NASSER YUSIF ON POSSIBLE SECURITY ROLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 000076

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2010
TAGS: KWBG PREL PTER ASEC GZ IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: NASSER YUSIF ON POSSIBLE SECURITY ROLE

REF: JERUSALEM 4947

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer, per 1.4 (B) and (D).

ConGen Jerusalem cleared this message.


1. (SBU) Summary: National Security Force BG Nasser Yusif
told poloffs recently that, if called upon to join an Abu
Mazen government as interior minister, he would bring the
green-uniform public security forces, Force 17, and the naval
or coastal police under his personal operational control, and
then, subject to concurrence by the political leadership,
focus his attention on the relatively "easy" job of cleaning
up the West Bank. Only after order is re-imposed there --
within 20 days -- would Yusif turn his attention to Gaza,
setting up his headquarters there "until the job is done."
In a drop-by, the Ambassador cited the need for progress in
the investigation of the October 15, 2003, attack on U.S.
personnel in Gaza. He stressed that although the United
States stands ready to assist Abu Mazen, USG security
concerns make it extremely difficult to operate effectively
on the ground in PA territory. Yusif agreed that law and
order must be job number one for the PA, and concurred with
the Ambassador's assessment that the Palestinian people
themselves need security if their society is to grow. He
predicted that security during the January 9 presidential
election will pose little problem because Abu Mazen maintains
such a commanding lead in the race. The real challenge, he
stressed, will come during the March municipal elections, May
PLC elections, and August Fatah elections, where no one
faction has a commanding lead and where militants may choose
to press their cases by violence. Accordingly, PA security
forces must gain control by March. End Summary.

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We Need Progress in the Investigation
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2. (C) Pol/C and Poloff met at length recently with National
Security Force (NSF) Major General Nasser Yusif, ranking
military officer in the Palestinian Authority security
establishment, and NSF Brigadier General Samir Siksek, during
a primarily social call beginning at the Embassy and then
moving to Pol/C's home. (Note: Yusif is the number two
ranking military officer within the PLO, ranking behind only
Tunis-based MG Ahmed Afani, who, at least until Yasser
Arafat's death, held the title of deputy chief of staff to
Yasser Arafat. Yusif's membership on the Fatah Central
Committee makes him the de facto more senior officer.)
During a brief drop-by, the Ambassador reiterated the need
for progress in the investigation into the October 15, 2003
attack on Embassy personnel and expressed his hope that PA
security efforts will have a wider, positive impact on
Palestinian society as a whole. The Ambassador explained
that, in the hope of an improved security situation, the
Embassy is working to hold on to funds for major water
projects that were put on hold following the deadly October
15, 2003 attack, after which all travel to Gaza was halted.
He urged the PA to make all possible efforts to resolve the
investigation and to re-impose law and order so that current
U.S. funding will not be lost and future funds can be
effectively utilized.

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Open to Possibilities
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3. (C) Yusif said he had refused then-Chairman Arafat's
request in 2003 to become minister of interior because there
was, at that time, no authority attached to the position.
Now, "if asked, I will serve," he said, adding that "our
desire to work must be coupled by your (the United States')
desire to help." With little or no law and order evident in
the streets, Yusif said, security is the Palestinians' number
one concern today. He added that during a recent visit to
Gaza, he had been protected by "a batallion" of troops and he
could not even go to pray in the mosque in Gaza City without
armed guards. During his several years as senior NSF
commander in Gaza in the mid and late '90s, the religiously
observant Yusif attended daily prayers with little or no
escort. For the first time, he said, there are murders,
rapes, and problems with narcotics in Gaza.

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Israel Sets Palestinian Priorities
--------------


4. (C) The GOI, Yusif said, will be setting PA security
priorities in the coming months by virtue of the demands
Israel makes of the Palestinians. Should he be appointed
interior minister, Yusuf said, his own preference would be to
focus his attention first on the West Bank as the "easier"
task that would "take 20 days" to clean up. Once that task
was complete, Yusif said, he would then physically move to
Gaza, staying there and personally overseeing the
establishment of law and order. If Israel, however, insists
that Gaza security must -- by virtue of the withdrawal,
continued rocket fire into Israel, or other reasons -- come
first, then Yusif said he will be forced to leave the West
Bank "as is" for the time being in order to focus his full
attention on Gaza. If Israel wants to test us, they will
force the PA to take on Gaza first, he said. But if they
want orderly, complete results, the PA will be allowed to
"clean" the West Bank first. As a very first step, what
Yusif referred to as the armed (presumably criminal) gangs
operating in the territories must be "crushed immediately."
The PA will only then, he said, be in a position to begin
taking on the militants step by step, as the militants make
mistakes. Yusif acknowledged that unless the PA establishes
security to prevent attacks against evacuating Gaza settlers,
disengagement could grind to a halt, and Palestinians could
suffer heavy IDF responses to attacks.


