"CHINA TIMES" ARTICLE DETAILING SENSITIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000203

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD -
ROBERT PALLADINO
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPAO TW
SUBJECT: "CHINA TIMES" ARTICLE DETAILING SENSITIVE
DEALINGS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Summary: The centrist, pro-status quo Chinese-language
"China Times" Sunday (1/16/05) carried an excerpt from
a new book written by journalist Wang Ming-yi entitled
"Dialogues and Confrontations: Political Competitions
between Taiwan and China." In the excerpt, Wang
describes a secret visit paid December 1, 2003, by then
U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for
Asian Affairs James Moriarty to President Chen Shui-
bian in which Moriarty handed Chen a letter written by
President George W. Bush expressing his concern about
Taiwan's referendum plans. The excerpt also discusses
dealings between Taiwan and the United States before
and after Taiwan's March 20 presidential elections.
Full text translation of the article follows.

"Moriarty Met With Bian and Said Strong Words; the
[Atmosphere of] U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Trust Suddenly
Changed. [Moriarty] Handed [Chen] a Letter Written by
Bush, Persuading Taiwan to Stop Holding a Referendum on
`Independence.' Moriarty and Bian Had a Huge
Discrepancy in Their Perceptions; the Meeting Ended
Unpleasantly, and the U.S-Taiwan Relationship Dropped
to the Freezing Point"

Journalist Wang Ming-yi wrote in the excerpt (1/16):

"December 1, 2003, 110 days before the day for casting
votes in the 2004 presidential election. Taipei City
Chungching South Road, the Presidential Residence, the
National Security Bureau Special Service Center and the
Mt. Jade Residential Guard Office received an order to
strictly control the personnel and vehicles coming in
and out of the Presidential Residence, and to
strengthen control of the situation on contiguous
roads. The reason was because the Mt. Jade Residence
was waiting for an 'important and mysterious' U.S.
guest, who is not so friendly towards Taiwan.

"He was said to be important because he was an `envoy
on behalf of the [U.S.] President' sent by the White
House; he was described as mysterious because Taiwan
and the United States agreed not to reveal this secret
schedule. On that day, National Security Council
Consulting Member Ke Cheng-heng welcomed the visitors
in front of the Presidential Residence. Ke had
accompanied the then `Legislator Chen Shui-bian' on a
visit Beijing in the 1990s, and had become the major
window for communication between Taiwan and the United
States after the DPP became the ruling party. U.S.
National Security Council Senior Director for Asian
Affairs James F. Moriarty entered the Mt. Jade
Residence, accompanied by AIT Director Douglas H. Paal.

"The identification of Moriarty for this trip was
`special envoy of President George W. Bush,' and he
brought a letter written by Bush. The purpose of that
letter had not only the diplomatic intention to
persuade Taiwan to refrain from holding a referendum,
but also the intention, by chance, to put political
pressure on Taiwan.

"Bush in his letter explicitly expressed the United
States' policy position that `[the United States]
opposes either side of the Taiwan Strait unilaterally
changing the status quo.' Regarding Taiwan's push for
a sensitive and provocative referendum, [the letter]
even explicitly expressed [the position] that the
United States was not willing to see and would not
support Taiwan holding the referendum that would `lead
to Taiwan independence.' At the same time, Bush
reiterated the United States' `One China' policy and
expressed the attitude that the United States was
looking forward to [both sides of the Strait]
peacefully solving the Taiwan Strait dispute.

"Presidential Office Spokesman James Huang, who had
been in the foreign service, said in regard to
Moriarty's visit to Taiwan that: 'for the last two
days, no U.S. government or AIT official has entered
the Presidential Office.' Huang did not lie, because
Moriarty actually did not enter the Presidential
Office, but the Mt. Jade Presidential Residence
instead.

"The unpleasant secret meeting became the critical
turning point in the relationship of mutual trust
between Taiwan-U.S. high-ranking officials [and caused
the relationship] to fall to its lowest point in
history.

"The critical factor of the unpleasant meeting between
Chen and Moriarty was that Moriarty's `perception of
[his] role' differed greatly from that of Chen's.
Taiwan's decision-making staff considered that Moriarty
``expressed too many `personal opinions,' beyond the
policy information that President Bush wanted to
express.''

