WHAT'S AT STAKE IN POLISH ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 003360 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PL SUBJECT: WHAT'S AT STAKE IN POLISH ELECTIONS REF: A. WARSAW 3298 ¶B. WARSAW 2479 Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, 1.4b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: With just a few weeks remaining in the Polish parliamentary and presidential election campaigns, all signs indicate that the new government and head of state will be ones committed to advancing long-standing principles of Polish foreign and economic policy. September 25 parliamentary elections will determine which of the two likely coalition partners -- the centrist Civic Platform (PO) and the center-right Law and Justice (PiS) -- will dominate the government and shape its key policies. The choice between the more liberal PO and the more nationalist, populist PiS is particularly sharp in economic policy, but differences in emphasis exist in their foreign and defense policies as well. In October 9 presidential elections, meanwhile, voters will choose from among two main candidates, whose presidencies would be defined largely by their different personalities and their partisan political relationship with the government. Both could be counted on, if elected, to sustain Poland's strategic partnership with the United States and its active engagement in Europe and the wider world. End summary. PO vs. PiS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) For more than a year, it has been widely assumed that PO and PiS would form the core of a new coalition government, and for some time the only issue was whether they would require a third coalition partner to reach a parliamentary majority. With their combined support in recent polls topping sixty percent, the question is no longer whether PO and PiS will govern alone but which of the two parties will finish in first place and thereby dominate the coalition. After months of surveys indicating a rough parity in support for PO and PiS, the Civic Platform has in the closing weeks of the campaign surged to a formidable lead over its rival (ref A),supporting that conventional wisdom about Jan Rokita (PO) as the next prime minister and PO's control of key ministerial portfolios. ¶3. (SBU) With large numbers of likely voters still undecided, however, we cannot exclude the real possibility that PiS can manage a close showing or even outpoll PO in the end. It is also possible, but less likely, that protest parties, such as the populist Self-Defense and the right-wing LPR, could do well enough to deny PO and PiS a parliamentary majority (in such a case, the margins would probably be small enough that PO and PiS could cut a deal to form a minority government, without a formal third partner). What, then, are the stakes in looking ahead to PO-led government versus one dominated by PiS? Foreign policy -------------- ¶4. (C) Rokita and PO presidential candidate Donald Tusk have been at pains lately to insist that PO and PiS have comparable and compatible visions for Poland, but certain differences are evident in the two parties' approach to foreign policy issues. Both PO and PiS can be expected to seek to establish their government as a more vigorous defender of Polish national interests than the outgoing government, particularly within the EU, but also in relations with the United States. Both were relieved by the apparent demise of the draft EU constitution, which they opposed as ceding too much authority to the "major powers" and as ignoring Europe's Christian heritage. PiS is decidedly more EU-skeptic than PO, however, and PiS rhetoric frequently casts Germany as an adversary (whether leading the charge against "historical revisionism" or condemning Schroeder's relationship with Putin). Tusk, meanwhile, has stated that he views improvement of relations with Germany among his top priorities (German elections this week may do a great deal to get that process moving). PiS members will press for a more aggressive approach toward Russia and Belarus, although in both cases the party's rhetoric is not likely to be matched in practice, given the need to maintain constructive relations with Russia and the challenges of the political situation in Belarus. Whether led by PO or PiS, however, the next government will almost certainly accelerate Polish efforts to support democracy and civil society in its eastern neighbors. ¶5. (C) We can count on the support of both PO and PiS to sustain Polish engagement in Iraq, and the next government will likely be more open to discussing a variety of post-2005 options than the outgoing GOP. Both parties supported the 2003 intervention and subsequent stabilization missions, and PO and PiS leaders have defended Polish involvement in Iraq during the campaign (although they have been careful to avoid raising the issue's profile). That said, leaders of the two parties have also signaled their dissatisfaction with the levels of support the current government was able to secure from us, suggesting that not only would they have done it differently but that Poland's participation in future missions will be based on new arrangements with the United States including requests for increased military assistance. ¶6. (SBU) Although Rokita has been generally reluctant to discuss possible cabinet configurations, he has confirmed publicly that Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (former Polish EU integration chief, currently an MEP) is his choice to be foreign minister. PiS officials have not yet conceded the MFA to PO, and this is one key ministry whose leadership may well be decided by the relative strength of PO's and PiS's performance September 25. Among the leading PiS candidates for the foreign minister position are former culture minister Kazimierz Ujazdowski and former deputy FM and deputy Defense Minister Radek Sikorski (lately of AEI in Washington). Economic policy -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The differences between PO and PiS are perhaps