DEMARCHE TO AUSTRIA ON U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 003463

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STATE FOR ISN AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015

TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IN AU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO AUSTRIA ON U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE


CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR

SUPPLIERS GROUP

REF: STATE 190856

Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips. Reaso

n: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) EconPolCouns delivered reftel demarche to Dorothea

Auer, Austrian MFA Director (assistant secretary) for

Non-Proliferation, and Alexander Kmennt, Auer's DAS-level

assistant for nuclear non-proliferation, on October 25.


2. (C) Auer and Kmennt were grateful for the detailed

description of U.S. policy toward India's nuclear program

which we presented. Kmennt said he had attended AA/S

Rademaker's presentation as well.


3. (C) Kmennt said Austria remained concerned about the

consequences of the U.S. initiative for the Non-Proliferation

Treaty. We stressed that our policy would move India closer

to our non-proliferation goals, and both Auer and Kmennt

readily agreed that this would be a desireable outcome, if

workable.


4. (C) Auer and Kmennt said one of the overriding questions

for Austria and, as far as they could tell through their

contacts, for other NPT states was the question of why the

U.S. pursueed and concluded the arrangements with India so

secretly. The current policy initiative was in contradiction

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with the outcomes of the 1995 anbd 2000 NPT review

conferences, if we were now saying that making decisions by

consensus did not matter. We said this was not our position.


5. (C) Kmennt noted that China was "very quiet" at the

moment. However, there was a good deal of speculation that

the U.S. was hoping to elevate India to the status of

strategic counterweight to China. In this connection, Kmennt

asked, how would we answer a Chinese initiative to create an

"exception" for Pakistan? We pointed out that the U.S.-India

agreement was not about weapons, but about energy, and had no

relevance to the strategic balance in Asia. As concerns

Pakistan, we said each country deserved unique treatment.

The Indian "exception" would remain one if the international

community kept it as such.


6. (C) Auer and Kmennt expressed doubt about our ability to

separate the military and civilian sides of India's nuclear

program. We noted that the agreement with India includes

safeguards, and we would work to implement them as part of

the agreement.


7. (C) Kmennt asked about the sequencing of the commitments

in the agreement, pointing out that India would deliver on

its obligations only after the U.S. and the international

community had done several important steps. What would

prevent India from reneging on its agreement after taking

what it could? We said both sides had taken the negotiations

seriously, and we concluded the agreement in the expectation

that the Indians would deliver on their promises.


8. (C) Auer and Kmennt thanked us for our presentation.

They said the topic would occupy Austria during its EU

Presidency in January-June 2006, and they asked that we

remain in contact on progress on implementation of the

agreement. This would also be a topic for Troika meetings in

the course of the Austrian presidency.

van Voorst