Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI4960
2005-12-23 07:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:
MA-SOONG DYNAMIC IMPROVES WITH SECOND MEETING
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 230747Z Dec 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004960
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: MA-SOONG DYNAMIC IMPROVES WITH SECOND MEETING
REF: A. TAIPEI 4871
B. TAIPEI 4423
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004960
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: MA-SOONG DYNAMIC IMPROVES WITH SECOND MEETING
REF: A. TAIPEI 4871
B. TAIPEI 4423
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).
1. (U) Summary: On December 22, KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou
and PFP Chairman James Soong met for a second time, to
coordinate the Pan-Blue position on the Defense Procurement
Special Budget, Control Yuan composition, and a possible
coalition Cabinet with President Chen's DPP government.
During their first meeting last week, Ma and Soong had
approached each other coolly and their statements merely
affirmed standard Pan-Blue positions favoring continued LY
cooperation and sensible defense spending (ref A). During
their second encounter, by contrast, relations between the
two men were much less tense and at times approached warmth.
At the subsequent press conference, moreover, the two men
offered bolder statements, criticizing the proposed defense
procurement, rejecting a "coalition Cabinet" for the time
being, and proposing to fill Control Yuan seats based on LY
representation. While KMT-PFP merger remains distant, Ma and
Soong appear to be working around old grudges, so far mostly
to Ma's advantage. End Summary.
2. (U) The December 22 meeting, like the first meeting on
December 12, was attended only by Ma, Soong, KMT
Secretary-General Chan Chun-pao and PFP Secretary-General
SIPDIS
Chin Chin-sheng. According to an account given by Chan to
the Taiwan press, the first item of discussion was the
prospect of forming a coalition Cabinet with President Chen
Shui-bian's DPP government. Chan said Ma opined during the
meeting that President Chen's credibility was very low, that
Chen was not the kind of person to readily share power, and
was only looking for someone to help him out of his
difficulties. Soong reminded Ma that when Chen reaches out
to the other side, it is best to keep one's guard up. After
the meeting concluded, Ma told the press that before the KMT
and PFP would permit their members to serve in a Chen
Cabinet, opposition and government would have to trust each
other again and would have to reach a consensus on important
fundamental policy matters, including cross-Strait relations.
3. (U) Ma and Soong next formulated a common Pan-Blue
position on the long-standing issue of the Defense
Procurement Special Budget. In his press statement, KMT
Sec-Gen Chan said Ma and Soong agreed that the U.S. had never
put pressure on Taiwan to buy specific items at specific
prices. The "special budget" process, moreover, was
inappropriate for such large item acquisitions, because the
LY would need to closely monitor the acquisition, which it
could not do in the special budget process. In their public
statements following the closed-door session, both Ma and
Soong reiterated their opposition to "expensive" arms
procurement, while acknowledging Taiwan's need to maintain
appropriate defensive capabilities. Soong said that Taiwan
should make it clear to the U.S. that it is determined to
defend itself from attacks from China, but added that the
"United States should (also) show a corresponding
determination" (Comment: Presumably to defend Taiwan. End
Comment). Soong claimed that the price of the U.S. arms
package had been greatly inflated, asking rhetorically why
Taiwan should purchase eight submarines for US$1 billion when
they could be purchased elsewhere for US$300 million. (He
did not say where.) Speaking for both parties, Soong said if
the U.S. were truly committed to helping Taiwan upgrade its
defenses, it would allow Taiwan to purchase "new weapons"
instead of the "old" ones offered in the current arms
package. Ma added that Taiwan should not be limited to the
three systems offered by the current USG arms package if
there are other weapons capable of meeting the same defense
requirements.
4. (U) KMT Sec-Gen Chin told the press that the final topic
of discussion was a Pan-Blue proposal to nominate members of
the Control Yuan based on LY party representation. (Note:
The Pan-Blue coalition has a one-vote majority in the LY;
Pan-Blue legislators have refused to act on President Chen's
list of 29 Control Yuan (CY) nominees since December 2004,
causing the CY to lay dormant since February 2005. End note.)
Since this proposal had been discussed and approved by
senior KMT and PFP advisers before the Ma-Soong meeting, the
two chairmen simply expressed their agreement to make it
public. After the meeting, Ma and Soong said the CY should
be staffed using the National Communication Commission model
(see ref B),and urged President Chen to accept their
"NCC-model" proposal.
5. (U) KMT Sec-Gen Chen told the Taiwan press that as
evidence of the dramatically better relations between Ma and
Soong just ten days after their first meeting, Soong, just
before leaving, leaned toward Ma and said "Merry Christmas!"
The more the two men talk, he said, the more congenial their
relationship becomes, plainly trying to boost an image of
Pan-Blue unity.
6. (C) Comment: The seemingly improving relations between
Ma and Soong may indicate that Soong more fully understands
the weak position both he and the PFP occupy in relation to
Ma and his KMT. Every time Soong appears next to Ma, Soong's
political stock goes up, if ever so slightly; conversely,
should Ma choose to ignore Soong and his party until they
simply fade away, there is little that Soong could do to
exact revenge that would not also be suicidal. Soong appears
to understand that if he helps Ma create the image of
increasing Pan-Blue unity, he can retain some influence
within the Pan-Blues, particularly on the issue of the
defense budget, and possibly on cross-Strait relations. The
second Ma-Soong meeting was in response to an emergent crisis
in the LY over the Defense Special Budget, and therefore was
less dramatic and less scripted than the first meeting
between the two chairmen. End Comment.
