Austrian Response to DHS letter on VWP

UNCLAS VIENNA 003321

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO, and EUR/AGS

DHS FOR MNEIFACH

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: CVIS CMGT PREL AU
SUBJECT: Austrian Response to DHS letter on VWP


certification based on Personal Identity Card

REF: A) STATE 183690 B) VIENNA 2646


1. Per Reftel A, Post transmitted the text of DHS'

certification letter response to the Austrian central

VWP contact, Heinrich Pawlicek. Pawlicek, who had

meanwhile obtained an electronic copy of the signed

original, was eager to point out that the problems in

reading the ID card are a result of an intentionally-

introduced error used only in sample cards to prevent

their misuse. For DHS to test the readability of

genuine cards, the Ministry of Interior is now

providing a new batch of ID cards for DHS testing.

These new cards should be readable by DHS readers. We

understand that the cards will be mailed directly to

Martin Kraemer, Consul General at the Austrian Embassy

in Washington. The text of the Austrian response

follows.


2. Begin text:(informal Embassy translation)

During the [September 23] Visa Waiver Program

conference in Washington, D.C., representatives of DHS

and DOS were presented with a possible solution in the

case of Austria, whereby national identity cards might

be used to sufficiently compliment Austrian passports

issued on or after Oct. 26, 2005. In particular, it

was noted that the Austrian personal identity cards are

recognized among the most secure documents in the world

due to the state-of-the-art technology employed in

their design. Also, in the course of the conversation,

sample identity cards that met the exact technical

standards required by DHS were passed along to U.S.

officials. DHS representative, Mr. Brad Wing, offered

his individual thanks after the conversation for the

suggestion of an outstanding solution.

The Austrian personal identity cards that were handed

over to DHS officials are samples - and only samples -

of such cards, which is signified on the cards in

writing by the word "Specimen." Each card includes an

ICAO-compliant, machine-readable zone; the zone is,

however, deliberately tagged with an error number to

render the cards invalid and thereby prevent their

illegal use. Therefore, when scanned, the sample cards

will register as unreadable. This feature is

absolutely necessary to prevent misuse since government

officials of foreign countries who do not speak German

cannot be expected to realize that the name

"Musterfrau," printed on the card, translates as

"sample woman," and is not in fact someone's actual

name. Were a person of passable likeness to acquire

the sample card and travel onward to one of the 29 non-

German speaking countries where this card is recognized

for identity purposes, this security feature ensures he

or she will be stopped. This practice is commonplace

among manufacturers of sample documents throughout

Europe.

The sample cards that were provided should thus have

been readable but the DHS readers would likely have

recognized the intentionally-introduced error number

and have produced an error message.

To address the problem, we will now produce and

directly deliver from the Austrian printing office to

the US Consulate new sample cards that do not contain

this error number. From a security standpoint, these

are not "sample" cards, but the "real deal," and as

such, we would like to express our concern for their

safety and ask that they be kept under lock and key.

I would like to kindly request that these comments

along with the newly submitted cards be passed along to

DHS representative, Mr. Brad Wing, Biometrics

Coordinator, US-VISIT, Border and Transportation

Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and

that under his supervision, the new cards be tested.

End text.

VAN VOORST