EMBLEM: WHY THE GOI NEARLY BALKED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006766

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/IPA AND EUR/AGS, PRM FOR ACTING A/S GREENE, L
FOR BELLINGER, NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA, NSC FOR
ABRAMS, H, L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2015
TAGS: IS PGOV PREF PREL SZ GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI SOCIETY GOI INTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: EMBLEM: WHY THE GOI NEARLY BALKED

REF: GENEVA 02903

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: While Israel did not oppose the recent
MDA-PRCS agreements, the issue hits the GOI at an unusually
volatile transitional moment in Israeli domestic politics.
During this tenuous period an issue such as this that touches
on security, or the status of East Jerusalem and the
settlements, could explode onto the national stage at a
moment's notice, forcing Israeli leaders to take a public
stand on the political price of MDA admission into the
movement. The MDA-PRCS agreements reached the desk of a
Foreign Minister campaigning to lead the political party that
the Prime Minister had just abandoned. FM Shalom objected to
the MDA-PRCS agreements possibly because he perceived an
electoral liability in failure to oppose any agreement that
acknowledges the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva
Convention to the West Bank. Responding to pressure from
Washington firmly articulated by the Charge, Shalom passed
the final decision on the MDA-PRCS agreements to PM Sharon,
who decided not to oppose them. Through his actions FM
Shalom tried, simultaneously, to protect the interests of
traditional Likud supporters, to highlight the Prime
Minister's failure to do so, and to avoid standing in the way
of MDA's accession into the movement. It is likely that, in
addition to PM Sharon, the only senior political figures in
Israel familiar with the agreements' actual content are FM
Shalom, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz, and Health Minister
Dan Naveh. None of these leaders has yet criticized in
public the PM's decision not to oppose the MDA-PRCS
agreements. It remains possible that FM Shalom may do so at
a later date if it serves his political advantage. End
Summary.

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CHRONOLOGY: THE FOREIGN MINISTER PUNTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER
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2. (C) The Charge called FM Shalom's office late evening
November 27 after learning that the GOI might suddenly advise
MDA President Noam Yifrach not to sign the following day a
memorandum of understanding and operational agreement with
the PRCS. FM Shalom's policy advisor, Opher Bavley, said
that Shalom had only just received two hours earlier the text
of the agreements, though the MFA had certainly been aware of
their contents for a long time. Bavley said FM Shalom,
advised to be cautious in a letter from Attorney General
Menachem Mazuz, believed the MDA-PRCS agreements represented
too great a political commitment and liability for the GOI to
accept. Bavley added that Health Minister Dan Naveh also
wanted to further examine the agreements before deciding
whether to object to them. Charge subsequently spoke to
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Foreign Policy Advisors, in the
absence of Shalom Turgeman, and spelled out the brewing
crisis.


3. (C) After consulting with NEA A/S Welch, Acting PRM A/S
Greene, and Ambassador Moley, Charge contacted FM Shalom
directly, arguing that his position was unhelpful. The
MDA-PRCS agreements represent a vital step toward MDA
recognition, the Charge insisted, and to back out at this
late date would diminish the prospects for MDA's accession
into the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement. He also stressed
that the Syrians and other MDA opponents would seize upon any
last-minute GOI intervention to bolster their claim that the
MDA is not independent of the GOI. Moreover, the USG has
worked very hard over many years to support MDA's bid to join
the movement, and a postponement would constitute a major
set-back for all parties.


4. (C) Shortly after this conversation, FM Policy Advisor
Bavley called to inform the Charge that FM Shalom and Health
Minister Naveh had decided to pass the decision to PM Sharon.
At that point, Turgeman, who was in Washington, took over
the issue. MFA Director for International Organizations and
Human Rights Daniel Meron told poloff November 28 at 0830
that PM Sharon said he appreciated the significance of the
agreements, understood USG concerns, and decided to refrain
from advising Yifrach not to sign the agreements. Meron also
said the MFA issued a statement to the Government of
Switzerland stipulating that the agreements do not represent
a commitment on the part of the GOI.
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DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT
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5. (C) The passing of the MDA issue like a hot potato from
political rival to political rival reflects the significantly
heightened sensitivity among Israeli leaders to any issue
that may have political repercussions. With Ariel Sharon's
formation of a new party, the split of his old Likud home
base and dynamic movement throughout the political arena,
right-wing political leaders in Israel are divided,
defensive, and desperate. Recent public opinion polls in
Israel indicate that the now solidly right-wing rump Likud
party may lose many seats in the Knesset during the next
election. During this tenuous period any issue that touches
on security, or the status of East Jerusalem and the
settlements, could explode onto the national stage at a
moment's notice, forcing Israeli leaders to take a public
stand on the political price of MDA admission into the Red
Cross / Red Crescent Movement. Fortunately, Israeli
newspapers did not publish the text of the MDA-PRCS
agreements. It is likely that, in addition to PM Sharon, the
only senior political figures in Israel familiar with the
agreements' actual content are Foreign Minister Silvan
Shalom, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz, and Health Minister
Dan Naveh. None of these leaders has yet criticized in
public the PM's decision not to oppose the MDA-PRCS
agreements. It remains possible that FM Shalom may do so at
a later date if it serves his political advantage.


6. (C) Comment: Having habitually sought to claim credit
for the actions of others, FM Shalom notably passed up the
opportunity to take part in MDA's victory march by handing a
key decision to the Prime Minister. FM Shalom may perceive
an electoral liability in failure to oppose any agreement
that acknowledges the de jure applicability of the Fourth
Geneva Convention to the West Bank. He presently seeks to
avoid actions that might jeopardize support among settlers
for his campaign to lead the Likud party. By objecting to
the agreement and then passing the decision to the Prime
Minister, he protected the interests of traditional Likud
supporters, highlighted the Prime Minister's failure to do
so, and avoided standing in the way of MDA's accession into
the movement. End Comment.


7. (C) Health Minister Dan Naveh recommended that FM Shalom
advise MDA President Yifrach to delay signing the agreement.
He heads the GOI Ministry with jurisdiction over ambulances
in East Jerusalem. In the face of recent political turmoil,
he has decided to remain in the Likud. While his political
ties thus remain closer to FM Shalom than to PM Sharon, Naveh
has avoided publicity during the Likud party's leadership
battle.


8. (C) Attorney General Menachem Mazuz also recommended that
FM Shalom advise MDA President Yifrach to delay signing the
agreement. Mazuz appears firmly committed to the GOI
position that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply de
jure to the occupied territories, which the GOI claims had no
recognized sovereign before 1967 and thus is not "occupied."
MFA IO Director Meron informed poloff that concerns about the
Fourth Geneva Conventions led Mazuz to advise FM Shalom not
to support the agreement.

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