IDF DEPUTY COS KAPLINSKY BRIEFS A/S WELCH ON LATEST VIOLENCE, IDF-PA SECURITY COORDINATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004405



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2015

TAGS: PREL, KWBG, PTER, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: IDF DEPUTY COS KAPLINSKY BRIEFS A/S WELCH ON

LATEST VIOLENCE, IDF-PA SECURITY COORDINATION



Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

.



1. (C) Assistant Secretary Welch, Ambassador Kurtzer, Lt Gen

Ward and NSC Director Mustafa met with MGen Moshe Kaplinsky,

the IDF Deputy Chief of the General Staff, BGen Yossi

Kuperwasser, IDI Chief of Production, and BGen Udi Dekel,

Chief of Strategic Planning Branch, in the evening of July

14. The previously planned meeting took place shortly after

news came in that a Qassam rocket fired into Israel from the

Gaza Strip had killed an Israeli woman in Nativ Ha Asara.



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Recent Violence

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2. (C) Reviewing events of the day (July 14),BGen

Kuperwasser reported that IDF soldiers killed a wanted PIJ

activist with ties to the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade early that

morning in the Rafidiya neighborhood of Nablus. The PIJ

organization in Gaza reacted by firing a Qassam rocket that

impacted near the Israeli city of Sderot on Thursday morning,

causing no casualties. PIJ cells fired additional rockets

and mortars at Israeli targets in the Gush Katif settlement

block. Hamas was not active during the morning events.



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Hamas Joins the Fray

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3. (C) Hamas cells, however, joined the attacks after 1200

hrs, firing four mortars and/or rockets that impacted Nahal

Oz (inside the Green Line),lightly injuring three IDF

soldiers, Kuperwasser explained. Cells also fired rockets

and mortars at Israeli targets in and near the Gaza Strip.

At approximately 1800 hrs, four rockets struck the Netiv Ha

Asara moshav inside Israel north of Gaza, killing the

22-year-old Israeli woman and wounding her boyfriend,

Kuperwasser stated.



4. (S) Hamas involvement in the fighting was likely due to

two factors, Kuperwasser assessed. First, Hamas was unhappy

with how PA President Abbas translated the results of his

recent meeting with Hamas leader Khalid al Mashal in

Damascus. Hamas believed that Abbas had agreed to allow the

"follow-up committee" composed of representatives from the

opposition, including Hamas, to participate in operational

decisions in running the Gaza Strip through disengagement

prior to the PLC elections. Abbas, according Kuperwasser,

may have left Mashal with that impression in Damascus, but

when Abbas returned home to strong criticism from his own

party, advised opposition groups that they would only have an

advisory role in Gaza administration. Kuperwasser said he

believes that Hamas displayed its displeasure by "welcoming"

Abbas' arrival in Gaza on the afternoon of July 14 with the

attacks on Israeli targets, thus sending a strong message to

Abbas that it would act in any matter it felt appropriate

without consulting him. The attacks placed Abbas under

enormous pressure. Kuperwasser also acknowledged that Hamas

joined the fighting on Thursday afternoon in response to

continued IDF operations in the northern West Bank.



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PA-IDF Security Coordination

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5. (S) MGen Kaplinsky characterized overall security

coordination with the PA in recent weeks as very good. He

stated that there have been three meetings with PA MOI MGen

Nasir Yusif's deputy, BGen Jamal Abu Zayd ) one that he

attended, and two attended by MGen "Haki" Harel, the IDF

chief of Planning Branch. The meetings have been good, he

stated, very "sincere," with wide representation from all of

the PA security organizations. The two sides agreed to meet

every 10-14 days at the operational level, with each meeting

followed up by meetings between field commanders. Kaplinsky

said that coordination has been good, with both sides talking

about specifics on the map. The two sides, he stated, have

also agreed to conduct joint exercises (scheduled for early

August). Kaplinsky stated that the IDF still intended to

meet with PA counterparts next week, despite the ongoing

attacks.



6. (S) Unfortunately, Kaplinsky stated, despite the good

coordination, no results are apparent on the ground. This

led him to conclude that the PA counterparts with whom the

IDF is coordinating do not have power over forces on the

ground. Nasir Yusif's influence on the ground, he stated, is

poor. During every meeting with the PA, he said, the IDF

drives home the point that it will not disengage under fire.

Disengagement, however, has begun and "we are under fire."

Kaplinsky gave credit to the PA for its efforts against

smuggling tunnels. The PA's inability, however, to arrest

Hassan Madhun, the Fatah cell leader responsible for numerous

attacks against the Gaza crossing facilities, underscored its

overall ineffectiveness. The IDF, he stated, will continue

to talk and coordinate with the PA, but it is not happy with

the level of PA activity on the ground.



