NATO MOVES FORWARD WITH LANDMARK BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T USNATO 000003





STATE FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, NP/PPC, AC/DS

OSD/ISP FOR SCHLESS, ROSE

OSD/MDA FOR KIEFER, SEARSE

NSC FOR VOLKER, DICASAGRANDE



E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014

TAGS: NATO, KNNP, PARM, MNUC

SUBJECT: NATO MOVES FORWARD WITH LANDMARK BALLISTIC MISSILE

THREAT ASSESSMENT



REF: C-M(2004)109



Classified By: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)



1. (S) Summary: During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of

the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the

completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile

Risks and Threats. The fruit of more than 18 months of

negotiations, the Analysis fulfills in part a 2002 Prague

Summit tasking to examine options for addressing ballistic

missile threats to the Alliance. At 180 pages, it provides

the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and ballistic

missile (BM) proliferation trends the Alliance has ever

produced. Among the document's key findings are that some

countries currently have the capability to launch a ballistic

missile attack on NATO's southeastern flank and U.S. forces

in the Pacific, and that the risk of a ballistic missile

attack on any Alliance territory, population centers or NATO

forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade

to come. The Analysis contains unprecedented consensus

positions on the intentions, capabilities and proliferation

record of Iran, Syria and North Korea as well as Russia and

China. It also addresses the contributions of

non-proliferation instruments, including new approaches such

as PSI and UNSCR 1540, as well as the implications of the

A.Q. Khan network.



2. (C) Combined with two major feasibility studies and

ongoing technical consultations, the Analysis provides NATO

with the political consensus and general assessment necessary

to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the

acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against the

full range of ballistic missile threats. In this context,

USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Community's strong

support for the Analysis's development, will continue to

request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and

welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to

brief Allies in the Senior Politico-Military Group on

Proliferation (SGP) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on

WMD and BM proliferation-related topics. End Summary.



Context of the Longer-Term Analysis

--------------



3. (U) While NATO has yet to make a definitive decision on

missile defense for populations and territories, NATO's

Strategic Concept notes that NATO's posture against the

proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery "must

continue to improve, including through work on missile

defense." At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and

Government agreed "to examine options for addressing the

increasing missile threat to NATO territory, forces and

population centers in an effective and efficient way through

an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along

with deterrence" as well as to initiate a Theater Missile

Defense (TMD) Feasibility Study.



4. (C) This TMD feasibility study, which focuses on the

technical requirements, costs, and time scale of possible

architectures for an Active-Layered Theater Ballistic Missile

Defense (ALTBMD) system to protect NATO deployed forces, was

completed in 2003. In January 2004, a second Missile Defense

Feasibility Study was contracted to examine options for

protecting Alliance territory and population centers. Upon

its scheduled completion in July 2005, this study will be

submitted to the Conference of National Armaments Directors,

which will review and approve a consolidated report in late

2005. This report in turn will be forwarded to the Executive

Working Group (Reinforced) (EWG(R)),NATO's primary forum for

missile defense consultations.



5. (C) During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the

North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the

completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile

Risks and Threats (reftel),which fulfilled another 2002

Prague Summit tasking to assess current and potential WMD and

ballistic missile threats to the Alliance over the next ten

years. The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations,

this 180-page Analysis contains unprecedented consensus

positions on key countries of proliferation concern and

provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and BM

risks and threats the Alliance has ever produced.



6. (S) The Analysis is divided into five chapters, which

address non-proliferation regimes and national measures;

capabilities and intentions; alternative means of delivery;

secondary proliferation and procurement networks; and





intelligence gaps. As a whole, it clearly demonstrates that

NATO already faces certain risks and potential threats, and

that the Alliance must continue to closely monitor the

intentions and capabilities of countries of proliferation

concern.



7. (C) Combined with the EWG(R)'s ongoing work and the two

Missile Defense Feasibility Studies, the Analysis provides

NATO with the political consensus and general assessment

necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the

acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against

ballistic missile threats. This includes the goal of

achieving initial operational capability for an ALTBMD system

to protect NATO deployed forces by 2010 as well as possible

steps toward acquiring capabilities to protect Alliance

territory and population centers against the full range of BM

threats.



