U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: AUSTRIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002663 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA/RA, SA/INS, NP, EB/ESC/IEC, EUR/PGI AND EUR/AGS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2015 TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP PARM PREL SUBJECT: U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE REF: STATE 133163 Classified By: ACTING ECON/POL COUNSELOR MICHAEL DE TAR REASONS: 1.4 (B),(D) AND (F) ¶1. (C) Following receipt of reftel (and a specific MFA request for a briefing),Acting Econ/Pol Couns met with MFA Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Alexander Kmentt to discuss U.S-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation. Kmentt said he had been studying the initiative intensively since release of the joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. Kmentt emphasized that Austria would review the initiative carefully. The implications were far-reaching ("a tectonic shift"). Austria was seeking clarifications about some aspects of the agreement, and wanted to share concerns about possible political ramifications. ¶2. (C) Kmentt volunteered that India had been responsible about not acting as a proliferator, clear about its view that the NPT was "discriminatory" -- and "fairly transparent" about its intentions. Technically, the distinction between Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) only applied to states parties to the NPT. Still, opponents of the cooperation initiative would argue that it amounted to de facto recognition of India as a NWS. On the other hand, Kmentt said, one had to be pragmatic - this was just acknowledging reality. ¶3. (C) Kmentt voiced concern that countries of concern - specifically, Iran and North Korea - would seek propaganda advantage from the U.S.-India initiative. They would assert that the NPT was inherently unfair, and then allege that the U.S. was applying a double standard, he feared. ¶4. (C) Kmentt raised further questions and concerns in the following areas: -- Additional Protocol (AP): What kind of AP was under consideration, Kmentt asked? Clearly, it would have to be limited, he thought, rather than based on the model AP for non-nuclear weapons states. -- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): The current guidelines for the NSG would not permit exports of nuclear technology and materials to India, Kmentt noted, and so would have to change. He was concerned that China, a member of the NSG, might then seek some special status for Pakistan as well. There would have to be a debate within the NSG, which could begin at the Consultative Group meetings in October. -- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Kmentt asked whether the U.S. would also raise the subject of the initiative at the September MTCR plenary? -- Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT): Kmentt was intrigued by the commitment of the U.S. and India to support conclusion of an FMCT. Did this represent a shift in the U.S. position that such a treaty was inherently unverifiable, he wondered? Austria thought an FMCT could be verified, he said, and believed that the absence of verification mechanisms would seriously diminish the value of such a treaty. -- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): If India was willing to continue its unilateral moratorium on testing, Kmentt asked, would it go the extra mile and ratify the CTBT? This would be the logical next step, he said. ¶5. (C) Kmentt that that even if there was no consensus within the NSG and other fora for countries with advanced technologies, "market forces" would encourage others, such as France, to follow the U.S. lead. Kmentt also noted that the EU Nonproliferation Working Group (CONOP) would debate the issue, but was not sure that EU could find a consensus on how to address it. van Voorst