POST-PRC SOONG ON SPECIAL BUDGET, CROSS-STRAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002229 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: POST-PRC SOONG ON SPECIAL BUDGET, CROSS-STRAIT REF: A. TAIPEI 02214 ¶B. TAIPEI 02126 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 17 meeting with the AIT Director, People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong stated that his party will continue to block the Special Defense Procurement Budget and all other proposals initiated by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) until Chen Shui-bian publicly apologies for his criticisms of Soong during his PRC visit. Soong said that while he does not hold a personal grudge, he must pay heed to the deep anger among the PFP members. Soong also told the Director that in his meeting with PRC President Hu Jintao he had spent considerable time explaining "Taiwan's agony" and sense of separate identity to Hu and other Beijing officials. He explained that he had offered the new "two shores, one China" formula as a compromise between PRC's and Chen Shui-bian's different understanding of the "1992 Consensus." Acknowledging that the PRC was very reluctant to accept this new term, Soong said he felt Hu is ready to exercise flexibility as long as Taiwan does not pursue independence. While it is clear the PRC will not soften its anti-independence position, he said, he believes his visit had moved the debate forward by prompting the PRC to agree to the wording "as long as Taiwan does not move toward independence, military conflict in the Strait is avoidable." Soong said he believes President Chen was serious about finding a way to restart official talks with Mainland China at the time of their February 24 meeting, but that he does not know Chen's current mind or intentions. End Summary. PFP Stance on Special Budget -------------- ¶2. (C) In a May 17 meeting with the AIT Director, People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong stated that his party will continue to block the Special Defense Procurement Budget and all other DPP-initiated proposals until Chen Shui-bian publicly apologizes for his criticisms of Soong during his visit to the PRC. Soong charged that Chen's accusations were tantamount to being "stabbed in the back" and had set back his negotiations with the authorities in Beijing. He noted that Hu Jintao had actually chided him about his relationship with Chen, citing a traditional Chinese story about betrayal. Soong told the Director that Chen's public broadside had put him into a very difficult position because he did not want to respond in kind to Chen while visiting the PRC and had deliberately kept his statements brief and low-key. Soong told the Director that Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun apologized privately to PFP Secretary General Chin Ching-sheng, but that a private apology is not enough to compensate for Chen's verbal attack. Soong said that a number of PFP "maverick" legislators have seized on Chen's actions, along with "the NA election fiasco," to boycott cooperation with the DPP (Ref A). ¶3. (C) Despite internal discord within his PFP and his harsh treatment by the President, Soong told the Director that he is still willing to cooperate with the DPP "for the sake of Taiwan and people's livelihood." However, Soong said that he is currently in "waiting mode" and that until Chen offers a public apology, negotiation with the DPP will be impossible. When AIT reminded Soong of his previous pledges to support the Special Defense Budget, Soong side-stepped, and said that the demand for a DPP apology has become an "emotional" issue for the PFP. When AIT rejoined that for the sake of Taiwan's defense needs the KMT has continued to support the Budget, Soong replied, "if you believe the KMT really supports the Budget, then put it to a vote." When AIT reminded Soong about his pledge to put Taiwan's interests ahead of his personal concerns, Soong signaled that he had to leave. Explaining Taiwan to the PRC -------------- ¶4. (C) On his recent PRC visit, Soong told the Director that his primary goal had been "to create a bridge between Taiwan and the PRC." He said that when he met Hu Jintao on May 12, after a short press conference, they dispensed with all banquets and formalities and talked very candidly until ten o'clock in the evening. Soong said he followed up on the themes in his Qinghua University speech that afternoon, spending a considerable length of time explaining "Taiwan's agony" and why Taiwan is reluctant to talk to the PRC. Soong said that he explained to Hu that over the centuries Taiwan had developed a "special socio-economic cultural identity" that could not simply be dismissed as a political tool. He quoted the old Chinese proverb to