VILNIUS UNATTENDED OPERATIONS WAIVER REQUEST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 001202 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR IRM/CST/LD DEPARTMENT FOR DS/ACD/SSB DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CMP/ECB: WEBBER, MR. PATRICK DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CS/SSD: WALKER, JAN DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CMP/ECB: GERST, TENA DEPARTMENT FOR DS/C: STARR, GREG DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/EX/IM: COTE, JAN A DEPARTMENT FOR IRM/BPC/CST/LD/OB: TIANG-CHU, ELAINE DEPARTMENT FOR THE OFFICE OF THE CIO FRANKFURT FOR RIMC FRANKFURT FOR RCSO: CALVIN REIMER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2014 TAGS: AADP ABLD AMGT ACOA ASEC KRIM LH SUBJECT: VILNIUS UNATTENDED OPERATIONS WAIVER REQUEST REF: A. MCCRANE-TIANG-CHU EMAIL 9/23/2005 ¶B. 2003 STATE 84156 ¶C. WAIVER DECISION MEMORANDUM 8/25/92 ¶D. STATE 190564 ¶E. STATE 198066 ¶F. OIG REPORT OSO/1-95-28 ¶G. "SECURITY INSPECTION OF EMBASSY VILNIUS LITHUANIA," OIG NOVEMBER 1999 ¶H. 2004 VILNIUS 1319 ¶I. 2004 STATE 249854 ¶J. 2005 VILNIUS 69 ¶K. 5 FAH-6 H550 ¶L. 12 FAH-6 H-536.5-1 Classified By: McCrane, David J SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Post requests a temporary waiver to begin 24-hour unattended operations for classified communications. Post needs to have all message traffic available at the beginning of the business day in order to operate efficiently in response to Washington taskings. We cannot do that now without incurring significant overtime costs. A temporary waiver until planned OBO renovations bring the Embassy up to standards will empower post to respond to Washington requirements without jeopardizing classified information in this low security-threat post. Failure to provide the waiver would jeopardize our ability to maintain workflow and risk damaging hardware not designed to be dismantled and locked up on a daily basis. RSO, IM and EXEC concur with this waiver request and seek a decision soonest. End summary. THE PROBLEM -------------- ¶2. (S) Vilnius is an active mission with a heavy multilateral and bilateral agenda that reflects our excellent relationship with Lithuania. To respond to Washington requirements in a timely manner, post needs to have all incoming traffic in our inboxes by 0830 in time to arrange priorities for the day (Ref A). Post cannot do that now without incurring substantial overtime costs. Ref B authorized 24-hour unattended operations for all posts meeting certain criteria. Post has everything needed to go to unattended ops as required in Ref B except a vault door. Ref C memo recognizes this deficiency and provides a waiver for routine operations. We now want to extend the Ref C waiver to include unattended ops for the temporary period until renovations planned by OBO will eliminate the physical security deficiency. Without the waiver, IMO will be compelled to remove 30 hard drives and lock them in a safe. This would add additional demands on his time, and would jeopardize this sensitive equipment, which is not designed to be moved routinely. ¶3. (S) Post tried to solve this problem on our own by submitting a plan to provide physical security as prescribed by DS guidelines. Our plan, which focused on the purchase of two safes, was approved in October 2005, but we now find that the waiting time to order and ship the required safes is about one year. Although we attempted to find a solution, the net effect has been that our operations will still be hamstrung. Moreover, this stopgap measure will require us to spend approximately 100,000 USD on two safes that would not arrive until shortly before our Chancery renovation is scheduled to begin in 2007. ¶4. (S) No security threats that would jeopardize 24-hour unattended operations have arisen in the years since DS granted the Ref C waiver. Additionally, OBO has plans for a chancery renovation that, when completed, would eliminate the need for a waiver. The track record of the past thirteen years supports the extension of the Ref C waiver to cover unattended operations as well as standard operations. SOLUTION -------------- ¶5. (SBU) All interested Mission elements, including the RSO, MGT, IM, and the Front Office, support a waiver for Post to move to 24-hour unattended operations for the following reasons: -- OBO's planned chancery renovation project will solve the physical security issues; -- the physical threat level is low (Ref E); -- DS waived the physical security requirements for Post (Ref C); -- the PCC has operated for 13 years without a physical security incident; and -- post's technical protections conform to standards. ¶6. (S) Post requests that DS grant a waiver allowing the Vilnius PCC to go to 24-hour unattended operations until chancery renovations eliminate the need for the waiver. MULL