ISRAEL'S CONSTRUCTIVE NO-CONFIDENCE MECHANISM:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001549

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL IS GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S CONSTRUCTIVE NO-CONFIDENCE MECHANISM:
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? (C-NE4-01236)

REF: 2004 STATE 268778

Classified By: Political Counselor Norman Olsen for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: The 2003 revision of Israel's no-confidence
vote mechanism to require that all Knesset members voting
no-confidence pre-designate a single candidate to form a new
government was designed to keep government opponents from
resorting too frequently to time-consuming no-confidence
motions. In practice, however, opposition parties often file
multiple no-confidence motions each week on various and
sundry issues -- from closure of a hospital to withdrawal
from Gaza -- to grumble about their pet issues, even with no
hope of toppling the government. So why, then, do they
bother? This cable examines the Knesset's use of the
no-confidence vote and the understanding by the media,
academia, and Knesset members of this political tool. End
summary.

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Constructive No-Confidence: Alternative Leader Named
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2. (C) The constructive no-confidence mechanism has been in
effect under Israel's revised Basic Laws since January 2003,
and requires that sponsors of any no-confidence motion name
-- in the motion -- a Knesset member who, in the event the
motion passes, will be charged by the president "with the
task of forming a new Government." Passage of a constructive
no-confidence motion requires an absolute Knesset majority of
61 out of 120 members, as with the previous law. In the
event that the constructive no-confidence vote passes, the
government "shall be deemed to have resigned on the day of
the expression of no confidence," and the designated MK, know
as the replacement prime minister, is given up to 42 days to
form a new government. If that Knesset member cannot do so,
elections are mandated.


3. (C) According to the Knesset's Rules of Procedure, only
parties represented in the Knesset can sponsor no-confidence
motions, and parties with fewer than 10 MKs are limited to
three no-confidence motions in a parliamentary year. Each
no-confidence motion must include "the written consent of the
Knesset member" who would serve as replacement prime minister
in the event the motion carries. Therefore, if the secular
Shinui party, for example, were to sponsor a constructive
no-confidence motion on the GOI's failure to promote civil
marriage legislation, attached to that motion would be the
written consent of an individual MK, most likely Shinui
leader Tommy Lapid, to serve as replacement prime minister.
All MKs voting for that motion would knowingly also be voting
for Tommy Lapid to be tasked with forming a new government in
the event the motion passes.


4. (C) Eli Hazan, legislative assistant in the office of the
coalition whip, told poloff that in all such no-confidence
motions to date, the replacement prime minister has
invariably been the leader of the party sponsoring the
motion, although he or she could be any member of the
Knesset. The mechanism by which Likud rebels, or members of
any other party, would actually decide to submit a
no-confidence motion against their own leader and list
someone other than the current party leader as replacement
prime minister is far from clear. Since the Knesset rules
require that such motions can be submitted only by parties --
not individuals -- the Knesset leadership would need to make
a determination that such a motion was actually submitted on
behalf of a party, not just on behalf of some members of a
party. Complicating that determination is the fact that each
party's decision-making process is different. Likud, for
instance, has a strong, vocal Central Committee that party
leader and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has nonetheless
sometimes ignored. Thus, would a motion submitted by 13
Likud rebels with Central Committee endorsement and listing
someone other than Sharon as replacement prime minister
constitute a legitimate no-confidence motion in the eyes of
the Knesset leadership and lawyers? Shas, on the other hand,
relies solely on the word of its spiritual leader, Rabbi
Ovadia Yosef for decisions of this magnitude. Equally
important are the political costs that a replacement prime
minister such as Bibi Netanyahu would face by allowing his
name to be put forward. Justice Ministry Liaison and Likud
MK Paz Barnett noted to poloff that Netanyahu earlier
declined to allow right-wing MKs to submit his name as a
replacement prime minister. He also said that the chances
are very unlikely of Likud submitting a no-confidence motion
against Sharon.

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Number of No-Confidence Motions Increases
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5. (C) According to Israel Democracy Institute Senior Fellow
Asher Arian, politicians who originally pressed for the
constructive no-confidence provision intended it to limit the
use of no-confidence votes and thereby ensure greater
governmental stability. They reasoned, according to Arian,
that requiring that a replacement prime minister be named in
the motion would reduce the number of motions since it would
be more difficult to achieve consensus on a replacement.
Arian pointed out that the number of no-confidence motions
has in fact increased since the introduction of the
constructive no-confidence motion. He provided poloff with
data showing that the average monthly number of no-confidence
votes has increased from 2.9 votes in the last Knesset,
before the constructive no-confidence provision took effect,
to 3.5 votes in the current Knesset.


