NSC OFFICIALS DOWNPLAY "OFFENSIVE WEAPONS" IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TAIPEI 003030 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC TW SUBJECT: NSC OFFICIALS DOWNPLAY "OFFENSIVE WEAPONS" IN UPCOMING NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT REF: A. A) TAIPEI 2745 ¶B. B) 2004 TAIPEI 3002 Classified By: AIT DIRECTOR DOUGLAS PAAL, REASON 1.4(B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Taiwan National Security Council (NSC) officials dismissed recent press reporting that the upcoming National Security Report (see Ref A) will include references to "offensive weapons." They did, however, acknowledge that the report will very likely include a passing reference to developing a "counterstrike capability." NSC officials assured AIT that they will coordinate with the USG prior to the publication of the report in August. End Summary. Developing "Counterstrike Capability" -------------- ¶2. (C) NSC Deputy SecGen Henry Ko told AIT that the initial draft of the National Security Report as presented at a presidential-chaired NSC meeting on June 29 made no reference to "offensive weapons." He did note, however, that Presidential Office Secretary-General Yu Shyi-kun argued at the meeting that the National Security Report should mention the need for Taiwan to develop a counterstrike or deterrent capability. (Note: Yu, long an advocate of Taiwan developing offensive weapon capabilities, made provocative statements last September regarding counterstrike capability (Ref B). End Note.) Ko and other NSC officials told AIT that the Report, still a work in progress, will very likely include reference to a counterstrike capability (fanzhi nengli) without going into specifics over weapons systems that could provide such a capacity. When pressed on whether the Report would discuss specific indigenous missile development programs, such as the Hsiung Feng, NSC defense policy researcher Su Szu-yun assured AIT that it would not. "Deterrence" Across the Strait -------------- ¶3. (C) Elaborating on the meaning of "deterrence" in the Taiwan context, Su explained that recent developments in Taiwan,s indigenous missile programs were primarily aimed at attempting to prevent Mainland air superiority in the event of a cross-Strait armed conflict. Su noted that this was in contrast to irresponsible Taiwan press reporting on missile developments, which often suggests that Taiwan missiles could be used to strike Mainland population centers in the event of a conflict. Su stressed this was not Taiwan military doctrine. Keeping the USG in the loop -------------- ¶4. (C) Ko assured AIT that AIT would receive a full briefing prior to the public release of the Report, and that the NSC would welcome USG input. Furthermore, Ko noted, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) would be in contact with the U.S. Department of Defense to ensure that the report does not conflict with the upcoming U.S. report on Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities. Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) AIT will continue to press Taiwan interlocutors to exclude references to offensive weapons and minimize references to the development of a counterstrike capability from the National Security Report. Nevertheless, there are strong voices within Taiwan's national security and defense apparatus which support the inclusion of "counterstrike" language. These voices have two different advocacy groups: those who support offensive weapons and/or counterstrike capability for purely military and strategic purposes, and those who want Taiwan to develop a feel-good but ineffectual limited capability to strike at Mainland population centers in the event of cross-Strait armed conflict. This latter group is seeking to exploit an emotional sense among Taiwan identity and Taiwan independence supporters that an offensive capability will better enable Taiwan to stand up to China. PAAL