Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI819
2005-02-25 11:45:00
SECRET
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIWAN PREPARING FOR STRONG ANTI-SECESSION LAW

Tags:  PGOV PREL CH TW 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000819 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN PREPARING FOR STRONG ANTI-SECESSION LAW
RESPONSE

REF: A. TAIPEI 362

B. TAIPEI 773

C. 2004 TAIPEI 2662

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000819 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW SUBJECT: TAIWAN PREPARING FOR STRONG ANTI-SECESSION LAW RESPONSE REF: A. TAIPEI 362 ¶B. TAIPEI 773 ¶C. 2004 TAIPEI 2662 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (S) Summary: Senior Chen administration officials continue to warn that Taipei will react strongly to a PRC move to pass an Anti-Secession Law during the March National People's Congress. President Chen Shui-bian told the AIT Director that Taiwan's most likely response will be to pass some form of an "Anti-Annexation Law." Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) officials are backing away from Chen's public warnings to hold a referendum, citing likely resistance from the Pan-Blue. Moderates are urging the DPP leadership to take a wait-and-see attitude to the PRC draft law, but most Pan-Green interlocutors assess that Chen has already decided on a hard-line response. Senior Pan-Blue officials express concern that an over-reaction to the Anti-Secession Law could further exacerbate cross-Strait tensions, but acknowledge that public pressure may force them to support an Anti-Annexation Law. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) has thus far taken the most activist approach on the Anti-Secession Law, hoping to leverage the issue to gain enough seats in the May 14 National Assembly election to reverse a package of legislative reforms passed by the Legislative Yuan (LY) last August. End Summary. Calm Before the Storm? -------------- ¶2. (S) Ruling and opposition party officials expect March PRC National People's Congress (NPC) action on the proposed Anti-Secession Law to evoke a shrill political response from Taipei. DPP China Affairs Department Director Tung Li-wen told AIT that a series of activities sponsored by the DPP and NGOs on February 28 to protest the PRC law will likely signal the start of a downward spiral in cross-Strait atmospherics that will last at least into the summer, and perhaps longer. President Chen Shui-bian told the AIT Director on February 21 that he will try to constrain Taiwan actions for the moment, but warned that if Beijing proceeds with its plan to pass the law in March, the Taiwan public will react strongly. Other officials have lodged similar warnings. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) spokesman publicly accused the PRC of damaging regional stability and harming the basic rights of the Taiwan people after the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) reaff
irmed plans on February 25 to proceed with the draft law during the March NPC session. The MAC spokesman stated that PRC threats to pass the law have already provoked a strong negative reaction among the Taiwan people. DPP: Divisions Persist -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite occasional appeals for calm, President Chen has repeatedly signaled in public that Taiwan will hold a referendum or pass countervailing legislation if the NPC acts on its draft law. Nevertheless, moderates in the government and ruling party tell AIT that no final decision will be made until the contents of the PRC law are revealed. Several AIT interlocutors have argued that Taipei's assumptions that the Anti-Secession Law will fundamentally harm Taiwan's interests (Ref A) may be overstated. Veteran DPP legislator (and vocal Chen critic) Lin Cho-shui assessed that Beijing's move to introduce the law was a strategic error that Taiwan might be able to exploit if it avoids overplaying its hand. "Beijing likely took this decision as a result of pressure from hard-liners," Lin stated, "but if their actions undermine the PRC's relations with the U.S. and other major powers, the hard-liners may have to take the blame." National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor for cross-Strait Affairs Chen Chung-hsin offered a similar assessment, adding that as long as the draft law is light on substance, it may provide Hu Jintao with more flexibility for dealing with Taiwan in the future. "Hu can claim that he's given the hard-liners a public present, then proceed with a softer line on substantive relations with the DPP government," Chen added. Legislative Moves -------------- ¶4. (C) Nevertheless, other Pan-Green officials say they believe President Chen has already made up his mind to offer a harsh response, regardless of the contents of the PRC law. DPP LY Caucus Secretary General Lai Ching-te said that while no final decision has been reached internally, the DPP is very likely to support a legislative response to the Anti-Secession Law. Lai said this is a more realistic option than a referendum, since the Referendum Law passed in November, 2003, includes too many procedural hurdles to organize an Anti-Anti-Annexation Law referendum to coincide with the May 14 National Assembly (NA) election. While President Chen could invoke Article 17 of the Referendum Law, which gives the President the right to call a "Defensive Referendum" in response to external threats to change Taiwan's sovereign status, such a move would likely antagonize the Pan-Blue alliance. ¶5. (C) In contrast, DPP officials are confident they can win