most clear in their approaches to economic issues (ref B). Both parties regard reducing Poland's chronically high unemployment as their government's top priority, but PiS focuses on creating employment incentives to address the problem, while PO argues that the most effective way to reduce unemployment is to grow the economy and create new opportunities. PiS officials' concerns about Poland's income distribution and calls for greater "solidarity" may be partially dismissed as campaign rhetoric, but they reflect an approach that is rather more populist and statist than their prospective coalition partners. One of the key elements of the PO platform has been introduction of sweeping tax reforms (introduction of a flat 15-percent rate on VAT, corporate and personal income taxes),for example, while PiS has argued for maintaining progressivity. PO leaders are visibly more comfortable in dealing with the private sector, whose members are viewed with suspicion by many PiS officials. PO officials generally favor more complete privatization of state enterprises than that undertaken by the outgoing government, while PiS has called for a review of previous sales and favors state control of "strategic" sectors. ¶8. (SBU) Control of economic policy is an absolute requirement for the Civic Platform, regardless of whether they finish ahead of PiS or not. PiS leaders, from the Kaczynski brothers on down, have effectively acknowledged that the finance and economy ministries will go to PO. This will not mean that PO will have entirely free rein, however, and compromises will have to be reached on most key issues. With PO taking two economic posts, it appears that the third, treasury, may go to a PiS official (the front-runner is Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz of the Sejm's finance committee). Former deputy finance minister Jan Kawalec, a close Rokita advisor, is the leading candidate to head the finance ministry. Defense transformation -------------- ¶9. (C) Significant differences between PO and PiS are also apparent on defense policy, particularly regarding transformation of Polish armed forces. Civic Platform's approach, as articulated by former defense minister Bronislaw Komorowski and others, is to accelerate the processes underway to transform the military into a professional, expeditionary force, complemented by national guard-like elements. PO argues for immediate reforms to streamline the command structure and make the military less top-heavy. PiS, meanwhile, remains focused on potential external threats (principally from Russia) and is not convinced that Poland should reduce its territorial defense capabilities; the party favors retention of forces and the existing structure of garrisons. ¶10. (C) Komorowski has been seen as the odds-on favorite to return as defense minister, but it is neither clear that he wants the job, nor that this post would necessarily go to PO. We have heard rumors recently that Komorowski, who is closer to Tusk than Rokita, might prefer to be Tusk's National Security advisor should Tusk win the election. A possible PiS candidate for defense is Radek Sikorski, who served as deputy in that ministry as well. The presidential race -------------- ¶11. (SBU) It is important to remember that the powers of the Polish president were significantly reduced by the 1997 constitution, and that the office's political weight depends on the occupant's own skills and relationship to the government as much as its legal authority. Donald Tusk and Lech Kaczynski, with close party (and, in Kaczynski's case, blood) ties to the new government, would certainly be in a position to shape policy and speak authoritatively on foreign policy issues. Although some rivalries and differences would be certain to emerge (particularly between a President Kaczynski and a PM Rokita, although Tusk and Rokita do not always see eye-to-eye, either),we can expect that the president and government from the same camp would coordinate their statements and activities. With Cimoszewicz out of the running, it seems unlikely there will be a political split between the government and the presidency. ¶12. (SBU) Either of the two remaining candidates could be expected to support the broad outlines of Polish foreign policy, including active engagement in Europe, the strategic partnership with the U.S., and support for democracy and human rights throughout the world. It goes without saying, perhaps, that neither seem to have the political or personal skills of Aleksander Kwasniewski. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Barring an unlikely blow-out by the Civic Platform (with PO's percentage share of the vote in recent surveys reaching the high 30's, some here have begun to speculate about the possibility that PO could win a majority of parliamentary seats on its own),the next government will function much like all coalition governments, whatever the relative strength of the coalition partners. Areas of responsibility and interest will be carved out (PiS is determined to have the Justice and Interior portfolios, for example, given its anti-corruption focus),and compromises will have to be struck on most high-profile issues. Moreover, the parties have barely begun to address some critical challenges, such as reform of Poland's dysfunctional health care system. On many issues, clear differences in approach exist between PO and PiS, but that does not mean that the dominant coalition partner will get all it wants, nor even that it will prevail. ¶14. (C) The good news in all of this is that we are confident that we will be able to work closely and effectively with the next Polish government and president, regardless of the leadership mix between PO and PiS, and regardless of which of the two leading contenders replaces Kwasniewski. The next government may seek to drive a harder bargain on some issues, and working with a coalition government may require more intensive diplomacy -- particularly at the beginning -- but our partnership with Poland will remain strong. Ashe