5. (C) Yusif said he recognizes both the need for a
comprehensive security operations plan "from day one," and
that both the GOI and the donors will be looking for results.
He acknowledged that while donors are ready and willing to
assist, they want to support a strategic approach -- through
a single approved, transparent, and coordinated channel --
rather than through piecemeal, often opaque efforts with
individual security chiefs. Yusif indicated that the message
had been received and said that the "apathy within Fatah" had
come to an end. "Arafat tactics won't work for us.... Abu
Mazen is very serious." He acknowledged, however, that he
(Yusuf) currently has no authority to undertake such a
planning and organizational effort, and that Abu Mazen cannot
issue such a mandate prior to being elected PA President.

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Violence in Later Elections
--------------


6. (C) Yusif said he is confident that, if appointed as
interior minister, he can plan and initiate operations
expeditiously, and that, while he cannot promise concrete
results, he is nonetheless sure that both he and Abu Mazen
will make the maximum effort. Yusif predicted that the
January 9 presidential elections will pose little security
problem because Abu Mazen commands such a wide lead that the
election is not in doubt or up for grabs. The real
challenge, he stressed, will come during the March municipal
elections, the May PLC elections, and the August Fatah
elections, where no one faction has a commanding lead and
where militants may choose to press their cases by violence.
He predicted that, absent a major security effort, those
elections will not be peaceful because they involve real
political competition and too many armed factions are ready
to fight. Accordingly, PA security forces must gain control
by March.


7. (C) Abu Mazen, he said, should make the political
decision to act and then "be off the hook," leaving the
details of security implementation to his subordinates.
Yusif acknowledged that the March time frame is
extraordinarily short. Asked whether it is realistic, he
responded simply that the effort must be made. He added that
the GOI, having "scrapped all mechanisms for coordination"
with the PA in the past four years, is relying now only on
(unspecified) personal relationships to facilitate
cooperation, complicating things for the Palestinians.
"Allow us to have a security establishment, not
personalities," Yusif said, arguing for the re-establishment
of the District Coordination Offices (DCOs) and other
Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation mechanisms. Yusif
said he hoped that the GOI has learned to "stay out of
Palestinians affairs" and "stop trying to manipulate" the
militant groups.


8. (C) Yusif added that he could not overstate the
importance of the prisoner issue to the Palestinian people
and to an Abu Mazen government. He differentiated between
those prisoners who have conducted "military operations," who
helped military operations, and who are "normal suspects."
The latter group, he said, comprise the clear majority of all
prisoners, and resolving their fate would leave only a very
small group in jail. He estimated that the so-called normal
suspects comprise some 11,500 of what he said are some 12,000
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. He also called for
maintenance of labor flows from the territories into Israel
as critical to Palestinian well-being.

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If I Were the Boss
--------------


9. (C) Yusif said that he has inherited the title of supreme
commander of all the armed forces as most senior officer
remaining in the PLO upon the death of Yasser Arafat, putting
him in a unique position, if appointed interior minister, to
command the respect of the various security services and
begin addressing law and order. (Note: Yusif is also a Fatah
Central Committee member and is religiously observant.)
Fatah, he said, has decided that the interior minister
position must be the ultimate security authority in the PA.
The Ministry of Interior has two roles, Yusif said: one civil
and one security/military. Yusif acknowledged that a trusted
administrator, several of whom, he said, come readily to mind
from among Fatah Revolutionary Council members, could and
should be appointed to run the actual administrative and
civil elements of the Ministry, allowing Yusif to focus on
running the security elements.


