Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV5705
2005-09-16 11:09:00
SECRET
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

IRAN-IAEA: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Tags:  PREL KNNP AORC TRGY ENRG PARM IR IS GOI EXTERNAL 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 005705 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IPA, NP/RA (ODLUM, KESSLER),EUR/RUS, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015
TAGS: PREL KNNP AORC TRGY ENRG PARM IR IS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: IRAN-IAEA: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
THINKING ON NEXT STEPS


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 005705

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IPA, NP/RA (ODLUM, KESSLER),EUR/RUS, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015
TAGS: PREL KNNP AORC TRGY ENRG PARM IR IS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: IRAN-IAEA: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
THINKING ON NEXT STEPS


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Senior Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC)
officials Gideon Frank and Eli Levite told the Ambassador
September 8 that a renewed international push on Iran,
including referral to the UN Security Council, is necessary,
because, based on the response to date of the international
community and the IAEA, Iran might otherwise get away with
its nuclear weapons program. Frank and Levite said that
referring Iran to the UNSC will only be effective if (a) Iran
and the IAEA are obligated to take well-defined interim steps
while the UNSC deliberates Iran's case; and (b) the UNSC
President's decision -- reflecting the UNSC's view --
incorporates both clear, mandated steps that Iran must take
by dates certain, and clear consequences for failure. The
Israelis intend to continue aggressive lobbying of Russia to
exert more pressure on Iran. Frank and Levite praised
continued U.S.-Israel cooperation on Iran and the IAEA, and
in countering nuclear terrorism, noting the recent successful
visit of a DOE delegation to exchange information on the
results of a hypothetical detonation of a radiological device
in Israel (septel). Frank and Levite said that cooperation
has made it possible for the U.S. and Israel to avoid
problems before they arise, and cited as an example
previously diverging views on U.S. estimates of Iran's
ability to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. END SUMMARY.

--------------
IAEC WELCOMES NEW PUSH ON IRAN ...
--------------


2. (S) IAEC Principal Deputy Director General (Policy) Eli
Levite told the Ambassador September 8 that his late August
meetings in Washington gave him the impression that USG
concern that the Iranians might get away with stalling is

prompting the USG to make a new push for International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) action on Iran. Levite was heartened by
expectations that IAEA Director General ElBaradei's upcoming
report on Iran -- in conjunction with the combined efforts of
the EU3 and USG -- may result in Iran being referred to the
UN Security Council.

-------------- -
ADVISES HOW TO MAKE REFERRAL TO UNSC EFFECTIVE
-------------- -


3. (S) IAEC Director General Gideon Frank said he understands
that a referral to the UNSC may not necessarily entail
punishment for Iran, but might only start a new track of
diplomacy with no guaranteed outcome. Frank said a referral
that merely opens up discussions with no concrete
requirements might dispel the Iranians' anxiety and let the
IAEA off the hook. Iran could then use the time necessary
for the UNSC to reach a common position on Iran to convert
enough UF-6 to yield significant quantities of feed for the
enrichment process. He recommended two measures to ensure
that this does not happen:

(a) have the referral accompanied by a Board of Governors
(BOG) resolution that requires Iran and the IAEA to take
well-defined interim actions while the UNSC is deliberating
Iran's case. The BOG resolution needs to make it clear that
Iran has "failed to yield reassuring answers to a variety of
questions" to date, and must also make it clear to the
Iranians what they must do to address uncertainties that have
persisted over the last two and a half years.

(b) coordinate with the UNSC President so that his decision
-- reflecting the UNSC's view -- makes it clear what Iran has
to do by a date certain in order to avoid punishment.

