is to grow the economy and create new
opportunities. PiS officials' concerns about Poland's income
distribution and calls for greater "solidarity" may be
partially dismissed as campaign rhetoric, but they reflect an
approach that is rather more populist and statist than their
prospective coalition partners. One of the key elements of
the PO platform has been introduction of sweeping tax reforms
(introduction of a flat 15-percent rate on VAT, corporate and
personal income taxes),for example, while PiS has argued for
maintaining progressivity. PO leaders are visibly more
comfortable in dealing with the private sector, whose members
are viewed with suspicion by many PiS officials. PO
officials generally favor more complete privatization of
state enterprises than that undertaken by the outgoing
government, while PiS has called for a review of previous
sales and favors state control of "strategic" sectors.


8. (SBU) Control of economic policy is an absolute
requirement for the Civic Platform, regardless of whether
they finish ahead of PiS or not. PiS leaders, from the
Kaczynski brothers on down, have effectively acknowledged
that the finance and economy ministries will go to PO. This
will not mean that PO will have entirely free rein, however,
and compromises will have to be reached on most key issues.
With PO taking two economic posts, it appears that the third,
treasury, may go to a PiS official (the front-runner is
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz of the Sejm's finance committee).
Former deputy finance minister Jan Kawalec, a close Rokita
advisor, is the leading candidate to head the finance
ministry.

Defense transformation
--------------


9. (C) Significant differences between PO and PiS are also
apparent on defense policy, particularly regarding
transformation of Polish armed forces. Civic Platform's
approach, as articulated by former defense minister Bronislaw
Komorowski and others, is to accelerate the processes
underway to transform the military into a professional,
expeditionary force, complemented by national guard-like
elements. PO argues for immediate reforms to streamline the
command structure and make the military less top-heavy. PiS,
meanwhile, remains focused on potential external threats
(principally from Russia) and is not convinced that Poland
should reduce its territorial defense capabilities; the party
favors retention of forces and the existing structure of
garrisons.


10. (C) Komorowski has been seen as the odds-on favorite to
return as defense minister, but it is neither clear that he
wants the job, nor that this post would necessarily go to PO.
We have heard rumors recently that Komorowski, who is closer
to Tusk than Rokita, might prefer to be Tusk's National
Security advisor should Tusk win the election. A possible
PiS candidate for defense is Radek Sikorski, who served as
deputy in that ministry as well.

The presidential race
--------------


11. (SBU) It is important to remember that the powers of the
Polish president were significantly reduced by the 1997
constitution, and that the office's political weight depends
on the occupant's own skills and relationship to the
government as much as its legal authority. Donald Tusk and
Lech Kaczynski, with close party (and, in Kaczynski's case,
blood) ties to the new government, would certainly be in a
position to shape policy and speak authoritatively on foreign
policy issues. Although some rivalries and differences would
be certain to emerge (particularly between a President
Kaczynski and a PM Rokita, although Tusk and Rokita do not
always see eye-to-eye, either),we can expect that the
president and government from the same camp would coordinate
their statements and activities. With Cimoszewicz out of the
running, it seems unlikely there will be a political split
between the government and the presidency.


12. (SBU) Either of the two remaining candidates could be
expected to support the broad outlines of Polish foreign
policy, including active engagement in Europe, the strategic
partnership with the U.S., and support for democracy and
human rights throughout the world. It goes without saying,
perhaps, that neither seem to have the political or personal
skills of Aleksander Kwasniewski.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) Barring an unlikely blow-out by the Civic Platform
(with PO's percentage share of the vote in recent surveys
reaching the high 30's, some here have begun to speculate
about the possibility that PO could win a majority of
parliamentary seats on its own),the next government will
function much like all coalition governments, whatever the
relative strength of the coalition partners. Areas of
responsibility and interest will be carved out (PiS is
determined to have the Justice and Interior portfolios, for
example, given its anti-corruption focus),and compromises
will have to be struck on most high-profile issues.
Moreover, the parties have barely begun to address some
critical challenges, such as reform of Poland's dysfunctional
health care system. On many issues, clear differences in
approach exist between PO and PiS, but that does not mean
that the dominant coalition partner will get all it wants,
nor even that it will prevail.


14. (C) The good news in all of this is that we are confident
that we will be able to work closely and effectively with the
next Polish government and president, regardless of the
leadership mix between PO and PiS, and regardless of which of
the two leading contenders replaces Kwasniewski. The next
government may seek to drive a harder bargain on some issues,
and working with a coalition government may require more
intensive diplomacy -- particularly at the beginning -- but
our partnership with Poland will remain strong.
Ashe