6. (C) Likud MK Uzi Landau, who characterizes himself as the
father of the "constructive no-confidence motion," told
poloff that his intention was to reduce the number of
no-confidence motions by making success of the motion more
difficult. Landau lamented that his brainchild has not had
that effect. MOJ advisor Barnett commented that the
requirement for a replacement prime minister hardly
constrains those filing no-confidence motions. MKs, he said,
are concerned about who is listed on the no-confidence motion
as replacement leader only when there is a chance the motion
will receive 61 votes. So far, the highest vote total in
favor of any constructive no-confidence motion has been a
56-56 tie. Even then, Barnett commented, MKs may support
another party's no-confidence motion having calculated that
the replacement prime minister is incapable of forming a new
coalition. The no-confidence vote thus becomes a de facto
vote for new elections.

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MKs Use No-Confidence Vote as Soapbox
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7. (C) The constructive no-confidence vote is -- regardless
of its authors' intent -- mostly used by MKs as a public
vehicle to make political brownie points with their
constituencies without seriously threatening the government.
The ultra-Orthodox Shas party, for example, might sponsor a
no-confidence motion against the Sharon government to protest
cuts in child allowances. Shas knows, however, that it will
not obtain 61 votes in favor of the motion, and that the
Shinui party, which leads the opposition, will not only
oppose the resolution in substance, but would never agree to
Shas leader Eli Yishai as replacement prime minister. Shas,
however, sponsors the motion regardless, in part for the
opportunity to raise the issue in the televised Knesset
session. Shas MK Amnon Cohen told Poloff that his colleagues
understand the no-confidence mechanism well and that they use
it to debate issues, but that "they don't treat it
seriously." Cohen assessed that the no-confidence votes
every Monday "are a good use of time" for the purpose of
discussion.


8. (U) National Union MK Zvi Hendel echoed Cohen's
reasoning. According to a January 31 Ha'aretz article,
Hendel said that his faction submits the motions because "the
discussion of the no-confidence motion provides a platform
for voicing political positions in detail, expressing
feelings and shaping public opinion." The Ha'aretz article
also maintained that no-confidence motions have presented
less of a threat and nuisance to the Sharon government since
Shinui departed the coalition and subsequently became the
lead opposition party in January. The author of the article
"Fractured Factions of the Opposition," Gideon Alon, pointed
out that several parties in the opposition, such as the
religious Shas party, do not even recognize the arch-secular
Lapid as leading the opposition and that, because of the
opposition's divisions, no-confidence motions cannot gain the
necessary 61 votes to topple the government. "The main
beneficiary to (sic) this situation," he wrote, "is the
coalition, which needs no effort to vote down the
no-confidence motions one after another."


9. (C) According to Alon, the current situation contrasts
greatly to the situation before Shinui became the lead
opposition party. At that time, Likud MK and coalition
chairman Gideon Sa'ar could not be absent from no-confidence
votes as he was needed to rally majorities against them.
Sharon's senior advisor, Dov Weissglas, once complained to
emboffs before Shinui took over as leader of the opposition
that the weekly no-confidence votes were time-consuming for
Prime Minister Sharon, since he often had to attend the votes
to ensure that they were defeated.

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No-Confidence: Public Entertainment
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10. (C) While academics and political commentators for the
most part understand the mechanics of the constructive
no-confidence vote, journalists for the major Israeli media
reporting on Israel's fast-moving political scene often
exaggerate the importance of no-confidence votes, perhaps
partly to sell papers. Major Israeli newspapers, for
example, often use headlines claiming that Sharon "narrowly
survives" a no-confidence vote when the tally of yeas and
nays is close, even if the motion received far fewer than the
61 votes necessary to topple the government. The media
"doesn't understand (the no-confidence vote)," Alon
commented, "and the public certainly doesn't understand it."
For the opposition parties, Arian commented, it is "Monday's
show." Arian compared the public's interest in the outcome
of no-confidence votes to its interest in sports events. It
is entertainment, according to Arian, "an escape from
reality." The public, he said, "just cares about who comes
out on top."

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