10. (C) As he told ConGen pol chief (reftel),Yusif said he
would consolidate all security-related elements into three
branches under the Interior Ministry:

-- the blue-uniform police, the Preventive Security
Organization (PSO),and civil defense.
-- the general intelligence service.
-- the green-uniform national security (or public security)
forces, Force 17, and the naval or coastal police (sometimes
called the marines). Several other elements, such as
military intelligence and special forces, that are
technically part of the public security forces now but
operate autonomously, and the Palestinian part of the Joint
Security Committee (with Israel) would be integrated into the
public security forces.


11. (C) Yusif said that in order to press ahead with what he
anticipates will be the difficult task of bringing security
to the territories, he would take personal operational
control over the third branch, which he referred to
collectively as the public security forces. These forces
currently fall under the commands (at least nominally) of MG
Mousa Arafat in Gaza and MG Haj Ismail in the West Bank.
Yusif suggested that, depending on performance, either or
both commanders could be moved to senior staff jobs under
him, removing them from operational command of forces. Once
he turns his attention to Gaza, he would move his
headquarters there to maintain more effective operational
control over what he said is a far more difficult task than
subduing the West Bank. The other two security branches would
be under Interior Ministry authority, but operate under the
direct operational control of their designated chiefs, who
would report to the interior minister. The Mukhabarat, which
is currently outside the Interior Ministry, and the PSO,
which is technically already part of Interior, would be
limited to gathering and developing intelligence only, rather
than taking actions in the field as they currently do.


12. (C) Every commander, Yusif said, would be given a chance
to demonstrate his competence -- "even Mousa (Arafat)." If
the commander does not perform as instructed or up to
expectation, then that commander will be removed, Yusif said.
He cautioned, however, that to hold each and every person
responsible for actions during the Intifada would be a recipe
for failure as no one would be clean enough. Arafat's legacy
is that almost everyone is tainted by how they were forced to
operate for the last 40 years. Yusif was nonetheless
confident that there are sufficient competent people with
whom he could effectively staff a ministry.

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And What About Dahlan?
--------------


13. (C) Yusif was skeptical that Muhammad Dahlan would or
should again have a position of authority in a future Abu
Mazen administration. Dahlan has no experience, Yusif said,
and failed in his previous tenure as minister of state for
security. As an example of Dahlan's lack of stature, Yusif
cited the November attack on Abu Mazen in the Arafat mourning
tent in Gaza City, which took place while Dahlan was
"standing right there." Many more-senior and more competent
officers stand ahead of him, both in rank and within Fatah,
Yusif continued. Furthermore, "you can't talk about
corruption without talking about Dahlan." Yusif opined that
Dahlan might again rise to a senior position in the next 10
to 15 years. In the near term, however, the only way for
Dahlan to move ahead would be for the Fatah Conference to
elevate him or else for him to successfully run for a seat in
the PLC.


14. (C) Noting that the GOI and others had pressured Abu
Mazen into bringing Muhammad Dahlan into Abu Mazen's previous
government to run security, Yusif said that Abu Mazen must be
able to appoint someone whom he trusts and with whom he can
work. That relationship will be extremely important
throughout the spring and summer months, as the security
services must be able to ensure law and order during the
municipal elections, PLC elections, and then the Fatah Party
Conference.

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Showing Results Towards Peace
--------------

15. (C) Yusif warned that "extreme measures" might, at times
have to be taken in the order to assert control and revive
the unity of the legitimate armed forces, in Gaza in
particular. Yusif said that he would expect "reasonable
help" from the GOI in his endeavor. The Palestinian people,
Yusif continued, are not capable of swallowing any more
hardships, defined as either "Israeli aggression" or PA
"disorders and failures." The situation has long been
untenable, but now must certainly be resolved before the
Fatah conference in August, Yusif said. "The Palestinians
must take decisions then. Should we proceed with the peace
with Israel or not?" A portion of that question would be
answered by Israeli actions in the coming months, he said.
The best option would be for the Party Conference to be held
simultaneously with a resumption of the political track, so
that the PA leadership could show the people some results.


16. (C) BIO NOTE: Yusif, who appeared in good health and
was once a hearty eater, declined to eat any meat during
lunch, citing what he said was a diagnosis that he suffers
from excess "uric acid." He now eats only vegetables and
fish. He described no other symptoms or conditions affecting
his health or capabilities.



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