NSA EILAND SAYS DISENGAGEMENT GOING WELL, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005082 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015 TAGS: KPAL KWBG PGOV PREL EG IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ECONOMY AND FINANCE SUBJECT: NSA EILAND SAYS DISENGAGEMENT GOING WELL, BUT DISAGREEMENT PERSISTS OVER CUSTOMS ENVELOPE Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 15 meeting with NEA A/S Welch and the Ambassador, Israeli NSC Director Giora Eiland and Deputy Director Eran Etzion assessed that it seems disengagement "is going to be easier than expected." The majority of the discussion centered on what would happen after disengagement, particularly on the customs envelope. Israel's preferred option is to move the customs point to Kerem Shalom; if Palestinians do not agree, the GOI will move the customs envelope to the border between Gaza and Israel. A/S Welch countered that this option could leave Gaza worse off, and suggested that other options were viable. A/S Welch cautioned that the Israeli proposals could make Gaza "a prison," and urged that Israel make Gaza "more open, more prosperous, more free, more secure." Eiland objected that the world expects Israel to continue to be responsible for Gaza and its economy, while the point of disengagement is to abdicate that responsibility. End summary. -------------- Disengagement "Easier Than Expected" -------------- ¶2. (C) NSC Director Giora Eiland seemed optimistic about the disengagement process, saying it "seems it is going to be easier than expected." He estimated that half of the settlements in Gaza are almost empty, and that "most people understand that it is more or less over." The only real problem Eiland identified is the approximately 4,000 people who infiltrated Gaza and are potentially violent. ¶3. (C) The behavior of the Palestinians has also been "better than expected," according to Eiland. He was quick to point out, however, that this behavior did not result from PA determination and effectiveness, but from the clear decision by Hamas to not "undermine the evacuation." Eiland said the ongoing restraint in Palestinian violence during disengagement depends on Hamas maintaining this policy. -------------- Difficulties After Disengagement -------------- ¶4. (C) Eiland highlighted four main difficulties after disengagement. Israel's domestic problem, in particular the deep division within Israeli society over disengagement, is serious. A second difficulty stems from Hamas. Eiland said that Hamas has announced that it will return to violence after the withdrawal is complete. Hamas wants to differentiate itself from the PA, particularly before the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Hamas leaders do not want Palestinians to perceive the PA as successful after disengagement, and, therefore, Eiland claimed, have no incentive to refrain from attacking Israel after the withdrawal. ¶5. (C) A third difficulty comes in the area of the Philadelphi strip. Eiland said that there has been a "semi-formal decision" to evacuate Philadelphi, and that an arrangement was finalized with the GOE August 14 that Egyptian border guards would be deployed along the border. Eiland clarified that while all GOI ministers support the decision to evacuate Philadelphi, many are uncomfortable with the idea of the deployment of Egyptian border guards. Eiland and Etzion disagreed about how important the upcoming Knesset vote on this issue will be. Eiland maintained that, while Israel will withdraw from Philadelphi, there will be no real evacuation until the Egyptians are deployed. Etzion predicted that Israel will be out of Philadelphi before the end of 2005. -------------- Customs Envelope -------------- ¶6. (C) Eiland identified the customs envelope as the fourth difficulty. He argued that the more open the border between Gaza and Egypt, the more strict the customs and security measures between Gaza and Israel and Gaza and the West Bank will have to be. He acknowledged that the Palestinians want more openness along both borders, but said "we cannot allow both simultaneously." He maintained that dangerous people and goods could freely move into Gaza from Egypt, and then into Israel from Gaza. Eiland outlined four possible options: ¶A. Israel's proposal: move the customs border to the Gaza/Israel border at Erez and Karni. ¶B. The PA proposal: maintain the customs point at Rafah (on the border with Egypt),with third country nationals monitoring customs. ¶C. Israeli compromise proposal: move the Egypt/Gaza crossing southeast to Kerem Shalom on the Gaza/Egypt/Israel border. There, the amount of Israeli involvement could be negotiable, with gradual transfer of responsibility to Palestinians. ¶D. Other compromise proposal: that Rafah be controlled by Palestinians, but only used for people. Goods could cross through Nitzana and then into Gaza with full Israeli inspection. The Israelis do not like this option, according to Eiland, because people carry baggage, and, therefore, dangerous or suspect goods would end up passing through Rafah. -------------- Customs Options -------------- ¶7. (C) Eiland asserted that Prime Minister Sharon wants to pursue option A, believing that it most completely rids Israel of responsibility for what happens in Gaza. A/S Welch responded that option A would effectively turn Gaza into a "big prison," cutting it off economically from Israel and the West Bank, and making it even less economically viable and less open than it currently is. The Ambassador suggested that the GOI focus on a performance-based arrangement, easing their own customs check when and if the Palestinians prove they are controlling their border with Egypt. A/S Welch suggested that the customs point be at Rafah with the help of third country nationals, and that Israel only become more strict if the GOI discovers that the PA is not doing its part on the Egyptian border. ¶8. (C) Eiland and Etzion objected to both of these suggestions. Eiland said that once Israel is out of Gaza, it can exercise the right of any government - that of controlling access to its country. He also objected to the idea of other nations helping to monitor customs. "We cannot trust any third party" to certify that goods meet Israeli standards. Eiland complained, "Everyone treats us as the only ones to be responsible for the economy of the Palestinians. Everything can flow out through Egypt. Why should we be responsible for anything else?" ¶9. (C) In response to A/S Welch's question about what would happen if the two sides do not reach agreement, Eiland said the GOI would go back to option A. A/S Welch cautioned that this option would "set up the worst possible situation for yourselves in terms of the image of what you created," by, in effect, cutting off Gaza from Israel and the West Bank, and weakening the PA. Etzion requested clarification on the USG position on the customs options. A/S Welch replied that there is an emerging American position, that Gaza should be "more open, more prosperous, more free and more secure" the day after. Eiland appeared eager to find agreement with A/S Welch and the Ambassador on this point, and, when none was reached, expressed disappointment that the meeting had not been "more pleasant." -------------- The New Status of Territories -------------- ¶10. (C) After disengagement from the northern West Bank, the GOI plans to transfer control of civil responsibilities to the PA, but maintain security responsibilities. Eiland claims that the GOI intends to eventually transfer those as well; "sooner or later we will have to transfer security to Palestinians, but we would like to negotiate that -- not just give it away." ¶11. (C) Etzion raised the issue of the status of Gaza after Israeli withdrawal. Eiland commented that the GOI would rather not have a UN resolution, but that they would appreciate a USG announcement defining the status of Gaza, suggesting something along the lines of, "Once Israel does a, b and c, Gaza is no longer occupied." Eiland asked for USG views. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER