C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001293

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2030
TAGS: PREL CH JA ASEAN
SUBJECT: MOFA CHINA DIVISION DIRECTOR ON JAPAN-CHINA
RELATIONS

REF: A. A) TOKYO 001166


B. B) 001208

Classified By: Political Section Deputy Carol Reynolds. Reasons:1.4(b/
d).


1. (C) Summary: MOFA China Division Director Izumi told
POL Deputy March 3 that Japan had strongly protested the
PRC's proposed anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan, citing
recent hopeful steps and the need for a peaceful resolution
of the cross-Strait issue as arguing against such
legislation. He urged U.S.-Japan coordination on the issue.
Izumi opined that President's Hu's inability to consolidate
his authority has made him vulnerable to hardliners on Taiwan
and Japan. Boosting Hu might redound to U.S. and Japanese
interests, as would strengthening ASEAN, he suggested. End
Summary.

PRC Anti-Secession Law
--------------


2. (C) During a March 3 meeting with POL Deputy, MOFA Asian
Affairs Bureau China Division Director Hiroyasu Izumi
expanded on GOJ February 22 and 23 discussions with visiting
State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu
(ref A). In discussing the proposed anti-secession
legislation with Sun, MOFA interlocutors made four basic
points. First, the proposed legislation would upset hopes
for following up recent positive steps in cross-Strait
relations, such as Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's
acceptance of "the results of the 1992 Hong Kong meeting,"
PRC President Hu Jintao's relatively mild language on Taiwan
in his New Year's speech, and the agreement on direct charter
flights during the Lunar New Year. With these small, but
important steps toward a cross-Strait dialogue, why would the
PRC risk roiling the cross-Strait waters with anti-secession
legislation? Second, MOFA laid down a marker that Taiwan
issues were of interest to Japan. While the PRC may view
Taiwan as a domestic matter, MOFA asserted that cross-Strait
relations have regional implications. Third, MOFA expressed
its strong concerns regarding the possibility that the text
of the anti-secession law would mention the use of force
against Taiwan. Japan strongly opposes the use of force to
settle cross-Strait matters. Fourth, MOFA called on the PRC

to establish as soon as possible a cross-Strait dialogue in
order to find a peaceful resolution to the cross-Strait
issue.


3. (C) Izumi commented that he did not know how the PRC
would take the GOJ assertions, but he felt that MOFA had sent
a clear message. He noted that LDP, DPJ and Komeito Party
leaders had each sent similar messages to the PRC. Izumi
urged U.S.-Japan coordination on the anti-secession law.

Hu Vulnerable on Taiwan and Japan
--------------


4. (C) Commenting that Hu Jintao had yet to consolidate his
authority, Izumi said that China's cross-Strait policy was a
good indicator of Hu Jintao's hold on power because it was
such a sensitive matter. He expressed concerns that former
President Jiang Zemin would be able to include hard-line
language in the anti-secession law. Having stepped down from
office, Jiang Zemin may now freely snipe at Hu's handling of
important issues, and Taiwan is an area where Hu is
particularly vulnerable. Izumi cited talk circulating in
Beijing of Japan's supposed betrayal on Taiwan issues on the
heels of PM Koizumi's amicable bilateral summit meetings with
Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao late last year. GOJ approval of a
visit by former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui and the
inclusion of Taiwan in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan
Security Consultative Committee are cited as evidence of
Japanese perfidy, Izumi said.


5. (C) Hu's inability to determine PRC policy toward Japan
has led to drift in the political relationship, Izumi noted.
He attributed Beijing's inability to get past the issue of PM
Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine to Hu's relative
weakness. Consequently, that one issue has been allowed to
block progress on bilateral matters such as the conflict over
Japan's EEZ in the East China Sea. Izumi hopes that Premier
Wen will accept Japan's invitation to attend the Aichi Expo
later this year as a means of improving bilateral relations.
To date, State Council Vice Premier Wu Yi plans to lead
China's delegation to the Expo. In the meantime, he
suggested, the United States and Japan should try to think of
ways of boosting President Hu in order to strengthen China's
foreign policy moderates. Secretary Rice's upcoming visit to
Beijing will be helpful, as would trilateral talks on
security issues among the United States, Japan, and China,
Izumi commented.

Relations with ASEAN
--------------


6. (C) In the context of guiding China's foreign policy,
Izumi suggested it would also be helpful for the United
States and Japan to take steps to strengthen ASEAN as an
institution. Currently, China is able to "pick off"
Southeast Asian countries individually, often using Thailand
as a messenger, but if ASEAN were a stronger institution, it
would stand a better chance of standing up to China. The
United States, Japan and Australia should consider how to
strengthen Indonesia's role in ASEAN, he advised.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Izumi had just returned from Beijing where he had
accompanied Asian Affairs Bureau DG Sasae (ref B) and his
comments may reflect frustration with the PRC's insistence on
holding the bilateral relationship hostage to the Yasukuni
issue. Izumi's suggestion for U.S.-Japan-PRC trilateral
talks on security issues was the first we had heard this
proposal. We are uncertain the degree to which such talks
have wider GOJ support.
MICHALAK