Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TAIPEI2127
2005-05-11 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIWAN CONCERNED OVER PRC-JAPAN FRICTIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR CH TW 
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111052Z May 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002127 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN CONCERNED OVER PRC-JAPAN FRICTIONS

REF: 2004 TAIPEI 3742

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002127

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AIT/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN CONCERNED OVER PRC-JAPAN FRICTIONS

REF: 2004 TAIPEI 3742

Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: Taipei remains optimistic over current trends
in Japan-Taiwan relations, but officials express concern that
Beijing may demand concessions over Taiwan as a condition to
reducing short-term frictions between Tokyo and Beijing.
Taiwan officials note that Beijing has shifted the focus of
its demands on Japan in recent weeks from history to Taiwan.
Taipei fears that Tokyo may be pressured to make concessions
over its position on Taiwan participation in the World Health
Organization (WHO) or plans to grant permanent visa-free
status to Taiwan travelers. Nevertheless, recent statements
by the Japanese Foreign Minister reaffirming Taiwan's
inclusion in the scope of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty have
reassured Taipei that Japan will be increasingly willing to
resist PRC pressure and therefore longer term trends in
Japan-Taiwan relations will remain positive. Taiwan
officials are accelerating efforts to enhance trilateral
communications among the U.S., Taiwan, and Japan, especially
on security policy. End Summary.

When Elephants Fight...
--------------


2. (C) Officials in Taipei expect a further long-term
deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations and are reviewing
Taiwan's place in what they expect to be a new, and much less
stable, strategic environment. Lo Fu-chuan, Chairman of the
quasi-official Association for East Asian Relations (EARA)
and former Representative to Tokyo, asserted that both
Beijing and Tokyo are likely to continue to foster a level of
tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship in order to advance
both governments' respective domestic political agendas. Lo
assessed that the Koizumi government is intentionally
encouraging the public to see CHINA as a threat in order to
secure a number of political objectives, including expanding
Japan's international role, revising Article Nine of the
constitution, and upgrading Taiwan's defense capabilities.
Lo noted that this trend, combined with Beijing's long term
policy of encouraging anti-Japanese sentiments for domestic
political consumption, has added a destabilizing new dynamic
to regional security.


3. (C) National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor for
Asian Affairs Lin Cheng-wei offered a similar assessment, but
added that the two sides have realized they may have both
overplayed their hands in recent weeks and are looking to
cool tensions without sacrificing core domestic political
interests. For Japan, he continued, it will be difficult to
give Beijing concessions over the East CHINA Sea gas

exploration, Yasukuni Shrine, history, or textbooks without
offending key constituencies within the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). In this context, Lin told AIT that
Taipei is concerned that the PRC focus has shifted from
history to Taiwan in its high-level interactions with Tokyo
in the wake of the April anti-Japanese demonstrations, and
this could encourage Tokyo to view a Taiwan concession as an
easy way out.


4. (C) Lin hypothesized that Japan might be tempted to offer
a change in Japan's position on Taipei's bid to participate
in the World Health Organization (WHO) as a gesture to
Beijing. EARA's Lo told AIT that Japanese officials did not
offer any substantive response during Lo's mid-April visit to
Tokyo to press for Japanese support. Lo explained that
Taipei hopes that Japan will encourage other Asian nations
early to support Taiwan WHO participation, noting that Japan
did not make its position known last year until the eve of
the World Health Assembly (WHA) meeting. Thus far, however,
Tokyo has not revealed its hand.

Visa-Free Travel in Question?
--------------


5. (C) The NSC's Lin expressed concern that recent Japan-PRC
frictions may also delay efforts to grant Taiwan visitors to
Japan permanent visa-free travel privileges. Lin asserted
that LDP heavyweight Nikai Toshihiro has cited tensions with
Beijing to slow the process of granting permanent visa-free
status to Taiwan visitors. Tokyo has granted Taiwan visitors
limited visa-free travel for the period of the Aichi Expo as
a first step towards fully eliminating visa restrictions for
Taiwan tourists.


6. (C) EARA's Lo downplayed the PRC angle over the visa
issue, instead blaming Presidential Office Secretary General
Yu Shyi-kun's recent "guerrilla diplomacy" for upsetting
plans for lifting visa restrictions. Lo explained that Tokyo
and Taipei have an informal agreement that Taiwan will give
the Japanese Foreign Ministry 10 days notice before any
senior Taiwan official arrives in Tokyo without a visa. Yu
and his aides, however, angered Japanese Foreign Ministry
officials when Yu showed up without notification in April to
meet with Japanese political leaders. Lo said the flap was
the result of "arrogant and immature" Yu advisors who were
seeking to prove a point by visiting without prior NSC, MOFA,
or TECRO Tokyo coordination. (Comment: Yu aides confirm that
the visit was arranged by former Executive Yuan (EY)
Secretary General Arthur Iap. For the past several years,

SIPDIS
Iap has attempted to wrest control of Japan policy from NSC
Secretary General Chiou I-jen, Reftel).

SIPDIS

Ripples in an Otherwise Positive Trend
--------------


7. (C) Concern over the immediate fallout from recent
PRC-Japan tensions have not clouded the otherwise optimistic
outlook in Taipei over longer-term trends in the Japan-Taiwan
relationship. The NSC's Lin said that Foreign Minister
Machimura Nobutaka's recent affirmation that the Taiwan
Strait has always fallen within the boundaries of the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty encouraged Taipei that Japan may
be willing to resist PRC pressure over Taiwan. Taiwan
officials are also encouraged by signs that Japan, even the
traditionally conservative Foreign Ministry, is taking a more
assertive stance with Beijing over Taiwan issues. Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC) Chief Secretary Jan Jyh-horng told AIT
that PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu
recently complained to Taiwan contacts that Japanese Vice
Foreign Minister Yachi Shotaro was much tougher in his
February meeting with Sun over the Anti-Secession Law (ASL)
than American officials were with TAO officials during
January talks in Washington.

Taipei Looks U.S.-Taiwan-Japan Strategic Dialogue
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Taipei is looking to leverage warming U.S.-Japan
relations by enhancing trilateral "Track Two" and
"One-and-a-Half" dialogue with Washington and Taipei. Former
MAC Vice Chairman Alexander Huang told AIT that his think
tank has been recently commissioned by the NSC to recreate a
low-profile trilateral Track Two process similar to the one
that existed in the late 1990s involving former Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage and EAP A/S Kelly. MOFA North

SIPDIS
American Affairs Director General Victor Chin said that USG
officials in Tokyo and Washington will be invited to
participate in the closed door meetings. The Taiwan NSC also
recently tasked TECRO Offices in Tokyo and Washington to
increase coordination with each other on security policy and
to expand contacts with USG Japan specialists and GOJ
American hands, especially those with cross-Strait expertise.

Comment: Slowly Perhaps Surely
--------------


9. (C) Most Taiwan Japan policy officials (as distinct from
their senior political leadership) understand that overt ties
with Tokyo could endanger Taiwan's equities with the
Mainland, especially in the current tense atmosphere between
Japan and Mainland China. However, the assessment that the
U.S.-Japan alliance will increasingly focus on balancing
growing PRC influence is seen as a major strategic
opportunity for Taipei. The challenge for Taiwan
policymakers will be to avoid overplaying Taipei's hand.
Missteps like the Yu visit and recent assertion by President
Chen Shui-bian that Taiwan has provided Japan intelligence on
PRC submarine movements may be more likely to undermine
Taiwan's interests than overt bilateral pressure on Tokyo
from Beijing.
PAAL

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