Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05VANCOUVER1614
2005-12-22 00:26:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Consulate Vancouver
Cable title:  

CSI VANCOUVER: RUNNING SMOOTHLY WITH CANADA'S FULL SUPPORT

Tags:  CA KCIP SNAR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS VANCOUVER 001614 

SIPDIS

WHA/CAN; WHA/FO; INL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CA KCIP SNAR
SUBJECT: CSI VANCOUVER: RUNNING SMOOTHLY WITH CANADA'S FULL SUPPORT


UNCLAS VANCOUVER 001614

SIPDIS

WHA/CAN; WHA/FO; INL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CA KCIP SNAR
SUBJECT: CSI VANCOUVER: RUNNING SMOOTHLY WITH CANADA'S FULL SUPPORT



1. (U) The Port of Vancouver was one of the US Department of
Homeland Security's original Container Security Initiative ports
in 2002. US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officials explained
that out of 10,000 or so shipments that come into the port per
month, only about 2 to 3 percent are stopped for additional
security checks by CSI and Canadian officials. The system is
working smoothly with Canada's full cooperation. Interestingly,
most of the shipments coming to Vancouver's ports are from Asian
ports where other CSI operations already exist. Therefore, these
US bound shipments have already been checked at their origin and
are essentially being checked twice by US Customs and Border
officials. CBP officials in Vancouver do not view this as
duplicative, but rather, they see it as a valuable tool that
keeps the supply chain to US destinations more secure in an
international shipping environment mired in high volume and
complex bureaucracy.


2. (U) CSI is established at 40 ports worldwide and its original
intent was to intercept potential weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) from entering the US from foreign origins. So far, no
known WMD have been detected through CSI but CBP officials
believe that CSI is a deterrent for these weapons.
Additionally, CBP has successfully interdicted IPR violators,
chemical precursors, drugs, and illegal cigarettes from
Vancouver's ports.


3. (U) There are only two CBP officials managing CSI from
Vancouver, both on long term TDY status. They told us that they
check containers based mostly on anomalies found in Bills of
Lading or erroneous manifests received from freight forwarders.
The paperwork for containers is complicated. For example, one
Bill of Lading could have 15 containers attached to it, whereas
sometimes one container could have several Bills of Lading
associated with it. Therefore, working closely with CBP
counterparts at other CSI ports as well as with Canadian
officials becomes paramount for determining anomalies. If they
determine that a container warrants further inspection, they can
decide to x-ray it or to "strip" the container entirely. CSI
shares a warehouse facility in Burnaby (a suburb of Vancouver)
with Canadian officials for these purposes. When US bound
containers are shipped to Vancouver, they either: 1) remain on
board and are moved to the US by ship, or 2) are loaded onto
trucks or trains for US destinations.


4. (U) Other useful security and time-saving tools available to
US officials are the "24 hour rule" which requires that
manifests arrive 24 hours before the containers, allowing
inspection officials to review the content and amount beforehand
and then match that information with the size and number of
containers that follow 24 hours later. CTPAT is a program where
freight forwarding companies can apply to become "trusted
travelers" similar to how NEXUS Land or Air work.

LUKENS