CHEN OFFERS NEW "1992" FORMULATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000865 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW SUBJECT: CHEN OFFERS NEW "1992" FORMULATION REF: A. TAIPEI 467 ¶B. TAIPEI 773 ¶C. TAIPEI 819 ¶D. BEIJING 3158 Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) President Chen Shui-bian used a March 1 teleconference with European parliamentarians to offer a new formulation aimed at finessing the Taiwan-PRC deadlock over "one China." Chen stated that Taiwan "hopes to advance cross-Strait dialogue and consultations based on the results of the 1992 Hong Kong talks." National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor Lin Jin-chang told AIT that the inclusion of the term "results" was aimed at responding to the PRC's demand that Taiwan accept the disputed "1992 consensus" as a precondition to renewed cross-Strait dialogue. Lin added that the new language is a direct outgrowth of the February 2 meeting between Taiwan Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chief Secretary Patricia Lin and PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs SIPDIS Office (TAO) Deputy Director Sun Yafu (Ref A). "We now know they need a reference to the exchange of messages after the 1992 Hong Kong talks,'" Lin stated, "but they need to also remember that we are not in a position to acknowledge publicly the existence of a '1992 consensus.'" Carrots as Well as Sticks -------------- ¶2. (C) The NSC's Lin told AIT that Chen decided to float the new formulation on March 1 in hopes of bolstering the hands of PRC moderates in the lead-up to the National People's Congress (NPC) session. Lin added that the NSC has urged the president to offer moderate voices in Beijing at least some ammunition to tone down the language in the Anti-Secession Law draft. "We need a carrot as well as a stick" in response to Beijing's NPC moves, he added. Lin said he hoped the USG would bring Chen's March 1 formulation to Beijing's attention, bemoaning that the Taiwan media missed the president's new "1992" language in their coverage of his speech. Lin claimed that Chen's decision to articulate his May 20, 2000 "five no's" pledge during his February 24 meeting with People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (Ref B) was also meant as a positive message to Beijing ahead of the NPC meeting. ¶3. (C) Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chief Secretary Jan Jyh-horng separately told AIT that Taipei has not received a reply from the TAO to Taiwan's February 2 offer to hold talks in a third country over resolving the "1992" deadlock. Jan said that Taipei is prepared to work towards a compromise on the "1992" issue, but cautioned that if the language in the PRC's proposed Anti-Secession Law is overly provocative, Taipei may reconsider its willingness to be flexible. Next Steps: Preparing for the Worst -------------- ¶4. (C) Chen's recent overtures notwithstanding, the NSC's Lin said that Taipei fully expects the PRC to go ahead with NPC action on some form of an Anti-Secession Law. Lin said the NSC-led inter-agency working group is preparing a policy options paper that will dictate how Taipei will respond to various possible versions of the law (Ref C). Lin added that he will try to share the document with AIT sufficiently in advance so that the USG will know what Taipei plans to say and do after the contents of the PRC law are announced. Lin stated that Washington's initial public response to the PRC law text may have a major impact on how Taiwan reacts. He warned that any indication that the USG accepted the PRC text, especially if it were strongly worded, could increase pressure in Taiwan for a strong response. Comment: Inching Forward -------------- ¶5. (C) Chen's new formulation could move the two sides a small step closer to a work-around over Beijing's "one China" precondition (Ref D). The fact that Taipei was able to respond to specific PRC concerns raised in a private, direct discussion between officials is also a reminder of how important it is to restart some form of dialogue. Whether the two sides can make further progress on the "1992" issue, however, may well depend on the contents of the PRC's Anti-Secession Law and the volume of the reaction in Taipei. PAAL