Key Findings of the Longer-Term Analysis

--------------



8. (S) The risk of a ballistic missile attack on any

Alliance territory, population centers, or NATO deployed

forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade

to come. Iran and Syria have ballistic missiles that can

reach parts of NATO territory and deployed forces, and they

have chemical weapons (CW) for use as warheads. Concerns

over Russian and Chinese BM capabilities are currently

primarily limited to the potential for accidental or

unauthorized launches, and the risk that their technology

will proliferate to unstable countries.



9. (S) Current and future assessments of BM capabilities

must take into account scenarios where components

indigenously developed or acquired from abroad are integrated

into existing missile programs to improve accuracy and

operational readiness. Countries developing BMs may not

necessarily follow U.S. or Russian patterns of development or

deployment. North Korea began fielding and selling the No

Dong after a single flight test, and countries today may rely

in part on computer modeling or other means aside from easily

observable test launches to keep their development programs

covert.



10. (S) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are not widely

recognized as an immediate threat to the Alliance, but an

indirect risk to NATO deployed forces is possible. In the

future, there will be an increased risk that UAVs could be

converted to carry and dispense CW and biological weapons

(BW). The willingness of some states and illegal entities to

transfer UAV or cruise missile (CM) components, peripheral

equipment or technology is increasing and requires effective

counter-proliferation measures to reduce their availability.

There is currently no disarmament or non-proliferation

agreement that restrains the production, development or

possession of UAVs and CMs.



11. (S) Possession of WMD and their means of delivery has

become a major goal for both state and non-state actors for

reasons of prestige, influence or deterrence. Proliferating

states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated

measures to obtain WMD- or BM-related equipment, materials

and technologies. Some countries that were proliferation

customers in the 1980s have themselves become suppliers. The

development of indigenous capabilities in relevant dual-use

applications such as nuclear power, biotechnology and space

launch systems can help to conceal ultimate intentions.

North Korea and Iran as well as Russian and Chinese entities

are likely to remain the major suppliers of WMD- and

BM-related equipment, materials and expertise. The

identification, monitoring, and eventual dismantlement of the

A.Q. Khan network show that there is a complicated worldwide

marketplace for these inputs.



12. (C) Although arms control agreements and

non-proliferation regimes will continue to slow the

proliferation of WMD and BMs, the capability of both

suppliers and proliferants are likely to improve. The

adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is the

strongest affirmation of the international community's

support for multilateral treaties and other international

instruments that seek to prevent WMD proliferation.

Traditional diplomatic measures are enhanced by new tools

such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and Operation

Active Endeavour, which serve to complement and strengthen

international norms and mechanisms.





Select Country-Specific Conclusions

--------------



North Korea:



13. (S) Recent developments in North Korea seem to indicate

ambitions to use WMD combined with BMs not only as a

deterrent but also as a political bargaining chip and a means

of blackmail to obtain economic or financial aid. Various

sources place North Korea has having 10 to 30 kg of

weapons-grade plutonium, and while North Korea claims to have

a nuclear deterrent, there is uncertainty as to whether it

currently has operational nuclear weapons for military use.

It is possible that North Korea would use WMD and BMs if it

felt that the survival of the regime was at stake.



14. (S) Pyongyang is reportedly developing a new land-mobile

intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the

Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched BM; if confirmed, this

potential to use a more advanced propulsion technology would

be of serious concern. North Korea has continued with

development work and ground-based testing of the Taepo

Dong-2, which according to some Allies' experts with a third

stage could deliver a weapons payload of 500 kg up to 15,000

km--i.e., all of the United States and Europe, albeit with

very poor accuracy. U.S. forces in the Pacific are within

range of North Korean missiles, and it is cause for serious

concern that North Korea's willingness to proliferate

longer-range BM technology will hasten the risk to broad

expanses of NATO territory.



Iran:



15. (S) Iran continues to put a high priority on an

ambitious BM program focused on the development of both

liquid and solid propellant short-range BMs and medium-range

BMs with assistance from Russia, North Korea and China.

Tehran has announced its intention to put satellites into

orbit, which would establish the technical base to develop an

IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.