"U.F.O Broadcasting Company Manager Jaw Shaw-kong, in a
TV debate on the referendum before the presidential
election, quoted internal documents from [Taiwan's]
National Security Council and revealed that Moriarty,
before the meeting with Chen, made a harsh criticism:
`If you really think that [everything] is okay so long
as you don't change the national flag, the name of the
country, and the territory -- you are wrong. Doing so
will bring about the deaths of U.S. soldiers in the
Taiwan Strait, and we don't want to pay that price.
The defensive referendum has no other purpose but to be
provocative. The referendum merely wants to show that
Chen Shui-bian can challenge China. To demand that
China remove its ballistic missiles, however, will end
up causing negative effects.'

"Actually, the document that Jaw quoted was not the
real copy of the conversation between Chen Shui-bian
and Moriarty. What Jaw quoted was a compilation of the
talks between [Taiwan's] National Security Council core
staff, Moriarty, incumbent National Security Council
Senior Director for Asian Affairs Michael Green, and
Green's deputy Ford Hart not long after Moriarty left
Taiwan and after `the meeting between U.S. President
George W. Bush and China's Premier Wen Jiabao.'
Moriarty, Green, and Hart, with regard to Chen Shui-
bian's policy direction and electoral language,
proposed direct and harsh `warnings' to Taiwan National
Security Council officials that "the formerly `one
side, one country' [formula] proposed by the Taiwan
leader is an obvious example [of unpleasant surprises].
For the past few months, Taiwan has kept on giving us
`surprises,' and anyone could consider that Taiwan's
political purpose is to change Taiwan's status quo."

[The U.S. officials also warned that] "You cannot
consider that you can do anything except for the `Five
Nos.' If you make other moves, there will still be
conflicts."

"We do not trust the leaders of Taiwan too much. I
[Moriarty] went to Taipei three times. President Chen
listened to my opinion the first time; [he listened to
me] a little the second time; [he listened to me] not
at all the third time. You still insist on taking that
route. We are so worried about what the Taiwan
government plans to do, and this is why my president is
so worried. He is worried that there will be another
conflict.'

"National security staff of the Chen Shui-bian
administration judged that the keynote of President
Bush's remarks at the `Bush-Wen meeting' was a `script'
directly drafted by Moriarty alone. Chen's diplomatic
staff recalled later: `During that period of time,
Taiwan took a lot of beatings from Moriarty but was
unable to talk about them. But the situation got
better after Moriarty was transferred.' Chen had also
told his staff that `Green should be a better person
than Moriarty!'

"Taiwan evidently stood in an unfavorable position with
regard to the competition between Washington, Beijing
and Taipei before and after the `Bush-Wen meeting.'
But Washington's and Beijing's doubts about Chen had
not been successfully removed even after Chen's re-
election. Washington and Beijing even matched each
other's strength in private [at that time].

"Sources said the reason why Beijing indicated in its
`March 26 announcement' that it `will not sit back with
its hands off' if Taiwan's situation gets out of
control was mainly because Beijing had seen AIT Chair
Therese Shaheen say in Washington that the United
States would deliver a congratulatory message to Chen
Shui-bian and Annette Lu after the Taiwan authorities
formally announced their re-election. [For Beijing,]
the move was evidently an attempt `to interfere with
Taiwan's domestic affairs' while the election disputes
on the island were not yet settled. As a result,
Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office acted quickly to issue
the [March 26] statement, a move that seized the
opportunity to counter Washington's efforts to quickly
`acknowledge' Chen's re-election.

"Two days prior to the March 19 shootings [of Chen and
Lu], AIT Taipei Deputy Director David J. Keegan called
the then Taiwan Presidential Office Secretary-General
Joseph Wu and KMT Chairman Office Director Ting Yuean-
chao, respectively. Keegan said under the State
Department's instructions, when the March 20 election
results came out, AIT Taipei Director Doug Paal would
call on the President-elect first and other candidates
later. Keegan also asked Wu and Ting to arrange the
respective meetings.

"When [KMT Chairman] Lien Chan announced late in the
evening of March 20 that he would file an appeal to
annul the presidential poll, Taiwan's political
situation was in unprecedented chaos because of the
uncertain election results. Paal, however, paid a
secret visit to Lien's residence on Tunhua Road at

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10:30 AM, March 21, and met with Lien and James Soong,
who had just returned from [the demonstrations] outside
the Presidential Office. Former National Security
Council Secretary General Ding Mou-shih was also
present at the meeting. During the meeting, both sides
expressed their concern about Taiwan's political
situation. Paal was also concerned that the chaotic
situation on the island would not subside very soon.
Paal did not meet with Chen until the next day. Since
AIT said before the elections that Paal would call on
the `President-elect' first, Paal's meeting with Lien
and Soong was later interpreted by Chen as an
illustration showing that `someone in the United States
did not want to see me elected.'"

PAAL