NSA EILAND ON POST-DISENGAGEMENT STEPS FOR MOVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 005800

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL PINS PGOV KDEM IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT GOI EXTERNAL GOI INTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: NSA EILAND ON POST-DISENGAGEMENT STEPS FOR MOVING
FORWARD

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz. Reason 1.4 (B/D)
.


1. (C) Summary: Israeli National Security Advisor Giora
Eiland briefed NEA DAS Elizabeth Dibble September 21 on steps
Israel and the Palestinians can take over the coming year to
build on the success of Israeli disengagement. DAS Dibble
raised the situation at Rafah, and Eiland cited major points
of agreement with the Palestinians on next steps. He also
expressed a willingness to be flexible on the time it would
take to reach an understanding with all the parties involved
in discussions about Rafah. Note: this conversation took
place prior to this weekend's events in Gaza and does not,
therefore, reflect the current situation on the ground, or
the Israeli reaction to it. End Summary.

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DISENGAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED
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2. (C) DAS Dibble asked NSA Eiland to share his observations
on disengagement. Eiland cited several positive elements:

-- The days of disengagement proved to be the most peaceful
period of the past five years.

-- People on both sides -- Palestinian and Israeli -- are
tired of violence. This creates a better basis for the
future. Eiland said that over the past six to eight months
Israel had several excuses for retaliation to Palestinian
attacks, but the GOI refrained for (external) political
reasons and because the message from the Israeli people has
been: "Don't escalate or enter a cycle of violence -- even if
we can justify it."

-- Hamas is not like Al-Qaida. It is an organization that is
very popular and very sensitive to the level of support it
enjoys with the Palestinian people.

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HAMAS AND PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS
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3. (C) Addressing why Hamas kept quiet when it would appear
against their interest and image, Eiland surmised that had
Hamas instigated violence during disengagement, Palestinians
would have questioned its motives and asked why sacrifice
(i.e. casualties that would likely have resulted from Israeli
retaliation) were necessary to achieve an objective that had
already been realized.


4. (C) In response to the DCM's question about Hamas and
Palestinian elections, Eiland said the coming January
elections are the main factor that determines Hamas policy,
including Hamas respect for the PA's call for calm. Calm is
in the clear mutual interest of all Palestinian parties,
especially in Gaza, according to Eiland's analysis. He
cautioned that after the election things will change. "Once
Hamas has achieved its objective of strengthening its
political power, it will be able to undermine any political
process its leaders do not support." Eiland also predicted
that Hamas will end the current truce ("tahdiya") and
concentrate on violence in the West Bank.


5. (C) DAS Dibble asked Eiland whether Hamas might decide
that the political route is the way to go. Eiland replied
that there is no precedent for such a move. He situated
Hamas within the international network and ideology of the
Muslim Brothers. "Pragmatic moves may be made for a certain
time, but that will not necessarily result in the
transformation (of Hamas) into a political party willing to
give up its ideology (rejecting Israel's existence) or its
measures (terrorism)." In response to PolCouns' follow-up
question, Eiland clarified that Hamas does not see itself as
being "in the opposition." Its leaders see Hamas as a
coequal of the PA. Hamas will cooperate with the PA, but if
Hamas leaders disagree with the PA, "they will do it their
way. They do not accept PA rule (over them)." In fact,
Eiland said, Hamas has established areas where PA police are
not allowed, and Hamas maintains its own checkpoints.

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FATAH/TANZIM
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6. (C) Turning from Hamas, Eiland noted that the PA controls
the biggest independent militia: the Tanzim organization.
"So when we talk about disarming militias, Fatah (must be
accountable too)."

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NO WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
--------------


7. (C) Eiland said the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is more
severe than is currently perceived by many observers after
disengagement. This dispute is not about the content of a
final settlement so much as it is about the process leading
to it. According to Eiland, the official Israeli position is
that the disengagement from Gaza was unique: "(There will be)
no more steps in the future (in the West Bank)." Final
status talks are premature until the PA dismantles militias.
Before this is done, "it would be wrong for us to touch
political substance," Eiland maintained. Eiland analyzed the
PA's position as exactly the opposite: The PA will not
dismantle militias until there is a comprehensive political
solution, with detailed benchmarks, a timetable, and
international guarantees. The PA narrative, through Eiland's
eye, continues: "Only then will we (the Palestinians) have
the will and strength to get to the 'one authority, one
weapon, one law' endgame."


8. (C) Before respective Palestinian and Israeli elections,
there will be no real will to more forward to narrow
differences, according to Eiland. Neither side -- Israeli or
Palestinian -- can make a significant change in its position
due to domestic political reasons. In addition, the two
leading proponents of disengagement within the Government of
Israel -- PM Sharon and Vice Premier Peres -- have
fundamentally different philosophies and approaches to the
steps that should be taken post-disengagement.

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DIFFERENT POST-DISENGAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES OF PERES AND SHARON
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Eiland said Peres believes that improving the
economic situation in the Gaza Strip is the fundamental
condition for any future process. Thus, from the Peres
perspective, it is in Israel's interest to improve
Palestinian lives, and to allocate Israeli resources to that
end. This will also strengthen President Abbas. In
contrast, Eiland said, Sharon's position is that Israel will
no longer be responsible for life in Gaza. Sharon may be
willing to help, but not because it is in Israel's interest
to do so. Sharon is willing to take some security risks --
e.g., opening the Philadelphi corridor and possibly the
seaport too -- in order to demonstrate that Gaza is now a
Palestinian responsibility. Eiland sketched out how these
differing views could affect Israeli policy options. For
example, on passages between Gaza and the West Bank, Eiland
said Peres would be willing to pay a high price (to
facilitate this objective) whereas Sharon does not see an
Israeli interest in doing so. "Gazans can get what they need
from Egypt," is how Eiland summarized Sharon's hypothetical
response to Peres, adding that Sharon will not be willing to
take the security risk that he perceives would result from
providing a Gaza-West Bank connection.

