U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: AUSTRIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002663

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA/RA, SA/INS, NP, EB/ESC/IEC, EUR/PGI AND

EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2015

TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP PARM PREL
SUBJECT: U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: AUSTRIAN

RESPONSE

REF: STATE 133163

Classified By: ACTING ECON/POL COUNSELOR MICHAEL DE TAR

REASONS: 1.4 (B),(D) AND (F)


1. (C) Following receipt of reftel (and a specific MFA

request for a briefing),Acting Econ/Pol Couns met with MFA

Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Alexander Kmentt to discuss U.S-India Civil Nuclear

Cooperation. Kmentt said he had been studying the initiative

intensively since release of the joint statement by President

Bush and Prime Minister Singh. Kmentt emphasized that

Austria would review the initiative carefully. The

implications were far-reaching ("a tectonic shift"). Austria

was seeking clarifications about some aspects of the

agreement, and wanted to share concerns about possible

political ramifications.


2. (C) Kmentt volunteered that India had been responsible

about not acting as a proliferator, clear about its view that

the NPT was "discriminatory" -- and "fairly transparent"

about its intentions. Technically, the distinction between

Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States

(NNWS) only applied to states parties to the NPT. Still,

opponents of the cooperation initiative would argue that it

amounted to de facto recognition of India as a NWS. On the

other hand, Kmentt said, one had to be pragmatic - this was

just acknowledging reality.


3. (C) Kmentt voiced concern that countries of concern -

specifically, Iran and North Korea - would seek propaganda

advantage from the U.S.-India initiative. They would assert

that the NPT was inherently unfair, and then allege that the

U.S. was applying a double standard, he feared.


4. (C) Kmentt raised further questions and concerns in the

following areas:

-- Additional Protocol (AP): What kind of AP was under

consideration, Kmentt asked? Clearly, it would have to be

limited, he thought, rather than based on the model AP for

non-nuclear weapons states.

-- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): The current guidelines for

the NSG would not permit exports of nuclear technology and

materials to India, Kmentt noted, and so would have to

change. He was concerned that China, a member of the NSG,

might then seek some special status for Pakistan as well.

There would have to be a debate within the NSG, which could

begin at the Consultative Group meetings in October.

-- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Kmentt asked

whether the U.S. would also raise the subject of the

initiative at the September MTCR plenary?

-- Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT): Kmentt was

intrigued by the commitment of the U.S. and India to support

conclusion of an FMCT. Did this represent a shift in the

U.S. position that such a treaty was inherently unverifiable,

he wondered? Austria thought an FMCT could be verified, he

said, and believed that the absence of verification

mechanisms would seriously diminish the value of such a

treaty.

-- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): If India was willing

to continue its unilateral moratorium on testing, Kmentt

asked, would it go the extra mile and ratify the CTBT? This

would be the logical next step, he said.


5. (C) Kmentt that that even if there was no consensus

within the NSG and other fora for countries with advanced

technologies, "market forces" would encourage others, such as

France, to follow the U.S. lead. Kmentt also noted that the

EU Nonproliferation Working Group (CONOP) would debate the

issue, but was not sure that EU could find a consensus on how

to address it.

van Voorst