AIR POLICING DECISION CASTS LONG SHADOW IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 001228

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2015
TAGS: PREL LH
SUBJECT: AIR POLICING DECISION CASTS LONG SHADOW IN
LITHUANIA

REF: VILNIUS 977

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Alexander Titolo for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Extending NATO's interim Baltic air
policing program or making it permanent is one of the GOL's
highest security policy objectives. The GOL will look for
continuation of 24/7 Baltic coverage as the optimal outcome
of NATO's review of its air policing policy, and for NATO to
defend this policy vigorously in discussions with Russia.
The GOL fears a loss of confidence in NATO's security
guarantees, and public demands that Lithuania provide for its
own air defense will result if NATO ends 24/7 coverage. Such
an outcome could jeopardize GOL's defense transformation
plans and overseas operations. MOD and MFA officials express
guarded optimism that proposals currently under discussion in
NATO will maintain the interim mission. They voice
significant concerns, however, regarding readiness standards
and rules of engagement. End summary.


2. (C) The GOL has taken careful notice of the Russian
Government's actions since the September 15 crash of a
Russian Su-27 in Lithuania (reftel). After an initial period
of bluster and blame-shifting, the last few weeks have
witnessed Russian recognition of its responsibility for the
accident. These include public reprimands of two senior
Russian Air Force officials, swift payment of the agreed-upon
damage claim, increased willingness to explore confidence
building measures, and Russia's request to put "transparency
and predictability in Baltic airspace management" on the
November 23 agenda of the NATO-Russia Council. Lithuanian
Minister of Defense Gediminas Kirkilas has publicly applauded
these steps. At the same time, GOL officials privately tell
us they still regard Russia as a threat that merits close
attention.


3. (C) Darius Mereckis, the MFA's point man on air policing,
underscored in discussions with us November 17 the GOL's
insistence that all NATO allies have a minimum level of
protection from air-based threats. Mereckis said the GOL
will argue from this premise that the only way to achieve
this goal is for NATO to station interceptors in the Baltics.
Mareckis said that the NATO Air Defense Committee's October
14, 2005 note to the Secretary regarding NATO's air policing
policy (NADC-D REV1) largely assuages GOL concerns about the
future of the Baltic air policing mission. He interprets the
draft policy paper as an indication that the final policy
statement will keep planes in the Baltics on a permanent
basis.


4. (C) Mereckis detailed the GOL's hope that the NATO
Military Committee will incorporate lessons learned from the
Su-27 crash in formulating readiness standards and command
procedures for future Baltic air policing operations.
Mareckis identified problems with communication procedures
between the Regional Air Surveillance Coordination Center
(RASCC) in Lithuania and the Combined Air Operations Center
(CAOC) in Germany as one reason for the delay in scrambling
Lithuania-based NATO interceptors in response to the SU-27
incursion. He acknowledged that Lithuania and the other
Baltic nations must improve surveillance coverage of their
airspace to help ameliorate this problem. To that end, the
MOD has requested USD 6.2 million above its initial budget
request to parliament for radar equipment upgrades.


5. (C) Mereckis opined that NATO needed to change the
protocol that requires the interceptors to scramble only
after a plane violates Baltic airspace. He argued that the
NATO planes should respond when unidentified aircraft or
those of a non-NATO country approach or appear to approach
NATO airspace. Mereckis cited as model procedure for NATO's
air policing planes the actions of Finnish and Danish
national forces, which scrambled September 15 to monitor a
squad of Russian planes flying near Finnish and Danish
airspace. (The squad included the Su-27 that later broke
formation and crashed in Lithuania.) Mereckis said the
current requirement that the planes scramble within 15
minutes of receiving an order is acceptable.


6. (C) Putting security concerns in a political context,
Marius Puodziunas, of the MOD's Defense Commitments Section,
claimed to us that the Su-27 crash diminished public support
for NATO. Puodziunas also noted heightened public suspicions
that good relations with Russia are a higher priority for the
Alliance than the security of Lithuania. He pointed to
polling after the Su-27 crash that indicated that 74% of
Lithuanians want NATO to take a harder line in addressing
Russia's actions. The GOL, Puodziunas said, is keen to
prevent calls for Lithuania to develop a domestic air defense
capability in the face of public perception that NATO does
not adequately defend the Baltics. The MFA's Mereckis also
drew attention to polling data showing that 40% of
Lithuanians had lost confidence in the Lithuanian Armed
Forces. Mereckis said the GOL wants to restore the public's
confidence in the Armed Forces and NATO.


7. (C) Comment: We think that the GOL is overstating
concern about public confidence in NATO, reflecting the
security establishment's intense desire to make the NATO air
policing mission in the Baltics permanent. Lithuanians
understand that they have no other security alternatives
besides NATO, and that they are simply too poor to field
their own fighter aircraft capability, even in the unlikely
event that the other two Baltic republics pitch in. At the
same time, it remains politically important for the GOL to
show Lithuanians that NATO air police will be on the
neighborhood beat for the foreseeable future and that NATO
understands that Russia's behavior towards the Baltics is not
always friendly.
MULL