GOL SUPPORTS USG POLICY ON BELARUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 001161 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NB AND EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015 TAGS: KDEM PREL PHUM EAID PGOV BO UP LH SUBJECT: GOL SUPPORTS USG POLICY ON BELARUS REF: A. SECSTATE 188900 ¶B. VILNIUS 1076 Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Alexander Titolo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The GOL is refocusing its efforts to promote democracy in Belarus after fielding criticism from the USG and EU for overstepping the bounds of the agreed non-engagement policy. GOL foreign policy decision-makers admit that the Prime Minister's October 4 meeting with Belarusian PM Sergey Sidorski was ill advised. Insisting on the utility of maintaining a line of communication with Lukashenko, MFA Undersecretary Albinas Januska told the Ambassador that neither Lithuania nor any other EU member is positioned to do so. Januska pointed to Ukrainian President Yushchenko as best suited to be the West's messenger to Lukashenko. The GOL believes that signs of increasing paranoia from the Minsk regime argue in favor of engaging Belarusian Minister-level officials who may be able to play a role in pushing Lukashenko from power. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador delivered ref A points on USG policy on Belarus to MFA Undersecretary Albinas Januska, October 26. Januska, the MFA's leading voice and likely author of the GOL's Belarus policy, agreed with the outlines of the U.S.-proposed strategy. Januska said that he expects the EU to approve the idea of a one-time outreach to Lukashenko, provided the right interlocutor delivers the message. He suggested Yushchenko as an appropriate messenger, remarking that a Yushchenko-Lukashenko meeting would not violate the EU policy barring high-level contacts. ¶3. (C) Januska pushed for the USG to consider approaching high-level Belarusian officials in a "quiet, well controlled manner that had the approval of allies." Januska said that the GOL sees signs of increasing paranoia in the Minsk regime, pointing as an example to Lukashenko's refusal to allow Belarusian officials to meet in Vilnius with EU representatives. He suggested that this paranoia reflects Lukashenko's weakening control, or at least indicates an opportunity to further isolate him by influencing those closest to him. Januska conceded that PM Brazauskas's meeting with Belarusian PM Sidorski (ref B) was not an example of a best practice, and might put Sidorski, whom some here think a viable alternative to Lukashenko, at risk. As �A;in previous conversations with us (ref B),Januska cited Belarusian Foreign Minister Martynov as someone the Lithuanians might reasonably approach. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked Januska about the utility of military-to-military contacts. Januska said that Lithuania had avoided mil-mil cooperation while Vladimir Uschopcik was the Belarusian Vice Minister of Defense. (Uschopcik is under indictment in Lithuania for his role in the 1991 Soviet crackdown on independence advocates.) With Uschopcik out of government, mil-mil cooperation now seems a very good idea. He suggested, however, that Poland may be better positioned to carry out this type of cooperation. Januska also noted that Lithuania's embassy in Minsk has received few requests for information in its role as NATO Contact Embassy. ¶5. (C) Januska asked that the USG consider including in the message to the GOR (ref A) a statement to the effect that Russian interference in Belarus is unacceptable. He also raised Lithuanian concerns that the long-discussed potential merger of Belarus with Russia is moving forward, asserting that the joint commission established to prepare for this was close to finalizing several agreements. Januska stated that the GOL would view such a merger as a Russian annexation of Belarus, coming as it would by fiat rather than as a result of a democratic process. ¶6. (C) Januska told the Ambassador that the GOL will support daily TV broadcasts on the Lithuanian state satellite channel of 30-minutes of news programming focused on Belarus (in Russian with Belarusian subtitles). He raised the need to identify approximately five journalists to contribute material, and said the GOL may need some technical support in implementing this project. He asked the Ambassador to consider possible USG assistance for this project. ¶7. (C) Comment: Chastened GOL policymakers indicate they will cease to propose their own meetings with Lukashenko or his PM. They will, nonetheless, still actively seek opportunities to promote democracy in Belarus. Some among Lithuania's leaders hope that Adamkus or Brazauskas will someday mediate a potential crisis in Belarus, the way Adamkus played a role during Ukraine's Orange Revolution, if elections or other events shake Lukashenko's hold. While they entertain many dire scenarios, including the realization of the seemingly unlikely merger of Belarus and Russia, we expect the Lithuanians will be better team players in the future. They will urge the USG and EU to push the limits on engagement with Belarus, but likely not stray (too far) over the line on their own. MULL