-------------- --------------
NEXT STEPS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE IN THE UN AND AT THE IAEA
-------------- --------------


4. (S) Frank observed that the next milestone will be Iranian
President Ahmadinejad's appearance before the UNSC the week
of September 12. Frank said that the Israeli UN mission will
likely be preoccupied with high-level visits and focused on
other issues, and would probably find it difficult to
respond. He said he is trying to notify "the right people"
within the MFA and Prime Minister's office so that the
appropriate response can be delivered quickly. Frank praised
FM Silvan Shalom's recent discussions on the Iran-IAEA issue
with the Spanish and French foreign ministers, saying Shalom
made all the right points. The Ambassador advised that PM
Sharon should try to connect the Iran nuclear threat issue
with Israeli disengagement in his speech at the UNGA by
arguing that the risk Israel took for peace through
disengagement can only pay off if the heightened existential
threat posed by Iran's nuclear program is mitigated. In
effect, Sharon would be saying, "I have paid my dues, and yet
I still face an over-the-horizon threat in the form of Iran's
nuclear ambitions."


5. (S) Regarding IAEA Director General ElBaradei's
anticipated report on Iran -- which the Israelis understand
may be released on September 14 -- Frank said Israel wants to
ensure that the report is accompanied by an explanation of
what it contains. If the Israelis get what they want,
readers will be led "through a process of guided reading" to
certain conclusions that ElBaradei appears reluctant to draw,
based on his reports to date. Frank said the IAEA says it is
"not in a position to be able to write about undeclared
activities." Frank termed "regrettable" the IAEA's inability
to hold Iran accountable, citing its silence in reaction to
Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Rohani's recent statement
that whatever activity Iran had recently suspended, it did so
because Iran had no need for the activity. Frank said he was
pleased that the French expressed outrage, but lamented that
there should have been more outrage from the international
community, observing that the French reaction never made the
press.

-------------- --------------
NEXT STEPS IN ISRAEL'S DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS
-------------- --------------


6. (S) Levite said PM Sharon is definitely meeting with Putin
on the margins of the UNGA. Frank will meet with the
Russians in Vienna during an upcoming IAEA conference there.
Frank said he is also trying to arrange a meeting between the
Israeli and Russian National Security Councils as soon as
possible, possibly on September 25 in Moscow. Israel's goal,
he clarified, is to "hit every single guy in their system."
The Ambassador observed that Putin seems curious about what
he will be able to achieve as G-8 President when Russia
assumes the presidency. This gives the U.S., Israel and
other like-minded countries the opportunity to say, "If you
want to be a player in the Middle East, you need to be
responsible in your relations with Iran." Levite wondered
aloud what Russia's motives are in its relations with Iran.
The Ambassador suggested that much of what Russia does with
Iran has to do with recovering old financial debts that
extend back to Soviet relations with the Middle East.

-------------- --------------
ISRAEL GRATEFUL FOR COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR ISSUES
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Frank assessed U.S.-Israel cooperation on dealing with
Iran's nuclear program -- in capitals and in Vienna -- as
very good and expressed his hope that it would remain that
way. The Ambassador agreed, observing that such cooperation
allowed the U.S. and Israel to deal with differences before
they could turn into problems. One example was how the two
sides treated the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on how
long it would take Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability. Levite said that based on inquiries in
Washington, the GOI now assesses that Iran is currently five
years away from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, but
that beyond that, there are many uncertainties.


8. (S) Acknowledging difficulty in assessing the situation in
Iran, Levite asked the Ambassador what the U.S would do to
try to understand Iran better if it were in Israel's
situation. The Ambassador replied that Israel might consider
looking to the Gulf States -- particularly the United Arab
Emirates -- as barometers for assessing Iran. Unlike Egypt
and Saudi Arabia, their domestic situations allow their
governments to react to developments in Iran that can provide
useful indicators. The Ambassador observed that the USG
watches Iran from the Gulf, and that Israel's assets there
are reliable as well.


9. (C) Levite praised U.S.-Israel cooperation on other
nuclear-related projects, noting a successful visit by a DOE
delegation in early September (septel) to exchange
information on the results of a hypothetical detonation of a
radiological device in Tel Aviv. He expressed his hope that
the level and content of the cooperation would continue.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
KURTZER