Hu that "when distant people will not come to you, you cannot use force to compel them." This idea, Soong told the Director, was part of the message that Chen Shui-bian had asked Soong to convey to Hu -- that the PRC needed to acknowledge the reality of a separate Taiwan identity and take the initiative to create good will. Although he did not mention Chen's name, Soong continued, "both Hu and I understood what I was doing." Soong told the Director that he felt Hu received his message well and replied that "we agree to disagree." Reformulating "1992 Consensus" -------------- ¶5. (C) Another part of the message Soong carried with him to Beijing was Taipei's willingness to consider new formulations for the "1992 Consensus" -- which the DPP refers to as the exchange between the two sides during and after the 1992 Hong Kong talks -- as a platform for restarting formal political dialogue (Ref B). Soong told the Director that he wanted to find a formula that would permit the kind of flexibility that former Secretary Kissinger's Shanghai Communique created. He noted that Chen Shui-bian had accepted the 1992 idea when it was worded as "in the spirit of the fruitful results of the 1992 Hong Kong talks." Noting that he personally preferred the term "two shores" rather than "two sides," Soong told the Director that his new formulation, "Two shores, one China" connoted "two separate administrations." This would allow room, he explained, for Taiwan to call itself "ROC" and the other side to call itself "PRC." ¶6. (C) When the Director asked why the Presidential Office reacted so quickly and so negatively to his new formula, Soong repeated his earlier statement that Yu Shyi-kun telephoned PFP's Chin Ching-sheng immediately afterward Chen's public rejection. Soong said that Yu explained that Chen was actually pleased with Soong's formula and that the DPP would accept any PFP "retaliation" against its public rejection. ¶7. (C) Regarding the PRC response to his proposed formula, Soong conceded that "they were very reluctant to accept a new term." He told the Director, however, that "it is my feeling Hu is ready to exercise flexibility as long as Taiwan does not publicly push for independence." In response to the question of whether the PRC is willing to talk to Chen Shui-bian, Soong said, "They are still hesitant but it is my feeling that they were talking to me not merely because they are pursuing a united front strategy." Soong told the Director that he believed the PRC would talk to Chen Shui-bian if Chen accepted the "1992 Consensus" and renounced Taiwan independence. The fact that PRC officials spent so much time discussing those two conditions during his meetings with them, Soong emphasized, indicated that "they mean business." Renouncing Taiwan Independence -------------- ¶8. (C) The second of the "Six Points" that Soong reached with Hu stated that both PFP and CCP firmly oppose any "Taiwan Independence Movement" activities. Soong told the Director that he is convinced the PRC "will not soften its anti-independence position." He said that he explained to Hu that he was not asking for independence but rather that Taiwan be allowed to maintain the status quo of de facto independence and that Beijing not threaten Taiwan. Soong said Hu had told him that if he were to lose Taiwan, he would not be able to face his ancestors and insisted that decisions on Taiwan were not his personal decisions and, thus, he should not be provoked by efforts to gain de jure independence. Soong told the Director that Beijing wanted Chen to reiterate the "Five Noes" and that only in the last minutes of the meeting with Hu did the PRC side agree to include the final important sentence, "As long as Taiwan does not move overtly or covertly toward independence, military conflict in the Strait is avoidable" into the PFP-CCP "Six Points" agreement. Following up with President Chen? -------------- ¶9. (C) Soong told the Director that he does not hold a personal grudge against President Chen for his public criticisms of him. However, Chen had insulted the PFP membership and the resulting anger within the party has limited his flexibility. Soong said that, while he cannot judge Chen's current sincerity, when they met on February 24, Soong felt that Chen was serious about restarting talks with the PRC. Soong told the Director that Chen had emphasized that his term in the presidential office was about to expire and that he wanted to leave a legacy. Soong said that Chen had twice complained to him during their February meeting about former President Lee Teng-hui, noting that Lee had advised him to accept "ROC" and not to change the names of the state-owned enterprises. "Let us see if Chen is sincere enough," Soong concluded, "to ask me to make a second PRC trip." PAAL