NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH ANTICIPATE TURKEY, CROATIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002640 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 TAGS: PREL NL EUN SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH ANTICIPATE TURKEY, CROATIA TO DOMINATE GAERC DISCUSSION REF: A. SECSTATE 177048 ¶B. BRUSSELS 03534 ¶C. THE HAGUE 02374 Classified By: POLCOUNS Andrew J. Schofer for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch anticipate Turkey and Croatia to dominate discussion at the October 3 GAERC, and are cautiously optimistic that a positive decision on Turkish accession talks will emerge from the meetings. The Dutch are standing firm on "full cooperation" with the ICTY as a prerequisite for progress on Croatia, but believe ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte's October 2 report may provide the basis for a compromise -- in which case, they will not stand alone. They anticipate the GAERC will discuss EU-Russia relations, but do not believe the debate will yield any decisions about the future of the relationship after the expiration of the PCA. The Dutch will continue to support the EU-3 in its leadership role as negotiator with Iran and plan to support a tougher EU position towards Uzbekistan. Finally, interlocutors at the MFA suggested that other points of discussion may include the Middle East Peace Process, The EU's relationship with ASEM and the accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On September 28, POLCOUNS and POLOFF met with Pim Dumore (MFA, Director of Political Affairs) and Bahia Tahzib-Lie (MFA, Deputy European Correspondent) to present ref A points and discuss the upcoming GAERC meeting. On September 29, Desiree Kopmels (MFA, Deputy Director of Political Affairs) and Dirk Oldenburg (MFA, Deputy Director of European Integration) briefed POLOFF and representatives from Japan and New Zealand on the upcoming GAERC. All Dutch interlocutors expected the Turkish accession issue to dominate discussion at the meetings, but anticipated Croatia's accession to be a subject of interest as well. TURKEY: DUTCH SUPPORT EU POSITION TO BEGIN ACCESSION TALKS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) All interlocutors voiced support for the negotiating framework currently in place for Turkey's accession process and averred resistance to any changes to the framework. All MFA counterparts thought that Austria, in continuing to support its alternative "privileged partnership" framework, and as the sole hold-out to the negotiating framework, had isolated itself on the issue. Though Oldenburg and Kopmels declined to predict whether the Austrians would embrace the position of their EU partners, Dumore expected the Austrians to join the fold and the GAERC to conclude that Turkey has met all conditions in order to begin negotiations for EU accession. All interlocutors discussed the possibility of a preliminary GAERC meeting on Sunday intended, according to Oldenburg, to "solve both issues" of Turkey and Croatia. (COMMENT: The likelihood of a preliminary Sunday meeting appears to have increased substantially after EU ambassadors failed to come to a decision on the negotiating framework Thursday morning.) ¶4. (C) MFA counterparts explained that, while the Dutch support the EU position that each candidate for EU membership should be evaluated on its own merits, "some countries" (Note: Tahzib-Lie later acknowledged this referred only to Austria.) continue to link Turkey's accession to Croatia's. Oldenburg doubted Austria would publicly espouse this notion, explaining that Austria had earlier explicitly denied such a link. Oldenburg added that the Dutch will be closely watching the upcoming vote by the Turkish Parliament on ratification of the EU Constitution and will continue to insist that the Turks "make good" on their commitments for EU accession. WESTERN BALKANS: CROATIAN TALKS CONTINGENT ON ICTY COOPERATION -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) All MFA counterparts said the item second in order of importance for the GAERC would be the question of Croatia's accession process. Although the Dutch are in line with the UK Presidency's position that discussion of Croatia's accession is contingent on a decision on Turkey, all interlocutors agreed that there is no guarantee that the negotiations will proceed in such a fashion. Dumore and Tahzib-Lie noted, however, that the UK presidency's insistence on completing discussion on Turkey before proceeding to Croatia was a good sign. ¶6. (C) The Dutch are taking a "strict" position that discussion of EU accession is contingent on Croatia's full cooperation with the ICTY. Dumore was explicit in stating that, as far as the Netherlands was concerned, "good" or "improved" cooperation was not sufficient; only "full" cooperation was acceptable. He noted, however, that only Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte could define "full cooperation" -- while it could mean the apprehension of Gotovina, it could also mean that the Croatians are making comprehensive, good faith efforts to apprehend him without success. The Dutch are concerned that commencing accession talks on the basis of anything other than full cooperation would damage the credibility of the ICTY and are therefore waiting to receive del Ponte's assessment of Croatian cooperation with the Tribunal before deciding whether to initiate accession talks. Del Ponte is expected to return from Croatia on September 30; the Dutch believe that she will present her findings to the Ministerial Task Force on Sunday. Dumore noted that if del Ponte's report is in any way positive, there will be tremendous pressure on the GAERC to reach a "compromise" with Austria allowing progress on both Turkey and Croatia. While the Dutch do not support such a linkage, he stressed, they also do not intend to be isolated on this issue. ¶7. (C) None of the Dutch interlocutors thought the GAERC would devote much attention to Serbia, Kosovo, or Bosnia. UZBEKISTAN: NETHERLANDS SUPPORTS THE EU'S "TOUGHER" POSITION -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Tahzib-Lie and Dumore explained that the Dutch support the "tougher" EU position on Uzbekistan anticipated to emerge from the GAERC. Oldenburg suggested the Dutch would endorse a "gradual approach" to sanctions against Uzbekistan that may begin with a weapons embargo and progress to travel restrictions and perhaps ultimately to sanctions. All interlocutors refrained from speculating whether this tougher position would include visa refusals or travel restrictions and cautioned that they did not want to run the risk of further alienating Karimov. Tahzib-Lie said the Dutch would also be inclined to endorse a similar EU line on Belarus. RUSSIA -------------- ¶9. (C) The Dutch anticipate Russia's lethargic attitude toward readmission requests and restrictive visa policies to be on the GAERC agenda. Oldenburg added that the Dutch would advocate for more "flexible opportunities" for EU residents to enter Russia and criticize Russia's policy of requiring visas for holders of diplomatic passports. ¶10. (C) Although none of the MFA counterparts foresaw the GAERC reaching any substantive conclusions on the subject, all of them mentioned Dutch concern over the future of EU - Russia relations, particularly after the expiration in 2007 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The Dutch support the EU position that the four common spaces of partnership should continue to be implemented under a package arrangement, rather than through multiple sectoral arrangements as the Russians have proposed (ref B). Moreover, the Dutch prefer to continue with a set of legally binding principles; all interlocutors voiced concern over perceived Russian preference for a looser, non-binding agreement. BMENA/MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY -------------- ¶11. (C) None of the Dutch interlocutors expected BMENA or the topic of Middle East Democracy to be raised at the GAERC. Tahzib-Lie voiced general support for the points but doubted the GAERC would address either the Foundation for the Future or the Fund for the Future. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶12. (C) The Dutch believe that dialogue on the Middle East Peace Process at the GAERC will center primarily on James Wolfensohn's quick impact reconstruction program and on the roadmap. While all MFA counterparts were certain that recent violence in Gaza would certainly be a point of concern at the GAERC, all voiced confidence in the roadmap and in Wolfensohn. Oldenburg explained that, though the way the fund will be used is still a matter of debate, the Dutch have committed 10 million euros/year to Wolfensohn's program. IRAN: STILL STAYING THE COURSE -------------- ¶13. (C) Tahzib-Lie posited that the GAERC would review current events in EU-Iran relations but would not reach any decisions on future policy. The Dutch continue to defer to the EU-3 in negotiations with Iran and, pursuant to that relationship, will restate their support for the EU-3 leadership at the upcoming GAERC (ref C). Tahzib-Lie and Dumore demurred when asked whether the EU-3 was engaging China and Russia on Iran, pointing to general "broadening support" for the EU Presidency's recent statement on Iran. OTHER ISSUES: -------------- ¶14. (C) Though none of the Dutch interlocutors expected the China Arms Embargo to be on the GAERC agenda, they anticipated a discussion about Saudi Arabia's membership in the WTO, which they oppose, and a discussion on EU-ASEM relations. Ukraine and Iraq were not expected to be on the agenda. BLAKEMAN