PRT ROADMAP: FROM LITHUANIA TO AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VILNIUS 000103 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NB (MGERMANO),EUR/PM, AND EUR/RPM (WANDERSON) NSC FOR DFRIED E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014 TAGS: MOPS MCAP PGOV PREL LH SUBJECT: PRT ROADMAP: FROM LITHUANIA TO AFGHANISTAN REF: A. VILNIUS 60 ¶B. VILNIUS 13 ¶C. VILNIUS 5 Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER TREVOR BOYD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In order to build upon our diplomatic success securing Lithuanian leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan, the USG should now move quickly to formalize plans to provide tangible deliverables to the GOL. Lithuania is urgently seeking Washington commitments to provide strategic airlift (including for a mid-February reconnaissance mission to the region),special equipment and ammunition, supplemental funding, development experts and funds, pre-deployment training in information operations and civil-military cooperation, and intelligence support. We strongly encourage allocating significant funding from planned new coalition support funds to cover the up to USD 10 million cost of start-up, sustainment and anticipated equipment needs for the PRT. The GOL has requested USG assistance in approaching third countries for contributions to the PRT. On location, senior Lithuanian officials have stressed their strong preference for assuming the PRT mission in Badghis, fearing deployment to the alternate Chagcharan would stretch their modest resources to the breaking point. This small, staunch ally deserves our support for once again responding to our call for action. We should move quickly and decisively to help them help us. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Senior leaders at the MFA and MOD have recently reconfirmed to the Ambassador Lithuania's intention to contribute to the effort to expand the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan (ref A and B). Interlocutors underscore, however, that the government will need considerable assistance to make good its conditional offer to establish a PRT. For its part, the GOL has allocated 12 million Litas (USD 4.62 million) from the Ministry of Defense budget to cover the salaries and expenses of 70 troops to deploy to Afghanistan in support of a PRT. Although precise assistance requirements will have to wait until parties determine the location and mission of the Lithuanian-led PRT, the GOL has preliminarily identified certain technical, financial, and diplomatic support needs the USG might undertake to fill. -------------- --- Lithuania's PRT Locale: Badghis or Chaghcharan? -------------- --- ¶3. (C) The MFA has underscored that Lithuania premised its political decision to establish and lead a PRT in Afghanistan on the assumption that it would be in Badghis. This assumption also informed GOL estimates of the set-up and sustainment costs of the PRT (costing roughly up to USD 10 million). The advantages of the province's size and proximity to the Italian Forward Support Base in Herat weighed heavily into the GOL's decision. Badghis simply appears a good fit for Lithuania's available resources and capabilities. ¶4. (C) Responding to NATO's recent encouragement to locate the PRT in the larger, more remote, mountainous province of Chaghcaharan, MFA Undersecretary Dalius Cekuolis told Ambassador Mull that the GOL had serious reservations about its ability to lead a mission "on the far side of the moon." Director of the MFA's Security Policy Department Kestutis Jankauskas noted that Lithuania has not entirely ruled out the option, but will need to reevaluate the situation, if NATO resolves that Lithuania should set up in Chaghcharan. Jankauskas observed that, given the greater size and greater logistical challenges involved in establishing a PRT in Chaghcharan, however, would expect significantly more USG and NATO assistance (including human resources) to establish and sustain the mission there. -------------- Key Assistance Requirements -------------- ¶5. (C) Following consultations at the highest levels with Lithuania's MFA and MOD, we have identified several significant areas of assistance which will require NATO and USG diplomatic, development, defense and intelligence agency support. ¶A. February Reconnaissance Visit to Afghanistan -------------- -- Most pressing is USG support, including airlift and security assistance, for a GOL reconnaissance mission to the region during the second half of February. The GOL plans for a team of ten specialists to travel to Afghanistan's Herat, Badghis and possibly Chaghcharan provinces in mid-February. The visit will allow Lithuania to expand the knowledge they gained during a U.K.-sponsored trip to western Afghanistan in early January, to better develop their plans for the PRT and clarify their assistance needs. ¶B. Strategic Lift -------------- Lithuania possesses no national strategic lift assets. Lithuania's deployment would require Secretary of Defense approval for EUCOM or CENTCOM lift assets to provide transport not only to the theater from Lithuania's Zokniai airfield, but also tactical lift within Afghanistan, predictably between the PRT, Kabul, and Herat. In addition to the February mission, strategic lift assets will need to transport personal equipment and transportation assets for up to 70 personnel. ¶C. Pre-Deployment Training Package -------------- Lithuania seeks a robust pre-deployment training package in information operations (PSYOPS and HUMINT) and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). While the GOL may be able to look within, to its SOF forces, for general information about the theater, Lithuania will need to augment its rudimentary internal