7. (S) Ambassador Kurtzer asked Kaplinsky what realistic

steps he would counsel Nasir Yusif to take if he were Yusif's

advisor. Kaplinsky said he would would first advise Yusif to

take action against PIJ. PIJ is a small group, without

popular Palestinian support. Nasir Yusif has the capability

to challenge PIJ, even with his divided forces. He should

stop them from conducting attacks and arrest them. Second,

Kaplinsky continued, the PA leadership should provide support

to commanders who undertake difficult actions against

opposition groups on the ground. It is critical that the PA

leadership provide moral and verbal support to its commanders

in the field. Kaplinsky's third hypothetical suggestion was

to strengthen the "determination" of PA leaders to ensure

that orders, once given, are fulfilled. LT Gen Ward

concurred, stressing the need to verify that orders have been

implemented.



8. (S) Welch commended the IDF for its "huge" step forward in

coordination with the PA, and stressed the importance of

continuing the coordination. Ward underscored that the types

of attacks now occurring come as no surprise, because

everyone expected opposition elements to attempt to derail

disengagement. What matters is not playing into the hands of

these elements.



9. (S) Welch asked if the PA had contacted the IDF for

permission to transfer PIJ member Abu Nidal al Saadi from

Tulkarm to the PA prison in Jericho. Kaplinsky and

Kuperwasser said they were not certain whether the PA had

made such a request, but stated that the IDF normally

authorized such transfers. Kuperwasser explained, however,

that Nasir Yusif's forces did not have control of Saadi. PA

Special Forces personnel under Bashir Nafiah were housing him

and several other PIJ members in his headquarters in Tulkarm,

to the consternation and protest of the local National

Security Forces commander.



10. (S) Turning to another PIJ figure from Tulkarm,

Kuperwasser recounted that PIJ leader Louay al Saadi was

released from Israeli prison in January 2004 as part of the

Hizballah prisoner exchange deal. Saadi returned to the

Tulkarm area and began organizing terror attacks.

Kuperwasser said that Saadi is responsible for the February

25 suicide bombing at the Stage Club Tel Aviv, the car bomb

that exploded near Mevo Dotan following the Stage Club

attack, the killing of a Hermesh resident in a shooting

attack on his vehicle an attempt to send two bombers into

Jerusalem on May 31, the July 12 suicide bombing in Netanya

and car bomb near Shavei Shomron. Kuperwasser said that the

PA security forces in Tulkarm had close contacts with Saadi,

in an attempt to recruit him and his cell members into the

security forces. President Abbas, he said, was aware of the

effort and was disappointed that Saadi refused to join, now

realizing he cannot be integrated into the PA.



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Netanya Bombing

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11. (S) Kuperwasser charged that PIJ cells in the territories

maintain close ties with PIJ headquarters in Damascus, which,

for example, regularly provides funds, particularly following

successful operations. He said that Louay al-Saadi received

two payments of $15,000 each following the Stage attack.

Damascus also has provided operational guidance to the field.

There was a debate within the Damascus headquarters

concerning whether it should support the "tahdiya," or calm,

Kuperwasser explained, but as far as he knew no instructions

were ever sent to the field telling it to cease operations.

A couple of days prior to the Netanya bombing, Kuperwasser

said that Saadi's organization provided "hints" to the

Damascus leadership that it was planning an attack. The IDF

was not able to decipher the "hints", but assumes that

Damascus did not object to the attack. Following the Netanya

attack, the Tulkarm-based cell admitted to the attack in

messages to Damascus. Damascus, he said, showed no dismay

over the message, and in fact was pleased. In the meantime,

the Tulkarm PIJ took responsibility for the attack publicly

through Reuters/al Jazira. The Damascus-based PIJ leadership

instructed its leaders in Gaza to "clarify" with the PA that

it was not/not behind the attack. Likewise, Kuperwasser

stated, the Damascus-based PIJ headquarters ordered groups in

Lebanon and Syria not/not to talk.



12. (S) Following the attack, Kuperwasser continued,

President Abbas attempted to convince the Damascus-based PIJ

leadership not to admit to being behind the attack. Abbas,

according to Kuperwasser, made an enormous effort to reach

the Damascus leadership, arguing that admitting to the attack

could lead to the collapse of the "cease-fire". PIJ

leadership subsequently announced July 14 that it was bound

to the "tahdiya" as long as Israel refrained from targeting

the group, essentially stating that it was not bound to the

cease-fire, Kuperwasser commented. (Note: Abbas issued

orders to arrest Saadi on the evening of July 14.)



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Sensitive Time

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13. (S) BGEN Dekel commented that we are in a sensitive

period, as disengagement has, for all practical purposes,

already begun. Details are not important, he continued; the

PA must take actions to stop the terror. Kuperwasser pointed

out that Abbas had used the word "terror" in his denouncement

of the Netanya bombing, his first public use of the word in

such a context since 2003. No other PA leaders, however,

have followed his lead, he commented. The PA must treat

these attacks as terror, if progress is to be made, he said.

Kaplinsky closed the meeting by reaffirming the IDF

commitment to continue to coordinate with the PA in the hope

that the process would lead to results on the ground.



14. (U) A/S Welch, Lt. Gen. Ward and Ms. Mustafa cleared this

message.



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