PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR WU LI-PEI TO STAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000877

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR WU LI-PEI TO STAY

Classified By: AIT Acting Director David Keegan, Reason(s): 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: After a two-hour meeting on March 3,
President Chen Shui-bian managed to dissuade Senior
Presidential Advisor Wu Li-pei from resigning his position.
Wu had threatened to follow fellow pro-independence
Presidential Advisors Koo Kwang-ming and Huang Chao-tang out
the door in protest against Chen's recent concessions to PFP
Chairman James Soong. Explaining his frustrations to AIT,
Wu said that he was disturbed by Chen's February 24
declaration that the "ROC" is the largest common denominator
between the DPP and PFP. Wu asserted that the two leaders
should have realized that the largest common denominator
between them is the land and the people of Taiwan. Wu also
lamented that Chen remained silent on Soong's dismissal of
Taiwan independence as an option for island's future. More
fundamentally, however, Wu said that he questions Chen's
leadership style and his commitment to principles he thought
they shared. End Summary.

Giving Chen Another Chance
--------------


2. (C) After a two-hour meeting with President Chen Shui-bian
on March 3, former Formosa Foundation Chairman Wu Li-pei
announced that he will remain in his position as Senior
Presidential Advisor, at least for the time being. Wu had
originally told AIT on February 27 that he wanted to resign
in protest over President Chen Shui-bian's February 24 ten
points joint statement with People First Party (PFP) Chairman
James Soong (Chu-yu). Fellow pro-independence leaders Koo
Kwang-ming and Huang Chao-tang had quit as Senior
Presidential Advisors on March 1 over the same issue, but Wu
decided to give Chen the courtesy of a meeting before
formalizing his resignation. Although Wu told AIT on March 1
that he did not expect anything that Chen would say to change
his mind, Wu later told the press after his meeting with Chen
that he understands the pressures that led the President to
make his February 24 statements.

The Problem with Chen-Soong Meeting
--------------


3. (C) Explaining why he is so disappointed with the ten
points statement, Wu told AIT that Chen's recognition of the
"Republic of China (ROC)" is not a problem, however, he is
disturbed by Chen's declaration that the "ROC" is the largest
common denominator between Chen and Soong. Wu asserted that
the two leaders should have realized that the largest common
denominator between them is the land and the people of
Taiwan. An outspoken opponent of the USG's "one China"
policy, Wu also pointed out that Soong declared at the
February 24 joint press conference that independence is not
an option for Taiwan's future status. He acknowledged to AIT
that Chen did not agree with Soong but lamented that Chen did
not disagree either. On March 1 veteran DPP and New Tide
leader Hong Chi-chang conceded Wu's point to AIT. Chen, Hong
said, could have eliminated much of the fundamentalist furor
over his meeting with Soong if he had added "independence" to
his recitation of Taiwan's future options in his joint news
conference with Soong.


4. (C) Wu maintained that only the 23 million people can
decide Taiwan's future not the president or Soong. Wu said
that he had initially supported Chen's overtures to the PFP
as a mean to break the policy gridlock of the past four
years, but bemoaned that "Chen went chasing after demons but
in the end got himself caught by the demon."

Questions about Chen's Leadership
--------------


5. (C) Wu indicated that he is resigning not only over the
Soong meeting but also because of his disillusionment with
Chen's leadership style. Wu told AIT that he is dismayed by
how easily Chen can change his mind. He said that all sorts
of people have come to him over the past year, including
former Presidential Office Secretary General Su Tseng-chang,
to ask advice on how to approach Chen. Wu said that he had
no access to the President and was uncertain of who actually
did. He acknowledged that senior presidential advisors, such
Koo Kwang-ming, Peng Ming-min, Lee Hong-hsi, are considered
party elders, but dismissed as exaggeration claims that they
could walk into Chen's office at anytime. Recalling the time
when people criticized Koo Kwang-ming for not informing Chen
before taking out an Washington Post advertisement urging the
U.S. to abandon the "One China" policy, Wu said that Koo made
three attempts to contact the president, but could not even
get the president's confidential secretary, Ma Yung-cheng, to
return his telephone call.


6. (C) Insisting that he is not the only person frustrated by
Chen's leadership, Wu said that he recently met with former
President Lee Teng-hui, and they ended up commiserating with
each other about Chen's fickleness. Lee had also recently
spoken publicly against the Chen-Soong joint statement,
questioning its legitimacy and calling Chen's action "wrong."
Wu said that both he and Lee feel that Chen has failed to
build on the momentum of last year's February 28 "Hand in
hand" Peace Rally to further the cause of Taiwan identity.

Chiou Dominating Foreign Policy
--------------


7. (C) Wu also described his frustration about being
dispatched by Chen to Washington in early February to explain
Taiwan's policy positions without being properly briefed. Wu
told AIT that Taiwan's relation with the U.S. is handled
exclusively by National Security Council (NSC) Secretary
General Chiou I-jen, and that Chiou has not included him in
his inner circle. Wu said he found himself being asked tough
questions about Taiwan's positions on various sensitive
issues by Washington officials and not knowing anything
beyond generalities.

Comment: Keeping the Fundamentalists at Bay?
--------------


8. (C) Presidential Office and DPP officials have admitted to
AIT that they and the president were surprised by the
vehemence of fundamentalist anger over the February 24
Chen-Soong meeting, but see no alternative to working with
opposition forces in a bid to control the political center
(Septel). Chen's 2004 victory and use of fundamentalist
themes in last autumn's legislative election campaign raised
expectations among core DPP pro-independence supporters that
the president would follow through on their agenda in his
final years of office. Chen administration officials say
they see no way to advance the government's foreign policy
and domestic agendas, while remaining captive to their "dark
Green" supporters. It remains to be seen whether such
calculated strategies will prevent Chen from appealing again
to these supporters in elections later this year.
PAAL