capabilities with training from EUCOM, CENTCOM, AFSOC, and the U.S. intelligence community. Lithuanian planners are hungry for tactical intelligence, and briefings by DOD mobile training teams or the USG intelligence community would be extremely useful in assisting Lithuania's planning. Clearly a priority for the GOL, Lithuania has already approached SHAPE and the U.K. for training support. ¶D. Equipment -------------- Lithuania needs the equipment necessary to complete its mission. We understand that two requests (one for night vision devices (NVDs),the other for PRC-117 radios and Communication Security Devices) have stalled in the approval pipeline. In light of EUCOM's endorsement of Lithuania's request for the radios and in order to avoid a two-tiered NATO that denial of the NVDs might create (ref C),we would appreciate NSA and OSD's expeditious and favorable resolution of these issues. Denying Lithuania this equipment will limit the effectiveness of its deployment, restrict the interoperability of Lithuanian forces with other NATO allies in theater. It would also discount Lithuania's stellar track record of controlling its stock of sensitive USG provided equipment. MOD have compiled the following preliminary list of necessary equipment: eight high mobility military jeeps, two armored transporters, one tactical ambulance, a 180 kw electric power station, one set of water supply equipment, two freezer containers, one set of kitchen equipment (kitchen and canteen),and one set of security equipment (video cameras, sensors, etc.). Though the MOD will likely be able to reallocate much of this equipment from its own stores, the USG or NATO will need to provide lift assets to transport the material to Afghanistan and assistance to acquire material in theater. (Note: This list presumes delivery of 24 HMMWV's, including three tactical HMMWV ambulances through the FMF program in mid-February. End note.) ¶E. State Department or USAID Development Assistance -------------- -------------- In order to address a serious concern and shortcoming within the GOL's own capabilities, SA/A will need to authorize placing a USAID and/or State Department employee with access to USAID development funds at the Lithuanian-led PRT. The GOL will seek assurances that this USG representative will come without a predetermined development agenda, ready, instead, work with the PRT to respond to the priorities of the local government. ¶F. Supplemental Funds for Coalition Support -------------- -------------- We want to register an early plea at the beginning of the budgeting process of the supplemental funds the President seeks to support Coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan. We request that White House and Department of Defense planners set aside up to USD 10 million (above lift costs) to cover anticipated set up, sustainment, and equipment needs for the Lithuanian-led PRT. In order to expedite Lithuania's deployment, unlike FMF or IMET monies, the GOL should be able to spend these funds unconditionally on the mission. ¶G. Intelligence Support -------------- Given the dearth of intelligence on the region available to GOL planners, Joint Staff and the intelligence community will need to provide the PRT with technical support such as geospatial imagery, geothermal imagery and local contracting information. The DOD or intelligence community will need to share the findings of any land survey teams in the PRT site. ¶H. Diplomatic Support -------------- The GOL has requested USG diplomatic support in approaching third countries for contributions to the PRT mission. Lithuania, in addition to approaching the U.K. for pre-deployment training, has begun discussions with Denmark about troop support. One scenario they are entertaining would have Lithuania consolidate its personnel in Iraq, moving the 49 troops currently under Polish command to the Danish contingent in Basrah, thereby freeing the Danes to send 49 troops to the PRT. (Note: Lithuania might subsequently increase its cooperation with Polish forces in Kosovo. End note.) In addition to reaching out to the U.K. and Denmark, we recommend launching U.S. diplomatic overtures to Lithuania's Nordic-Baltic neighbors, and perhaps more widely within the NATO alliance, for manpower and material support. (Note: By law, Lithuania may have no more than 70 personnel in the Afghanistan region). Lithuania may also seek USG assistance in helping it re-establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Lithuania notified the Government of Afghanistan by a diplomatic note dated November 25, 2004 that it sought to re-establish diplomatic relations pursuant to the original 1930 bilateral agreement. Lithuania suggested an exchange of notes acknowledging this agreement and renewing relations through the GOA's diplomatic representatives in Warsaw. The GOA has not yet replied to this overture. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Responding to NATO and USG encouragement, Lithuania has once again stepped to the front of the line to offer enormous assistance to meet strategic and political goals far from home. They can only do so, however, within the limits of their scant resources. Having provided the GOL assurances of USG diplomatic assistance and contributions to airlift and development assistance prior to the announcement of their decision to lead the PRT, we should now move quickly to formalize plans. We understand that for political reasons, among others, the GOL would like to have boots on the ground in Badghis by September. (Note: The parliamentary authorization for deployments to Afghanistan expires at yearend.) It is likely that the degree to which a Lithuanian-led PRT is successful will depend as much upon USG and NATO responsiveness as Lithuanian leadership. MULL