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THE WAY AHEAD
--------------


10. (C) Eiland suggested three ways to improve the
situation, adding that they will require the goodwill and
flexibility of the parties, Egypt and others in the
international community.

-- (1) Resume real, productive dialogue with the Palestinians
on the economic side. "We were preoccupied (with
disengagement). Now we can work with Wolfensohn" and the
Palestinians. For example, Israel built a new, modern
passage facility at Erez. The Palestinians will not
cooperate on using the facility because they do not agree
where the (demarcation) line is located.

-- (2) Strengthen security cooperation between the two sides,
which started on a good basis during disengagement, and could
expand to other areas post-disengagement. The objective
would be to transfer more responsibility for other areas and
cities. The PA has changed some "old figures" in the past
few months, and this has strengthened the capacity of the PA.

-- (3) "Rebuild the (Palestinian) nation." Assistance could
be provided to the PA to support legislative and municipal
systems. In return, the PA will be required to become more
accountable. Benchmarks, in Eiland's view, would include the
gradual "fading out" of independent militias. Weapons cannot
be collected overnight, but the PA can determine -- in a day
-- that it is illegal for Palestinians to carry weapons. He
acknowledged that prospects for the PA achieving such
benchmarks would be improved if they do not appear to be
dictated by the GOI.


11. (C) Eiland's deputy, Eran Etzion, stressed the
importance for the international community to pressure Hamas
to disband its militia before the January 25 elections. DAS
Dibble asked Etzion for specific actions that Etzion would
suggest. In reply, Etzion mentioned the role that UNSCR 1559
had played in Lebanon, but could not explain how such a
precedent would work in Gaza after Israeli disengagement.
Etzion acknowledged that policy recommendations usually
boiled down to increasing pressure on the PA. Eiland
commented, in a moment of candor, that it might not
necessarily be bad to let Hamas participate in the political
process, but he said President Abbas had not exacted an
appropriate price for the participation of Hamas.

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ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: STAGNATION WILL LEAD TO VIOLENCE
-------------- --------------

12. (C) Eiland said the alternative to pursuing the options
described above is stagnation, which increases the risk of
violence, i.e. a "third Intifada," quoting PA Minister
Dahlan. The DCM asked whether the GOI anticipated further
unilateral measures to prevent such a scenario. Eiland
acknowledged that the GOI had not begun to dismantle
outposts, but claimed that the GOI had done "too much"
freezing of construction in settlements. DAS Dibble recalled
Israeli obligations on these issues, and the DCM suggested
the GOI move forward on the basis of the Sasson report.

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RAFAH AND PALESTINIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR GAZA
--------------


13. (C) DAS Dibble asked Eiland about the situation at Rafah
and Israeli views on timing. She questioned how long, in
Eiland's view, it would take to come to agreement on the
Rafah crossing, given the pressure the PA is under to find a
solution quickly on access from Gaza in and out of Egypt.
Eiland confided that the GOI had made a mistake in its
dialogue with the Egyptians and Palestinians. Certain
arrangements could have been agreed upon before
disengagement. Nonetheless, Eiland said, the GOI and PA
basically agreed on five general points:

-- Someday, movement of people and baggage between Egypt and
Gaza at Rafah will occur with no Israeli inspection or
presence.

-- Movement of cargo will be via Nitzana or Kerem Shalom.

-- Possibility of a third party monitor (not as a
requirement, but as an option);

-- If Rafah becomes operational, there will be no need for
other crossings for people to and from Egypt.

-- If these arrangements work reliably, Israel will not
change the customs envelope between Israel and Gaza.


14. (C) Eiland assessed that the gap between positions arose
not so much over issues of timing (six months versus two
weeks),but on the practical arrangements that need to be
made between three or possibly four parties concerned. In
particular, the question of who might enter Gaza freely
remains unresolved. Eiland said Israel had decided to allow
visitors (to enter Gaza) without prior clearance or agreement
"unless Israeli intelligence suggests that they are coming to
do bad things." Eiland gave examples: If Palestinian
refugees want to return from Lebanon, Israel does not want to
be involved. If the Iranian Revolutionary Guards seek entry,
Israel would want agreement (from the Palestinians and
Egyptians) that they cannot enter. Eiland suggested that
Kerem Shalom would be an interim solution until
understandings are reached on these issues. "We want to make
sure the PA controls Gaza. If they do not, will Israeli
commitments to keep the Customs Envelope open remain?"


15. (C) In closing, Eiland recalled that, until recently,
Israel's highest priority had been full control of the
Gaza/West Bank customs envelope. Post-disengagement,
Israel's much more important goal is to demonstrate that it
has no responsibility for the Palestinians. He noted that
Israel's only true security guarantee would be to
unilaterally transform Erez and Karni into international
passages and to change the customs envelope, but acknowledged
that this would separate Gaza and the West Bank and result in
severe economic consequences for the Palestinians. Such a
decision would mean the collapse of the PA in Gaza, in
Eiland's view. DAS Dibble asked Eiland about the state of
Israeli-Palestinian talks on Gaza. Eiland said that PA
Minister Dahlan's recent sickness had delayed discussions,
but that timing of a Rafah agreement was negotiable.


16. (U) This cable has been cleared by NEA DAS Dibble.

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