Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI96
2005-01-11 10:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:
IT'S POLITICS FIRST AS TAIWAN DRAGS ITS FEET ON
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000096
SIPDIS
STATE PASS AIT/W
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015
TAGS: EAIR PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: IT'S POLITICS FIRST AS TAIWAN DRAGS ITS FEET ON
CHARTER FLIGHTS
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas H. Paal. Reason: 1.4 (B,D)
Taipei 00043
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000096
SIPDIS
STATE PASS AIT/W
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015
TAGS: EAIR PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: IT'S POLITICS FIRST AS TAIWAN DRAGS ITS FEET ON
CHARTER FLIGHTS
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas H. Paal. Reason: 1.4 (B,D)
Taipei 00043
1. (C) In response to the high-profile visit by opposition
Kuomintang (KMT) leaders to Beijing over the last few days to
discuss cross-strait relations with the Chinese Taiwan
Affairs Office (TAO),and the announcement of an
understanding on direct Taiwan-China flights during the
Chinese New Year, the Taiwan Government is running hard to
catch up and regain the lead on cross-Strait negotiations.
Taiwan government officials dismiss the KMT visit as useless
and call for a "second round" of China-Taiwan charter flight
negotiations based on a "first round" reportedly held last
Friday in Macao. Taiwan, however, insists that future
negotiations must include Taiwan government officials,
otherwise Taiwan will fall back to "Plan B" -- resurrecting
the Spring 2003 modus operandi by which Taiwan airlines
applied for, and received, permission to fly charter flights
to Mainland Chinese cities.
2. (C) Taiwan,s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Vice
Chairman Chiu Tai-san announced at a press conference on
January 10 that Taiwan and Mainland China representatives had
met last Friday, January 7, in Macao to negotiate on
cross-strait charter flights around the Chinese New Year,
February 9. The negotiations, he said, were based on the
three principals of two-way, reciprocal, and direct
(non-stopover) flights. He expressed the hope that a "second
round" of bilateral discussions would be held "as soon as
possible," which should be based on the "2002 Hong Kong
model" by which Hong Kong and Taiwan had worked out a flight
agreement. The rest of the day, MAC officials remained
incommunicado and unresponsive to AIT queries because, as one
MAC staffer candidly told us, they were "sitting in front of
the television" watching reports from Beijing of the KMT
delegation visit.
3. (C) MAC Chairman Joseph Wu told AIT on January 11 that
the Taiwan government had authorized Taipei Airlines
Association (TAA) Chairman Michael Lo to present its charter
flight proposal on air routes, number of flights, airline
companies, airports, and security issues to Chinese
representatives in Macao. The Chinese side responded, he
said, that they would study the Taiwan proposals. Wu hailed
the Macao talks as "a significant step forward" because
Chinese officials had met directly with Taiwan government
officials in the TAA delegation, indicating that China will
now meet with Taiwan government officials. Future
negotiations, which he termed the "second round," must
proceed on the basis of the 2002 "Hong Kong model" (the
negotiations between Hong Kong and Taiwan on reciprocal air
services. TAA can lead the delegation "as a front for
government officials" in the delegation.
4. (C) Wu insisted that the KMT negotiations in Beijing
meant "nothing at all." Taiwan is working to ensure that the
Chinese side will talk directly with Taiwan officials, but
the KMT undermined that effort, he lamented bitterly, by
publicly stating there was no need for government officials
to be involved and even that there was, in fact, no need for
negotiations. The Chinese offer to expand the number of
airports for direct charter flights to include Taichung,
moerover, was "fake," he argued, because China knew full well
this was a non-starter for security reasons (Note: presumably
the large Taiwan Air Force base in Taichung. End Note).
Rather, China must negotiate directly with Taiwan based on
the Hong Kong model, otherwise Taiwan will fall back on "Plan
B," using the Chinese New Year 2003 model in which only
Taiwan air carriers flew to the mainland.
5. (C) Comment. With the Monday meeting between the KMT
delegation led by LY members Tseng Yung-chuan and Chang
Hsiao-yen and PRC officials, the next move is clearly
Taiwan,s, specifically Taiwan,s DPP government. Some
technical considerations remain to be worked out, including
whether or not the flights will have to pass through a third
territory,s airspace, the participation of Chinese airlines,
and whether passengers will be restricted to Taiwan
businesspeople in the PRC. But the key issue comes down to a
single question -- how badly does the DPP want to negotiate
these details in formal meetings that include government
officials?
6. (C) Beijing and the KMT delegation have forced the DPP
government,s hand by offering charter flights that meet most
of both sides, demands. However, the PRC is prepared to
move forward based only on consultations between Taiwan and
PRC airline associations that would exclude officials. The
Taiwan government had tried to keep the upper hand by
maneuvering the PRC into a position where it would have to
turn down Taiwan,s offer for charter flights after bilateral
consultations or accept Taiwan's "officiality," but appears
to have been outmaneuvered itself.
7. (C) The cross-Strait charter flights have become totally
enmeshed in Taiwan,s post-election domestic politics between
the DPP and its main opposition party, the KMT. The DPP
government is between a rock and a hard place. If it accepts
the PRC-KMT offer, it will forego what now appears to be one
of the primary political goals of the charter flight exercise
-- bilateral meetings between PRC and Taiwan officials
(without official status, but with official sanction). It
will also hand a major political victory to the KMT, which
will be able to claim credit for the flights and cast the DPP
as a party unable to improve cross-Strait relations. If the
government turns down the offer, it will help the KMT portray
the DPP as the cause of increasing cross-Strait tension. The
pro-independence TSU has been highly critical of the KMT move
bypassing the government, but with the prospects of
successful charter flights this criticism may not resonate
with Taiwan,s political center.
