NETHERLANDS/EU/TURKEY: DUTCH LOSING PATIENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002463 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015 TAGS: PREL TU NL EUN SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/TURKEY: DUTCH LOSING PATIENCE REF: A. LONDON 7361 ¶B. ANKARA 5183 ¶C. SCHOFER-CARVER E-MAIL ¶D. 9/8/05 Classified By: POLCOUNS ANDREW SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a senior Dutch MFA official (Pieter de Gooijer),the Dutch support starting EU accession talks with Turkey on October 3, but are losing patience with all sides. The MFA assumes there will be a September 26 GAERC and is planning accordingly. PM Balkenende is facing growing domestic pressure not to support Turkish accession, and is personally more sympathetic to Croatia's prospects than his foreign minister. De Gooijer expressed concern that efforts to link Croatia and Turkey are succeeding, and predicted that the UK presidency might seize upon an ambiguous finding by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte to cut a deal. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On September 8, Pieter de Gooijer (Deputy Director General of the Dutch MFA's Political Affairs Department), told POLCOUNS that COREPER's failure to reach agreement on an EU counter-declaration addressing Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus made it "almost certain" that a special GAERC would be held on September 26. The Dutch, he said, are proceeding as if such a meeting will take place even though they have not received the official word from London. (Note: On September 8, the MFA released Foreign Minister Bot's schedule including a September 26 GAERC meeting.) ¶3. (C) De Gooijer, who, during the Dutch EU presidency, personally helped craft the December 17 agreement paving the way for starting accession talks with Turkey on October 3, was clearly exasperated with the direction the process has taken in recent weeks. He stressed that beginning accession talks with Turkey on October 3 was still possible, but definitely not assured. Reaching EU agreement on a counter-declaration text had now become a prerequisite for concluding the Negotiation Framework. This added an additional -- but, in his view, necessary -- step to the process and created new opportunities for obstruction on the part of EU members, and/or self-destructive outbursts on the part of Turkey. ¶4. (C) De Gooijer was particularly disturbed that efforts to link Croatian and Turkish accession talks appeared to be gaining strength. At the end of the day, he said, those members favoring starting talks with Croatia had the power to hold Turkish accession talks hostage. Although the Dutch and British have been among the staunchest advocates of pushing Croatia to cooperate fully with the ICTY, he doubted that UK PM Blair would be willing to sacrifice starting Turkish talks -- which would be a clear blow to the British presidency -- to delay the inevitable. De Gooijer warned that any ambiguity in ICTY Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte's reports could well be seized upon to "cut a deal." Without stating it directly, de Gooijer made it clear that the Netherlands would not stand alone in this case. ¶5. (C) Finally, de Gooijer offered that Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende and Foreign Minister Bot are coming under increasing domestic political pressure to back off their firm support for starting Turkish accession talks on October 3. While Bot -- a former Dutch Ambassador to Turkey -- believes strongly in the benefits of Turkey joining the EU, he said, he has been compelled to make some tough statements recently calling Turkish accession into question. Balkenende, on the other hand, was never a true believer on Turkey and is personally more sympathetic to Croatia's situation than Bot. De Gooijer noted that the most serious parliamentary criticism in this area comes from Balkenende's own Christian Democrat party -- not a good sign for a prime minister already suffering the lowest poll figures in memory. ¶6. (C) The fact that the December 17 agreement was negotiated during the Dutch EU presidency remains a powerful incentive for staying the course on October 3, according to de Gooijer. He noted, however, that Balkenende's sense of loyalty to the agreement is weakening as memories of the Dutch EU presidency fade. De Gooijer added that Balkenende had been "offended" by the apparent lack of Turkish gratitude for his efforts last year (and since) on their behalf. Although Balkenende and Erdogan may talk from time to time, according to de Gooijer, the relationship is not a warm one. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: The Dutch, and Bot in particular, remain committed to implementing the December 17 agreement, including starting accession talks with Turkey on October 3. Their patience with all parties is wearing thin, however, and Balkenende will gain no domestic political capital from standing on principle in this case. If the EU fails to reach consensus on a counter-declaration or negotiating framework, and/or if the Turks shoot themselves in the foot again, the Dutch may start to look for a face-saving way out rather than struggle to save "their" agreement. END COMMENT. . BLAKEMAN