PAAL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: MA-SOONG DYNAMIC IMPROVES WITH SECOND MEETING
REF: A. TAIPEI 4871
B. TAIPEI 4423
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).
1. (U) Summary: On December 22, KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou
and PFP Chairman James Soong met for a second time, to
coordinate the Pan-Blue position on the Defense Procurement
Special Budget, Control Yuan composition, and a possible
coalition Cabinet with President Chen's DPP government.
During their first meeting last week, Ma and Soong had
approached each other coolly and their statements merely
affirmed standard Pan-Blue positions favoring continued LY
cooperation and sensible defense spending (ref A). During
their second encounter, by contrast, relations between the
two men were much less tense and at times approached warmth.
At the subsequent press conference, moreover, the two men
offered bolder statements, criticizing the proposed defense
procurement, rejecting a "coalition Cabinet" for the time
being, and proposing to fill Control Yuan seats based on LY
representation. While KMT-PFP merger remains distant, Ma and
Soong appear to be working around old grudges, so far mostly
to Ma's advantage. End Summary.
2. (U) The December 22 meeting, like the first meeting on
December 12, was attended only by Ma, Soong, KMT
Secretary-General Chan Chun-pao and PFP Secretary-General
SIPDIS
Chin Chin-sheng. According to an account given by Chan to
the Taiwan press, the first item of discussion was the
prospect of forming a coalition Cabinet with President Chen
Shui-bian's DPP government. Chan said Ma opined during the
meeting that President Chen's credibility was very low, that
Chen was not the kind of person to readily share power, and
was only looking for someone to help him out of his
difficulties. Soong reminded Ma that when Chen reaches out
to the other side, it is best to keep one's guard up. After
the meeting concluded, Ma told the press that before the KMT
and PFP would permit their members to serve in a Chen
Cabinet, opposition and government would have to trust each
other again and would have to reach a consensus on important
fundamental policy matters, including cross-Strait relations.
3. (U) Ma and Soong next formulated a common Pan-Blue
position on the long-standing issue of the Defense
Procurement Special Budget. In his press statement, KMT
Sec-Gen Chan said Ma and Soong agreed that the U.S. had never
put pressure on Taiwan to buy specific items at specific
prices. The "special budget" process, moreover, was
inappropriate for such large item acquisitions, because the
LY would need to closely monitor the acquisition, which it
could not do in the special budget process. In their public
statements following the closed-door session, both Ma and
Soong reiterated their opposition to "expensive" arms
procurement, while acknowledging Taiwan's need to maintain
appropriate defensive capabilities. Soong said that Taiwan
should make it clear to the U.S. that it is determined to
defend itself from attacks from China, but added that the
"United States should (also) show a corresponding
determination" (Comment: Presumably to defend Taiwan. End
Comment). Soong claimed that the price of the U.S. arms
package had been greatly inflated, asking rhetorically why
Taiwan should purchase eight submarines for US$1 billion when
they could be purchased elsewhere for US$300 million. (He
did not say where.) Speaking for both parties, Soong said if
the U.S. were truly committed to helping Taiwan upgrade its
defenses, it would allow Taiwan to purchase "new weapons"
instead of the "old" ones offered in the current arms
package. Ma added that Taiwan should not be limited to the
three systems offered by the current USG arms package if
there are other weapons capable of meeting the same defense
requirements.
4. (U) KMT Sec-Gen Chin told the press that the final topic
of discussion was a Pan-Blue proposal to nominate members of
the Control Yuan based on LY party representation. (Note:
The Pan-Blue coalition has a one-vote majority in the LY;
Pan-Blue legislators have refused to act on President Chen's
list of 29 Control Yuan (CY) nominees since December 2004,
causing the CY to lay dormant since February 2005. End note.)
Since this proposal had been discussed and approved by
senior KMT and PFP advisers before the Ma-Soong meeting, the
two chairmen simply expressed their agreement to make it
public. After the meeting, Ma and Soong said the CY should
be staffed using the National Communication Commission model
(see ref B),and urged President Chen to accept their
"NCC-model" proposal.
5. (U) KMT Sec-Gen Chen told the Taiwan press that as
evidence of the dramatically better relations between Ma and
Soong just ten days after their first meeting, Soong, just
before leaving, leaned toward Ma and said "Merry Christmas!"
The more the two men talk, he said, the more congenial their
relationship becomes, plainly trying to boost an image of
Pan-Blue unity.
6. (C) Comment: The seemingly improving relations between
Ma and Soong may indicate that Soong more fully understands
the weak position both he and the PFP occupy in relation to
Ma and his KMT. Every time Soong appears next to Ma, Soong's
political stock goes up, if ever so slightly; conversely,
should Ma choose to ignore Soong and his party until they
simply fade away, there is little that Soong could do to
exact revenge that would not also be suicidal. Soong appears
to understand that if he helps Ma create the image of
increasing Pan-Blue unity, he can retain some influence
within the Pan-Blues, particularly on the issue of the
defense budget, and possibly on cross-Strait relations. The
second Ma-Soong meeting was in response to an emergent crisis
in the LY over the Defense Special Budget, and therefore was
less dramatic and less scripted than the first meeting
between the two chairmen. End Comment.
PAAL