support from the opposition for an Anti-Annexation Law, achieving the government's objective of presenting a united front to Beijing over the issue (Ref A). The DPP's Lai said that the Pan-Blue would not dare oppose an Anti-Annexation Law for fear of being labeled pro-Beijing. KMT Policy Chief Tseng Yung-chuan separately acknowledged to AIT that the KMT SIPDIS would in fact support an Anti-Annexation Law for just this reason. "I realize that passing an Anti-Annexation Law will just exacerbate cross-Strait tensions" Tseng commented, "but no Taiwanese could oppose an Anti-Annexation Law." Tseng claimed to have conveyed this position to PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Chen Yunlin during a January 11 meeting in Beijing. Veteran KMT legislator Wu Dun-yi said the KMT may at least be able to minimize the risk of provoking a harsh PRC response by toning down the contents of an Anti-Annexation Law. "We will not support a Taiwan independence law," he asserted, "but rather insist that an Anti-Annexation Law simply safeguard the effective territorial integrity of the ROC, defined as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu." ¶6. (C) The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) formally announced plans to introduce an Anti-Annexation Law text on February ¶23. TSU Policy Chief Lee Shang-ren told AIT that the proposed legislation will likely contain provocative language, including the "one country on each side" formulation. However, he added that the TSU would be willing to moderate the contents in order to win support from the DPP and other parties. Nevertheless, People First Party (PFP) officials tell AIT they will oppose any form of Anti-Annexation legislation, fearing that it will provoke a cross-Strait crisis (Ref B). PFP Spokesman Hwang Yih-jiau told AIT that the PFP no longer fears being labeled as pro-Beijing and would not try to outdo the DPP to prove its pro-Taiwan credentials as it did during the 2004 presidential election campaign. Looking Ahead to May 14 -------------- ¶7. (C) TSU Policy Chief Lee told AIT that it did not really matter to his party whether or not an Anti-Annexation Law is enacted, since the TSU's real goal is to win enough seats in the May 14 NA election to overturn the package of legislative reforms passed by the LY last August (Ref C). TSU Secretary General Chen Chien-ming commented that if the TSU and PFP together win more than a quarter of the votes on May 14, they may be able to stop the NA from creating a single-member-district electoral system that would favor the DPP and KMT. Chen noted that most of those who bother to turn out to vote on May 14 are likely to be hard-core ideologues on both ends of the spectrum. He added that, from a purely selfish perspective, the TSU hopes the DPP will act responsibly on the Anti-Secession Law issue and allow the TSU to benefit from any backlash from fundamentalists that occurs. ¶8. (C) To this end, the TSU is leading efforts by pro-independence NGOs to organize seminars, petitions, and rallies to protest the PRC's proposed law. While the media has focused on anti-Anti-Secession Law events scheduled to coincide with the February 28 anniversary of the "Kaohsiung Incident," organizers say they will save resources for activities later in the Spring. TSU Secretary General Chen Chien-ming admitted to AIT that his party simply failed to act soon enough to organize a large turnout for 2/28. Instead, the TSU decided to postpone its main effort until March 6, when it plans an "Oppose Annexation, Protect Taiwan" rally in Kaohsiung. To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize -------------- ¶9. (C) The DPP appears to be divided on how actively it should support TSU and NGO protests against the Anti-Secession Law. President Chen and other senior DPP officials are scheduled to attend a public ceremony on February 28 that will involve the announcement of a resolution against the Anti-Secession Law. However, DPP party officials claim that this will be a low-key, non-provocative affair. Shen Fa-hui, a legislator from the DPP's moderate New Tide faction asserted that it is irresponsible for the ruling party to participate in any sort of public protests against Beijing. Grassroots leader and former DPP Chairman Lin Yi-hsiung offered a similar assessment to AIT, criticizing President Chen and MAC Chairman Joseph Wu for acting more like NGO activists than senior government officials. Others in the DPP have cited the difficulty of mobilizing a massive public response to Beijing's moves in the current political environment. "The atmosphere is simply different now, people are tired of political activities," commented Executive Yuan (EY) Secretary General Lee Ying-yuan, the organizer of the DPP's SIPDIS massive 2004 2/28 "Hands Across Taiwan" event. Comment: Assuming the Worst -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite appeals for restraint from moderates within his own government, President Chen has given every indication that he plans to follow through on his threats to respond strongly to NPC action on the Anti-Secession Law, regardless of its contents. While it appears that some form of Anti-Annexation Law could gain enough votes for passage in the current legislative session, finding a compromise that will gain Pan-Blue support will still be a challenge. AIT will continue to urge Taipei to offer a moderate public reaction and encourage the LY to consider passage of the Special Defense Procurement Budget as the most effective legislative response to the Anti-Secession Law. PAAL

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