NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: WHAT THE DUTCH WANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003054 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR MOPS AF NL EUN SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: WHAT THE DUTCH WANT REF: A. THE HAGUE 3037 ¶B. THE HAGUE 2988 ¶C. HAGUE-STATE E-MAIL.11/8/05 Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch officials have compiled a list of conditions for deploying to Uruzghan province in Afghanistan under ISAF Stage III which they shared with SACEUR on November 8. A key Dutch request is that U.S. forces remain at current levels in Zabol and two northern firebases in Uruzghan. The Dutch will continue intense consultations with partners, including the U.S., this week and hope to begin Cabinet discussion of the deployment on November 18. End SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) As noted reftels, Dutch Defense Minister Kamp, in coordination with Foreign Minister Bot, has asked for a thorough review of Dutch plans to deploy troops to Uruzghan province under ISAF Stage III. This review was prompted by recent Dutch intelligence analysis suggesting that the security situation in the province was more dangerous than anticipated. On November 8, Minister of Defense Kamp and other senior Dutch officials briefed SACEUR Jones on the results of their review, listing several new "conditions" which the Dutch believe would facilitate a positive Dutch decision to deploy. Charge was briefed on November 8 by CHOD Dik Berlijn, and on November 9 by MOD Director of General Policy Lo Castelijn, on the Dutch requirements, which will also be contained in a letter to SACEUR. ¶3. (C) The Dutch anticipate an initial deployment of 1,100 Dutch troops, plus 340 Australians and 100 Canadians for transport and force protection. Dutch conditions include: - Commitments by the Afghan government and G-8 lead nations to strengthen police, courts, and civil administration in the province. This would also include a continuation of U.S. training of police and military forces in the region. - An effective development strategy in the province involving USAID, its Dutch counterpart, and other development agencies. - Agreement on acceptable arrangements/regime for handling detainees. This would entail some infrastructure projects, such as the construction of appropriate detention and transfer centers. (Note: According to the MFA, a Dutch team is traveling to Afghanistan this week to engage Afghan authorities on this issue.) - Clear understanding/agreement that the Dutch deployment would be for two years. Castelijn and Berlijn both noted that such an agreement need not preclude the possibility of an extension, but they clearly wish to avoid any "bad-mouthing" if the Dutch decide not to extend -- as happened at the end of the Dutch deployment in Southern Iraq. - A clear distinction between OEF and ISAF missions in the region. Specifically, Berlijn and Castelijn stressed that OEF should retain responsibility for "counter-terrorism" operations, with ISAF taking on "counter-insurgency" functions. Castelijn clarified that this would help the GONL make its case to parliament -- where ISAF enjoys more support than OEF -- while retaining enough flexibility on the ground for OEF to conduct operations in ISAF areas if necessary. He added that the Dutch would insist on coordination between OEF and ISAF, maintaining the distinction between missions was a political necessity. - Full intelligence sharing on the ground. Castelijn acknowledged that he was not sure how big a problem this was; there was, in fact, more sharing taking place than some of those making the complaint understood. He noted, however, that the Dutch believed that establishing a "fusion cell" in Kandahar would be a good way of ensuring maximum coordination in the future. - Cost sharing to repair and maintain Kandahar airport. Castelijn stressed that this was essential. - Additional assistance on helicopter transport and other logistics issues; Castelijn indicated that this issue had already largely been resolved through consultations with the British, Canadians, and Australians. - Continuation of U.S. presence in Zabol and the northern firebases in Uruzghan province, as well as retention of an OEF capability to mount counter-terrorism operations from the firebases as necessary. ¶4. (C) With regard to the last point, Castelijn said that this would require a significant U.S. commitment, and said he intended to reach out to ASD Peter Flory in the next few days to discuss it. He added that the Dutch were not requesting an increase, but believed maintaining current force levels and advisors was necessary to secure the Northern and Western flanks of the territory in which the Dutch would be operating. Castelijn stressed that the Dutch did not anticipate dividing up Uruzghan geographically, but felt that the situation demanded a distinction between areas in which OEF counter-terrorism operations remained necessary and areas more suitable for ISAF missions. ¶5. (C) Castelijn noted that the Dutch intended to engage in intense consultations with NATO partners and the Afghan government over the next week to resolve as many issues as possible. Assuming discussion went well, the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs would then present their proposal to Cabinet on November 18 for a preliminary discussion, with a more formal discussion and possible decision on November 25 (and a referral to Parliament soon afterwards.) He recognized that some of the more general requirements would not be satisfied in a week, and noted that the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs would most review the situation again in 2006 to determine how much progress had been made. ¶6. (C) Castelijn said the Dutch had been impressed by SACEUR's willingness to consider the Dutch requirements in the spirit in which they were intended -- i.e., the Dutch want to go forward but need some help to do so. Castelijn added that the Dutch fully understood that only some of their requests fell into NATO's purview; others would have to be worked out directly with the Afghan government and individual partners. The key issue for the U.S. is whether it can maintain a presence in Zabol and northern Uruzghan. Castelijn noted that he and other senior Dutch officials had canceled travel plans this week and next to concentrate on the deployment issue. BLAKEMAN