POST SUPPORTS EXTENDING TPS FOR HONDURAS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 002289 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR WHA/CEN, PRM/PRP, WHA/EPSC, DRL/IL, AND EB STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC/CAM (LLIBANATI) TREASURY FOR DDOUGLASS LABOR FOR ILAB GUATEMALA FOR COMMATT MLARSEN AND AGATT E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SMIG PREL ECON EAID HO SUBJECT: POST SUPPORTS EXTENDING TPS FOR HONDURAS REF: A. A) ZIFF/WILLIARD E-MAIL 10/21/05 ¶B. B) STATE 99578 ¶1. (U) Summary: While much post-Mitch reconstruction efforts have been completed, some physical infrastructure, particularly housing stocks, remains inadequate. The stagnant Honduran economy and continued weak job creation make it unlikely the country could provide the jobs, HEALTH care, housing, and schooling for the approximately 87,000 people that might return if Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in the U.S. is not renewed. Failing to renew TPS could undermine the economic performance of CAFTA, MCC, and HIPC just as they are being launched, leading to a loss of faith by the Honduran poor in the ability of democratic governance to deliver a better quality of life. This erosion of public support for democratic governance -- already seen spreading throughout the region -- makes future economic reform much harder to impose, increases incentives for emigration and criminality, and plays into the hands of populists (and worse) who seek to undermine USG interests in the region. To give both the U.S. and Honduras the best chance for avoiding this nightmarish future, TPS should be extended until Honduras can greet its returning citizens with open arms, not empty pockets. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Reconstruction ) Infrastructure Would be Strained -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) With the help of the international donor community (of which USAID is the largest bilateral contributor),Honduras has largely recovered from the physical devastation of Hurricane Mitch. However, USAID has recently programmed an additional USD 2 million in recovery program funds primarily focused on water and sanitation activities. These programs are particularly targeted at rural areas, precisely the areas from which many of the emigrants covered by TPS protections come. A massive inflow of returning emigrants to these rural areas could place significant strain on the already overtaxed resources. An extension of the TPS program would allow USAID programs additional time to achieve results, further strengthening and repairing these rural facilities and thereby improving rural municipalities' capacity to absorb returning emigrants in the future. ¶3. (SBU) An area of particularly acute shortfall is housing. Post estimates that 33,000 homes were destroyed and another 50,000 homes damaged during Hurricane Mitch, with additional homes destroyed by recent violent weather including flooding caused by Hurricanes Stan, Wilma, and Beta in 2005. Not all have been rebuilt, and rapid uncontrolled urbanization has exacerbated this problem by creating housing shortages in some regions. Many families and workers have been left to make do with temporary solutions. USAID, the largest single donor in this area, financed the delivery of 6,100 permanent housing units. Many homes remain damaged, and damage by hurricanes to economic sectors (particularly agricultural production) put additional pressure on populations to move to Honduras' already bursting cities or to emigrate to the U.S. USAID and other assistance programs aim to help the agricultural sector to fully recover, and to create rural employment by diversifying and strengthening agricultural production. This is crucial to rural recovery in Honduras, but for this strategy to be effective in attracting expatriate or urban Hondurans back to their hometowns, sufficient additional time must be granted under TPS to ensure that housing stocks are also replenished to meet the needs of these returnees. -------------- -------------- Economic Conditions ) Benefits Not Reaching the Street Yet -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In contrast to infrastructure reconstruction, the Honduran economy has never regained sufficient growth to generate much-needed employment and financial resources for adequate public services. Economic growth of 4.5 percent in 2004 was the first sign of economic recovery following depressed economic growth of about 2.5 percent per year over the 2001-2003 period. Even with this recent sign of the start of a recovery, economic growth rates have not kept up with annual population growth of 3.0 to 3.5 percent. As a result, job creation continues to be weak, with even educated job seekers often unemployed or under-employed. The GOH estimates true unemployment at approximately 34 percent, though those statistics are likely conservative. Commodity prices, including coffee, are starting to rise, and the light assembly sector (especially textiles) is starting to recover, but job growth in 2005 has not been sufficient to accommodate anticipated population growth, much less the potential 87,000 TPS returnees. ¶5. (SBU) Worse, wages remain weak, so even those with gainful employment find it increasingly difficult to improve the quality of life for themselves and their children. Disillusionment and lack of prospects for a better life only serve to increase pressure to emigrate to the U.S. or to join one of the ultra-violent maras (gangs) that have come to plague both the region and certain U.S. cities. Not renewing TPS, if it resulted in a significant flow of returnees to Honduras, would increase unemployment, put further downward pressure on wages, and spur further illegal immigration and criminality. Such a situation threatens both Honduran and U.S. security interests, and the networks these gangs forge could potentially be exploited by drugs and arms smugglers, or terrorists. ¶5. (SBU) Poverty is still widespread, with about 64 percent of the households living on USD 2 a day or less, and an estimated 45 percent living in extreme poverty (USD 1 a day or less). Because of the continued weak economic growth, remittances from Hondurans living overseas continue to grow rapidly, reaching USD 1.1 billion in 2004 and becoming the country's largest source of foreign exchange. Remittances account for the equivalent of 15 percent of Honduran GDP, and make tangible and urgent contributions to improving the quality of life of the poorest of Hondurans, especially in small towns. Extension of TPS would help ensure that this vital flow of remittances continue without reduction, providing much needed liquidity and purchasing power in the countryside to stimulate both consumption and investment and lay the foundations for sustainable growth. -------------- -------------- GOH Has Planted the Seeds; Needs Time to Let Them Grow -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) President Ricardo Maduro, upon assuming office in January 2002, inherited seriously deteriorated government finances and has spent most of his administration trying to remedy the structurally-caused imbalances. Honduras continued to run budget deficits of 5.5 percent of GDP in 2002 and 2003, totally unsustainable for a deeply indebted country with no recourse to international capital markets. The austerity measures put in place in 2002 and 2003 in order to regain macroeconomic balance and reach an agreement with the IMF meant that the government was hard pressed to expand health care, housing, schooling, and other social services just to accommodate the current population. In 2005, these austerity policies resulted in Honduras reaching the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Completion Point and earning significant debt restructuring and forgiveness. However, the benefits of this restructuring will not be felt for several years, and the hope that this recent debt forgiveness has inspired masks a fragile and largely stagnant employment market. ¶7. (SBU) The GOH therefore does not yet have in hand the funds it needs to expand HEALTH and educational opportunities for Honduras' current population, much less for an additional 87,000 people. Extending TPS would give Honduras the extra time it both needs and deserves to put these debt service savings to work. Failing to extend TPS threatens to choke this newborn in its crib, by both cutting remittances and increasing the number of Hondurans seeking state services. The GOH worked hard to regain its economic footing. Any precipitous action now by the U.S. could undo much of what has been accomplished. By failing to give these reforms needed time to bear fruit, such action could also destroy popular confidence in economic reform, prudent fiscal policies, and could lead to a loss of faith in the ability of democracy to deliver a better quality of life to the working person. In the face of populist messages such as those emanating from Venezuela, the U.S. cannot afford to undermine public support for democratic reform. Unnecessarily curtailing TPS, if it undercuts delivery of the economic benefits the last three years of austerity were to have delivered, threatens to do just that. ¶8. (SBU) Similarly, the USG has invested much over the last two years to promote sustainable economic growth in Honduras. Free trade and responsible investment are two of the keystones of U.S. foreign economic policy in the region. Both the recent passage of the Central America Free Trade Accord (CAFTA) and granting Honduras funding under the Millennium Challenge Corporation will both make important contributions to finally getting Honduras back on its feet. But it must be borne in mind that CAFTA has not entered into force yet, and MCC has yet to disburse any funds. Both of these initiatives, crucial though they are, will not generate their greatest benefits for the common Honduran for two years or more. TPS must be extended to give these initiatives the time they need to realize their full potential. If failing to renew TPS reduces the impact of the benefits of these programs, that result not only harms Honduras and reduces its growth prospects, it also robs the U.S. of credibility as it tries to encourage the acceptance of free trade and investment policies elsewhere. If the U.S., by failing to extend TPS, does not give CAFTA and MCC time to deliver results, their weakened performance will be used as an argument against us by those who prefer protectionism, statism, and populism over free markets and entrepreneurial spirit. So close to our goal of putting Honduras on a sure footing, we cannot permit a misjudgment on TPS renewal to turn our hard-won victory to defeat. ¶9. (SBU) In addition to the powerful humanitarian and economic motives for TPS extension outlined above, it should be noted that Honduras has been a steadfast ally of the U.S. throughout this period. Honduras' support for the Global War on Terrorism is steadfast and Honduras sent troops to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, although these troops have since returned. Honduras was the first country in the Western Hemisphere to sign and ratify an ICC Article 98 Agreement with the United States. Honduras is very supportive at the UN, sharing our views on resolutions covering such key issues as human rights, human cloning, and the Middle East, as well as at the OAS and during the Summit of the Americas process. On October 20, Honduras was ONE of only four countries to abstain on the vote for the UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention that the U.S. opposed. Honduras introduced a UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) resolution on Cuba, which passed in April 2004, and voted for the U.S.-drafted UNCHR resolution on Cuba, which passed in April 2005. In January 2005, Honduras accepted the resettlement of 20 Cubans from Guantanamo. ¶10. (SBU) Honduras has also been extremely cooperative on recent changes in the USG,s deportation policy from &catch and release8 to &catch and deport.8 Honduras was the first country to agree to use video teleconferencing (VTC) in its U.S. consulates with DHS/ICE to expedite and reduce the costs of processing Hondurans who had illegally entered the U.S. for deportation back to Honduras. Honduras is accepting a significant increase in deportees to reduce the 1,300)person backlog that existed, in addition to new illegal Hondurans being caught and deported, making the overall deportee numbers significantly higher. The GOH says it needs DHS assistance for the Centers for Returned Migrants to process this upswing in deportees. Part of the reason the GOH has been so proactive is a desire for (a) Hondurans to be included in any future Temporary Worker Program (TWP),and (b) TPS to be extended until such a TWP comes into effect. ¶11. (SBU) Comment: Honduras has only just turned the corner following the devastation of Hurricane Mitch. This country is not yet in a position to absorb either the loss in remittances or the surge in returnees that would come from a failure to renew TPS. Worse than the economic impacts, however, would be the political consequences of such a decision. Because Honduras could not absorb such losses, growth would weaken, wages could fall, and the long-suffering Honduran poor would yet again fail to receive the benefits promised. This erosion of public support for democratic governance -- already seen spreading throughout the region -- makes future economic reform much harder to impose, increases incentives for emigration and criminality, and plays into the hands of populists (and worse) who seek to undermine USG interests in the region. To give both the U.S. and Honduras the best chance for avoiding this nightmarish future, TPS should be extended until Honduras can greet its returning citizens with open arms, not empty pockets. Ford