MA-SOONG DYNAMIC IMPROVES WITH SECOND MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004960 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: MA-SOONG DYNAMIC IMPROVES WITH SECOND MEETING REF: A. TAIPEI 4871 ¶B. TAIPEI 4423 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (U) Summary: On December 22, KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou and PFP Chairman James Soong met for a second time, to coordinate the Pan-Blue position on the Defense Procurement Special Budget, Control Yuan composition, and a possible coalition Cabinet with President Chen's DPP government. During their first meeting last week, Ma and Soong had approached each other coolly and their statements merely affirmed standard Pan-Blue positions favoring continued LY cooperation and sensible defense spending (ref A). During their second encounter, by contrast, relations between the two men were much less tense and at times approached warmth. At the subsequent press conference, moreover, the two men offered bolder statements, criticizing the proposed defense procurement, rejecting a "coalition Cabinet" for the time being, and proposing to fill Control Yuan seats based on LY representation. While KMT-PFP merger remains distant, Ma and Soong appear to be working around old grudges, so far mostly to Ma's advantage. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The December 22 meeting, like the first meeting on December 12, was attended only by Ma, Soong, KMT Secretary-General Chan Chun-pao and PFP Secretary-General SIPDIS Chin Chin-sheng. According to an account given by Chan to the Taiwan press, the first item of discussion was the prospect of forming a coalition Cabinet with President Chen Shui-bian's DPP government. Chan said Ma opined during the meeting that President Chen's credibility was very low, that Chen was not the kind of person to readily share power, and was only looking for someone to help him out of his difficulties. Soong reminded Ma that when Chen reaches out to the other side, it is best to keep one's guard up. After the meeting concluded, Ma told the press that before the KMT and PFP would permit their members to serve in a Chen Cabinet, opposition and government would have to trust each other again and would have to reach a consensus on important fundamental policy matters, including cross-Strait relations. ¶3. (U) Ma and Soong next formulated a common Pan-Blue position on the long-standing issue of the Defense Procurement Special Budget. In his press statement, KMT Sec-Gen Chan said Ma and Soong agreed that the U.S. had never 
put pressure on Taiwan to buy specific items at specific prices. The "special budget" process, moreover, was inappropriate for such large item acquisitions, because the LY would need to closely monitor the acquisition, which it could not do in the special budget process. In their public statements following the closed-door session, both Ma and Soong reiterated their opposition to "expensive" arms procurement, while acknowledging Taiwan's need to maintain appropriate defensive capabilities. Soong said that Taiwan should make it clear to the U.S. that it is determined to defend itself from attacks from China, but added that the "United States should (also) show a corresponding determination" (Comment: Presumably to defend Taiwan. End Comment). Soong claimed that the price of the U.S. arms package had been greatly inflated, asking rhetorically why Taiwan should purchase eight submarines for US$1 billion when they could be purchased elsewhere for US$300 million. (He did not say where.) Speaking for both parties, Soong said if the U.S. were truly committed to helping Taiwan upgrade its defenses, it would allow Taiwan to purchase "new weapons" instead of the "old" ones offered in the current arms package. Ma added that Taiwan should not be limited to the three systems offered by the current USG arms package if there are other weapons capable of meeting the same defense requirements. ¶4. (U) KMT Sec-Gen Chin told the press that the final topic of discussion was a Pan-Blue proposal to nominate members of the Control Yuan based on LY party representation. (Note: The Pan-Blue coalition has a one-vote majority in the LY; Pan-Blue legislators have refused to act on President Chen's list of 29 Control Yuan (CY) nominees since December 2004, causing the CY to lay dormant since February 2005. End note.) Since this proposal had been discussed and approved by senior KMT and PFP advisers before the Ma-Soong meeting, the two chairmen simply expressed their agreement to make it public. After the meeting, Ma and Soong said the CY should be staffed using the National Communication Commission model (see ref B),and urged President Chen to accept their "NCC-model" proposal. ¶5. (U) KMT Sec-Gen Chen told the Taiwan press that as evidence of the dramatically better relations between Ma and Soong just ten days after their first meeting, Soong, just before leaving, leaned toward Ma and said "Merry Christmas!" The more the two men talk, he said, the more congenial their relationship becomes, plainly trying to boost an image of Pan-Blue unity. ¶6. (C) Comment: The seemingly improving relations between Ma and Soong may indicate that Soong more fully understands the weak position both he and the PFP occupy in relation to Ma and his KMT. Every time Soong appears next to Ma, Soong's political stock goes up, if ever so slightly; conversely, should Ma choose to ignore Soong and his party until they simply fade away, there is little that Soong could do to exact revenge that would not also be suicidal. Soong appears to understand that if he helps Ma create the image of increasing Pan-Blue unity, he can retain some influence within the Pan-Blues, particularly on the issue of the defense budget, and possibly on cross-Strait relations. The second Ma-Soong meeting was in response to an emergent crisis in the LY over the Defense Special Budget, and therefore was less dramatic and less scripted than the first meeting between the two chairmen. End Comment. PAAL