PAAL
SIPDIS
STATE PASS AIT/W
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2015
TAGS: EAIR PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: IT'S POLITICS FIRST AS TAIWAN DRAGS ITS FEET ON
CHARTER FLIGHTS
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas H. Paal. Reason: 1.4 (B,D)
Taipei 00043
1. (C) In response to the high-profile visit by opposition
Kuomintang (KMT) leaders to Beijing over the last few days to
discuss cross-strait relations with the Chinese Taiwan
Affairs Office (TAO),and the announcement of an
understanding on direct Taiwan-China flights during the
Chinese New Year, the Taiwan Government is running hard to
catch up and regain the lead on cross-Strait negotiations.
Taiwan government officials dismiss the KMT visit as useless
and call for a "second round" of China-Taiwan charter flight
negotiations based on a "first round" reportedly held last
Friday in Macao. Taiwan, however, insists that future
negotiations must include Taiwan government officials,
otherwise Taiwan will fall back to "Plan B" -- resurrecting
the Spring 2003 modus operandi by which Taiwan airlines
applied for, and received, permission to fly charter flights
to Mainland Chinese cities.
2. (C) Taiwan,s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Vice
Chairman Chiu Tai-san announced at a press conference on
January 10 that Taiwan and Mainland China representatives had
met last Friday, January 7, in Macao to negotiate on
cross-strait charter flights around the Chinese New Year,
February 9. The negotiations, he said, were based on the
three principals of two-way, reciprocal, and direct
(non-stopover) flights. He expressed the hope that a "second
round" of bilateral discussions would be held "as soon as
possible," which should be based on the "2002 Hong Kong
model" by which Hong Kong and Taiwan had worked out a flight
agreement. The rest of the day, MAC officials remained
incommunicado and unresponsive to AIT queries because, as one
MAC staffer candidly told us, they were "sitting in front of
the television" watching reports from Beijing of the KMT
delegation visit.
3. (C) MAC Chairman Joseph Wu told AIT on January 11 that
the Taiwan government had authorized Taipei Airlines
Association (TAA) Chairman Michael Lo to present its charter
flight proposal on air routes, number of flights, airline
companies, airports, and security issues to Chinese
representatives in Macao. The Chinese side responded, he
said, that they would study the Taiwan proposals. Wu hailed
the Macao talks as "a significant step forward" because
Chinese officials had met directly with Taiwan government
officials in the TAA delegation, indicating that China will
now meet with Taiwan government officials. Future
negotiations, which he termed the "second round," must
proceed on the basis of the 2002 "Hong Kong model" (the
negotiations between Hong Kong and Taiwan on reciprocal air
services. TAA can lead the delegation "as a front for
government officials" in the delegation.
4. (C) Wu insisted that the KMT negotiations in Beijing
meant "nothing at all." Taiwan is working to ensure that the
Chinese side will talk directly with Taiwan officials, but
the KMT undermined that effort, he lamented bitterly, by
publicly stating there was no need for government officials
to be involved and even that there was, in fact, no need for
negotiations. The Chinese offer to expand the number of
airports for direct charter flights to include Taichung,
moerover, was "fake," he argued, because China knew full well
this was a non-starter for security reasons (Note: presumably
the large Taiwan Air Force base in Taichung. End Note).
Rather, China must negotiate directly with Taiwan based on
the Hong Kong model, otherwise Taiwan will fall back on "Plan
B," using the Chinese New Year 2003 model in which only
Taiwan air carriers flew to the mainland.
5. (C) Comment. With the Monday meeting between the KMT
delegation led by LY members Tseng Yung-chuan and Chang
Hsiao-yen and PRC officials, the next move is clearly
Taiwan,s, specifically Taiwan,s DPP government. Some
technical considerations remain to be worked out, including
whether or not the flights will have to pass through a third
territory,s airspace, the participation of Chinese airlines,
and whether passengers will be restricted to Taiwan
businesspeople in the PRC. But the key issue comes down to a
single question -- how badly does the DPP want to negotiate
these details in formal meetings that include government
officials?
6. (C) Beijing and the KMT delegation have forced the DPP
government,s hand by offering charter flights that meet most
of both sides, demands. However, the PRC is prepared to
move forward based only on consultations between Taiwan and
PRC airline associations that would exclude officials. The
Taiwan government had tried to keep the upper hand by
maneuvering the PRC into a position where it would have to
turn down Taiwan,s offer for charter flights after bilateral
consultations or accept Taiwan's "officiality," but appears
to have been outmaneuvered itself.
7. (C) The cross-Strait charter flights have become totally
enmeshed in Taiwan,s post-election domestic politics between
the DPP and its main opposition party, the KMT. The DPP
government is between a rock and a hard place. If it accepts
the PRC-KMT offer, it will forego what now appears to be one
of the primary political goals of the charter flight exercise
-- bilateral meetings between PRC and Taiwan officials
(without official status, but with official sanction). It
will also hand a major political victory to the KMT, which
will be able to claim credit for the flights and cast the DPP
as a party unable to improve cross-Strait relations. If the
government turns down the offer, it will help the KMT portray
the DPP as the cause of increasing cross-Strait tension. The
pro-independence TSU has been highly critical of the KMT move
bypassing the government, but with the prospects of
successful charter flights this criticism may not resonate
with Taiwan,s political center.
PAAL