REVERBERATIONS FROM MAY 14 ELECTION: CONFIDENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002212 SIPDIS WASHINGTON PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: REVERBERATIONS FROM MAY 14 ELECTION: CONFIDENCE AND CONCILIATION REF: A. TAIPEI 2183 ¶B. TAIPEI 2076 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas H. Paal, Reason 1.4 b ¶1. (C) A DPP riven by internal bickering one week ago has emerged from its May 14 National Assembly election plurality more confident -- in some cases, overconfident. In the latter category, Vice President Annette Lu claimed May 14 was a decisive victory for Taiwan sovereignty, a rejection of the Lien-Soong Mainland China visits and a message to Beijing. In the KMT, which placed an embarrassing second (after predicting victory),there is quiet and signs of a greater willingness to cooperate with the ruling DPP. Belying the caustic words of VP Lu, however, there are indications that President Chen and KMT Chairman Lien Chan might be willing to talk and cooperate on the National Assembly and on cross-Strait issues. End Summary. May 14 Election Message: Taiwan No Meal for a Lion -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting May 16 with foreign representatives to discuss Taiwan's foreign relations, the "deep-Green" (pro-independence) Vice President Annette Lu (Hsiu-lien) digressed to boast of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) first place finish in the May 14 National Assembly election (Ref A). That election, she told the representatives, showed Beijing that the people of Taiwan do not accept the one China principle and that Beijing must reconsider its Taiwan policy. May 14 was highly significant, she argued, and represented a rejection of the Mainland China visits of Lien Chan and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (Chu-yu),both of whom would abandon Taiwan and make it "a quick meal for a lion." ¶3. (C) While PFP Chairman James Soong's trip may have "seemed" successful, she continued, in reality May 14 was Taiwan's "clear answer" to Soong. Soong returned to Taipei on May 12 with his "two sides, one China" formula, Lu noted bitterly, but two days later his PFP fell to a dismal fourth place, "even below the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)." (Note: At this point MOFA North American Director Victor Chin passed Lu a note, and she dropped her discussion of Soong. Chin later told AIT that his note reminded Lu of a cable from TECRO/Washington reporting a meeting between TECRO Representative David Lee and NSC Asia Senior Director Michael Green regarding James Soong, at which there was agreement on the importance of the DPP administration showing flexibility toward Soong. End note.) KMT, Lien Chan Ready to Talk -------------- ¶4. (C) In a separate meeting, KMT foreign policy advisor and former TECRO/Washington Representative Stephen Chen (Hsi-fan) told AIT that Lien Chan is ready and willing to meet with President Chen to discuss cross-Strait issues. Chen, who accompanied Lien to Mainland China, said Lien fully realizes that his cross-Strait initiative will be fruitless without President Chen and the Taiwan government. The only obstacle to Chen-Lien talks now, Stephen Chen explained, is President Chen's harsh "campaign criticism" of Lien before the election, in which he lambasted Lien's Beijing University speech for criticizing Taiwan democratic institutions and aligning KMT and CCP against Taiwan independence (Ref B). The KMT has demanded an apology from Chen as a condition to a Chen-Lien meeting. There are, however, Stephen Chen noted, many ways to phrase an apology, pointing to President Chen,s oblique apology to former President Lee Teng-hui last week, in which Chen praised Lee rather than directly apologizing to him. ¶5. (C) Stephen Chen told AIT that the impression he derived from Lien's meetings in Beijing, was that Mainland China is not in a hurry on unification and is adamant only on independence. He saw TAO Director Sun Yafu's statement to Beijing University students before the Lien speech as a step forward, when Sun acknowledged that Beijing had been very inflexible on "one China" until a few years ago and was adjusting its "one China" definition to facilitate cross-Strait cooperation. Stephen Chen also praised the balanced U.S. support in the cross-Strait process. On the issue of balance, he expressed concern that President Chen in a hard line mode might try to distort U.S. encouragement of Beijing to negotiate with the elected authorities in Taipei -- an essential step, Stephen Chen noted -- to mean that Chen Shui-bian could just sit and wait for Beijing to make concessions. ¶6. (C) Stephen Chen argued that the PFP has been rendered largely meaningless in the cross-Strait process by May 14 and the PFP's "pitiful" 6 percent vote. He told AIT the KMT had been surprised by how poorly staffed and prepared Soong was on his trip, inappropriately repeating "Republic of China" over and over and announcing that he would "sign an agreement" contrary to Taiwan law. Rather, Chen insisted, the cross-Strait issue was now largely between DPP and KMT, with a reasonably good chance for cooperation now that the May 14 elections are over. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) While not a presidential insider on cross-Strait issues, Vice President Lu does represent a constituency of "deep Green" DPP supporters from which President Chen has apparently bought himself some breathing space with the May 14 DPP victory. Chen quickly reached out to Blue opposition leaders Lien and Soong after the DPP victory, calling for inter-party dialogue on cross-Strait issues. Along with possible DPP-KMT cooperation on constitutional reforms in the National Assembly commencing the end of May, Chen's effort to reach out, in conjunction with some kind of public apology for his harsh campaign rhetoric, could facilitate DPP-KMT cross-Strait dialogue. PAAL