Iran already has BM capabilities that put the southeastern

flank of NATO within range, and within the next ten years, it

is likely to produce qualitative and quantitative changes to

its military capabilities that will significantly increase

the potential threat to the Alliance and NATO forces deployed

in the region.



16. (S) Concerns have been widely expressed over Iran's

nuclear program and its failures and breaches regarding its

Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA),and the IAEA cannot positively identify that

Iran's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

Should its nuclear program continue to proceed at the same

pace, Iran could produce sufficient fissile material for a

first nuclear device by 2010. Iran is assessed to have an

offensive BW program and has almost certainly conducted

BW-related research using spray devices and adapted munitions

for delivery. Despite its ratification of the Chemical

Weapons Convention (CWC),Iran is also assessed to be

retaining an offensive CW program and has the technological

capability to develop a CW warhead for use on BMs.



Syria:



17. (S) There is no evidence that Syria plans to attempt to

acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability, and it

currently lacks the resources, infrastructure and scientific

expertise to pursue one. Syria is judged to have a BW

program in the research and development phase, as well as an

advanced CW program that includes several facilities for

testing, production and storage of CW. Syria can produce

SCUD missile fuel and various solid propellant ingredients,

and continues to make progress in this area with probable

Chinese and Iranian assistance. It can deliver both sarin

and VX with aerial bombs, SCUD-Bs and possibly SCUD-Cs.

Qualitative and quantitative improvements in Syria's WMD and

BM capabilities over the next ten years will increase the

potential threat to NATO territory, notably the southeastern

flank of the Alliance.



China:



18. (S) China has a mature capability to develop and launch

BMs with nuclear warheads and is carrying out a strategic

modernization program to improve the quality of its arsenal,

including replacing liquid-fueled ICBMs with solid-fuel

systems and deploying more of its BMs on road-mobile





launchers. China is believed to have an advanced CW program

as well as an offensive BW capability, and its voluntary

declarations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete.

While China has the capability to pose a potential threat to

NATO territory or deployed forces, at present Beijing focuses

on a strategic posture that defends its regional influence in

Asia. The greatest concern regarding Chinese capabilities is

the risk of onward proliferation of technology and material

to other countries. In light of all these elements, NATO

must remain aware of developments in China.



Russia:



19. (S) While Moscow has no intention of executing military

operations against the Alliance, Russia has a mature arsenal

of BMs capable of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of

NATO territory. It is also modernizing its BMs at a measured

pace and is pursuing warhead refurbishment. While the

Cooperative Threat Reduction program will continue to improve

the security of non-deployed nuclear warheads, weapons-grade

fissile material will likely remain vulnerable to theft.

Russia's BW program, which is probably still offensive,

remains active and declarations to date have failed to reveal

the full size and scope of the Soviet program. Russia

possesses a number of unacknowledged CW agents and weapons,

and it cannot be entirely excluded that Russia could pursue

some non-compliant activity without detection. It has given

priority to the development of modern CW systems and agents

designed to defeat NATO protective systems and circumvent the

CWC. In light of its WMD and BM capabilities, NATO must

remain concerned about the potential threat from Russia.



Small Step for NATO MD, Giant Leap for SGP

--------------



20. (S) Comment: While the Longer-Term Analysis is but one

of many inputs into the equation that will determine how NATO

will face the spread of WMD and BM capabilities, it has also

succeeded in highlighting proliferation issues of key

importance to the U.S. Spirited and sometimes contentious

debate with Allies (especially France and Germany) over Iran,

North Korea, and China in the SGP has in the end produced a

broad and agreed foundation for continued engagement with

Allies on tough proliferation questions. In this context,

USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Community's strong

support for the Analysis's development, will continue to

request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and

welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to

brief Allies in the SGP and the NAC on WMD and BM

proliferation-related topics. While such briefings--and the

debates they provoke--may seem to parallel discussion in

other fora, it is essential that we raise these issues at

NATO Headquarters if the U.S. is to play a leadership role in

shaping Alliance policy, guiding the development of

collective capabilities, and considering operational

responses to curb and counter the proliferation of WMD and

their means of delivery. End Comment.

BURNS





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