KMT INSIDERS WATCH MA START AND STUMBLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003805

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT INSIDERS WATCH MA START AND STUMBLE

REF: TAIPEI 3496

Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason(s):
1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) In a meeting with the Deputy Director on August 24
(reported septel),Taichung Mayor Jason Hu said the recent
KMT 17th National Congress was poorly organized, and blamed
senior KMT holdovers from Lien's chairmanship for failing to
prepare for the procedural and logistics challenges created
by proposed voting changes (see ref A). Hu explained that
the popular Ma benefited from the rule change allowing the
1,600 national delegates to directly elect the Central
Standing Committee (CSC). Had the CSC been elected under the
old system by the Central Committee's 210 members, explained
Hu, Ma's preferred candidates would have lost badly. The
direct election change, however, reduced the effect of
"vote-exchange" and other vote-controlling schemes typical of
earlier CSC elections. But, in approving the measure, Hu
said, delegates voted their self-interest, not their
allegiance to Ma's reform agenda.


2. (C) Nevertheless, Hu told the Deputy Director, the
National Congress proved to be a "rocky start" for Ma. Ma
had advocated a proposal to allow students under 27 years of
age to participate in CSC meetings to demonstrate the KMT's
new emphasis on youth and greater inclusiveness. Ma's inner
circle, Hu explained, had operated under the misconception
that Ma's endorsement alone was enough to secure the
measure's passage. Instead, influential KMT elders and
legislators balked at the idea of opening the doors of the
KMT's highest policy-making organ to students, and organized
to defeat the measure. Hu said a similar measure might have
received a warmer reception if, for example, Ma had chosen to
welcome students to the less-exalted Central Committee. Hu
maintained that Ma's advisors had failed to appreciate the
functional difference between the two committees, and did not
understand why it was considered inappropriate to invite
political novices to participate in senior-level policy
discussions. Hu said that, although he supports Ma, he
opposed the entry of youth into the CSC.


3. (C) Mayor Hu further told the Deputy Director that the
31-member CSC cannot really be broken down into the 10
pro-Wang, 10 pro-Ma, and 11 undeclareds ratio widely reported
in the press. Rather, he continued, CSC members' loyalties
are not so clear-cut, and he speculated that as many as half
of the new CSC pro-Wang members may shift to support Ma. At
the same time, most of the CSC members were elected without
any support from Ma, Hu explained, and have no obligations to
him. Some may choose to create difficulties for Ma in order
to attract his attention and extract political favors.
Nevertheless, Hu said, time is on Ma's side, and most of the
CSC members will realize that further weakening of the KMT is
bad for their own political fortunes, and will decide to help
Ma, if only to help themselves.


4. (C) Mayor Hu wondered aloud about Ma's political
understanding and innate leadership and decision-making
abilities. He told the Deputy Director that he had cautioned
Ma several times, after Ma had won the Chairman race, not to
publicly apologize to former KMT opponent Wang Jin-pyng for
tactics used during the campaign. Wang, he told Ma, would
never leave the party because he is an at-large LY member,
with no natural constituency of his own, and therefore was
wholly dependent on the party for his position, power, and
authority. Despite Hu's advice and Wang's repeated rebuffs,
Ma did publicly apologize several times. In doing so, Hu
said, Ma came across as an insecure leader trying too
desperately to win over a former adversary and wasting
valuable political capital in the process. Hu told the
Deputy Director that he often called Ma during the Chairman
race to offer advice on various points but now felt it was
time for Ma "to make his own decisions, make his own
mistakes, and learn from the consequences." Ma, he said,
must set a vision for the party, not just an image for
himself. In this regard, Hu said, he had urged Ma to make
the KMT more youth-friendly by formulating policies which
appeal to voters in the 20- to 40-year-old demographic,
including home-buying incentives, educational loans for
adults, education subsidies for young children, and reforming
Taiwan's military service laws.


5. (C) Mayor Hu told the Deputy Director that Chairman Ma
needs a political victory in the year-end local elections.
Any KMT gain in the city and county elections, or even the
avoidance of a major loss, will strengthen Ma. Hu said the
KMT's chances in Taipei County are 50-50, so a victory there
would be a credit to Ma. Ma's greatest weakness, however,
is his circle of senior advisors, who are perceived within
the party as inexperienced and overly aggressive. Many KMT
senior leaders were alienated by the Ma campaign decision to
accuse openly Wang Jin-pyng of corruption and vote-buying,
said Hu. Hu claimed to have warned Ma not to insult Wang
unless absolutely necessary -- Ma's advisors said Ma had to
use such tactics to assure victory in such a "close" race.


6. (C) Separately, KMT Mainland Affairs Director (and ally of
former KMT Chairman Lien Chan) Chang Jung-kung told AIT that
those closest to Ma "appear anxious to take power and
important party positions," and are costing Ma political
support among potential allies. Chang also confirmed that
Lien Chan deliberately snubbed Ma by failing to invite him to
Lien's 70th birthday. KMT Spokesman Zheng Li-wen separately
acknowledged that this had been a great loss of face for Ma.
The insult was, according to Chang, motivated by Lien's
resentment over Ma's reaction to the March 19, 2004 shooting
of President Chen. On the night of the shooting, Ma demanded
KMT candidates cease their campaign activities in Taipei. Ma
also refused to join Lien in the March 27 demonstration
protesting the election outcome. According to Chang, Lien is
also upset over Ma's decision to change the Central Standing
Committee election procedure, which Lien believes was done
not to democratize the party, but to strengthen Ma's control
over the CSC.


7. (C) Chang also told AIT that Ma does not have a "clear
Mainland policy." Chang speculated that Ma, as a Mainlander
born in Hong Kong, is not sure the Taiwanese people will
accept him as a presidential candidate in 2008, and that this
explains in part why Ma strove to emphasize the KMT's links
to Taiwan in his inaugural speech.


8. (C) Comment: In recent meetings with pro-Ma and pro-Lien
contacts within the KMT, there has been one consistent
refrain: Ma's inner circle of advisors are his greatest
liability. Their eagerness, coupled with their inexperience,
has rankled senior KMT leaders and party elders, whose
cooperation is essential to party reform and KMT
voter-mobilization efforts this December. Ma is also
criticized for failing, thus far, to craft an overarching
vision for the party. Perhaps he is concentrating his
attention on securing KMT victories in December. Once that
house is in order, Ma may shuffle his "cabinet," to install
those more capable of guiding him through the KMT's
procedural and political shoals. End comment.
KEEGAN