CHEN OFFERS NEW "1992" FORMULATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000865

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: CHEN OFFERS NEW "1992" FORMULATION

REF: A. TAIPEI 467


B. TAIPEI 773

C. TAIPEI 819

D. BEIJING 3158

Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) President Chen Shui-bian used a March 1 teleconference
with European parliamentarians to offer a new formulation
aimed at finessing the Taiwan-PRC deadlock over "one China."
Chen stated that Taiwan "hopes to advance cross-Strait
dialogue and consultations based on the results of the 1992
Hong Kong talks." National Security Council (NSC) Senior
Advisor Lin Jin-chang told AIT that the inclusion of the term
"results" was aimed at responding to the PRC's demand that
Taiwan accept the disputed "1992 consensus" as a precondition
to renewed cross-Strait dialogue. Lin added that the new
language is a direct outgrowth of the February 2 meeting
between Taiwan Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chief
Secretary Patricia Lin and PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs

SIPDIS
Office (TAO) Deputy Director Sun Yafu (Ref A). "We now know
they need a reference to the exchange of messages after the
1992 Hong Kong talks,'" Lin stated, "but they need to also
remember that we are not in a position to acknowledge
publicly the existence of a '1992 consensus.'"

Carrots as Well as Sticks
--------------


2. (C) The NSC's Lin told AIT that Chen decided to float the
new formulation on March 1 in hopes of bolstering the hands
of PRC moderates in the lead-up to the National People's
Congress (NPC) session. Lin added that the NSC has urged the
president to offer moderate voices in Beijing at least some
ammunition to tone down the language in the Anti-Secession
Law draft. "We need a carrot as well as a stick" in response
to Beijing's NPC moves, he added. Lin said he hoped the USG
would bring Chen's March 1 formulation to Beijing's
attention, bemoaning that the Taiwan media missed the
president's new "1992" language in their coverage of his
speech. Lin claimed that Chen's decision to articulate his
May 20, 2000 "five no's" pledge during his February 24
meeting with People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong
(Ref B) was also meant as a positive message to Beijing ahead
of the NPC meeting.


3. (C) Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chief Secretary Jan
Jyh-horng separately told AIT that Taipei has not received a
reply from the TAO to Taiwan's February 2 offer to hold talks
in a third country over resolving the "1992" deadlock. Jan
said that Taipei is prepared to work towards a compromise on
the "1992" issue, but cautioned that if the language in the
PRC's proposed Anti-Secession Law is overly provocative,
Taipei may reconsider its willingness to be flexible.

Next Steps: Preparing for the Worst
--------------


4. (C) Chen's recent overtures notwithstanding, the NSC's Lin
said that Taipei fully expects the PRC to go ahead with NPC
action on some form of an Anti-Secession Law. Lin said the
NSC-led inter-agency working group is preparing a policy
options paper that will dictate how Taipei will respond to
various possible versions of the law (Ref C). Lin added that
he will try to share the document with AIT sufficiently in
advance so that the USG will know what Taipei plans to say
and do after the contents of the PRC law are announced. Lin
stated that Washington's initial public response to the PRC
law text may have a major impact on how Taiwan reacts. He
warned that any indication that the USG accepted the PRC
text, especially if it were strongly worded, could increase
pressure in Taiwan for a strong response.

Comment: Inching Forward
--------------


5. (C) Chen's new formulation could move the two sides a
small step closer to a work-around over Beijing's "one China"
precondition (Ref D). The fact that Taipei was able to
respond to specific PRC concerns raised in a private, direct
discussion between officials is also a reminder of how
important it is to restart some form of dialogue. Whether
the two sides can make further progress on the "1992" issue,
however, may well depend on the contents of the PRC's
Anti-Secession Law and the volume of the reaction in Taipei.
PAAL