CHEN ENDORSES KMT VISIT, LIEN TO CALL CHEN BEFORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001893 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW SUBJECT: CHEN ENDORSES KMT VISIT, LIEN TO CALL CHEN BEFORE DEPARTURE REF: A. TAIPEI 1872 ¶B. TAIPEI 1849 ¶C. TAIPEI 1871 ¶D. TAIPEI 1867 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Presidential Office Spokesman announced on April 21 that President Chen Shui-bian endorses KMT Chairman Lien Chan's upcoming visit to Mainland China. The statement came hours after Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun and his KMT counterpart, Lin Fong-cheng, agreed that Lien would call the President shortly before he departs for Beijing. While bitter partisan infighting on the floor of the Legislation Yuan (LY) continued after the April 21 announcements, the agreement for an April 25 phone call between Lien and Chen could help resolve the current deadlock between the KMT and ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Public and private USG/AIT interventions over the past two weeks appear to have helped created conditions for both camps to back down from their previous confrontational stance. The PRC's April 18 invitation to People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong also provided the government cover to endorse opposition political party contacts. If the two upcoming visits proceed without major incident, there may be an opening to resume both cross-Strait economic liberalization initiatives and rational legislative deliberations over the Special Defense Procurement Budget and other major political initiatives. End Summary. Face-Saving Compromise -------------- ¶2. (SBU) President Chen Shui-bian's spokesman announced April 21 that the government welcomes KMT Chairman Lien Chan's plan to visit Beijing on April 26 as long as Lien engaged Beijing for the "purpose of defending the supreme interests of the people and nation." The President's endorsement came just hours after Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun and his KMT counterpart, Lin Fong-cheng, agreed on a plan that would have Lien place a telephone call to President Chen on the afternoon of April 25. The Presidential Office spokesman cited Lien's tight schedule to explain why the two leaders would not meet face-to-face. ¶3. (SBU) While spokesmen for the two camps continued to put a positive spin on the compromise plan, the April 21 evening announcements did not prevent Blue and Green legislators from trading another round of bitter recriminations in the LY on April 22. Responding to questioning from Pan-Green legislators, Premier Frank Hsieh rejected demands that the government block Lien's departure. The government's moves towards reconciliation coincided with stepped-up rhetoric from Pan-Green fundamentalists. Former President Lee Teng-hui lashed out at the Pan-Blue leaders on April 21, condemning them as traitors. Lee's Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) called on April 22 for crowds to "bring eggs and water bottles" to the Chiang Kai-shek Airport on April 26 to see Lien off on his trip. USG Role -------------- ¶4. (C) The Taiwan media gave prominent coverage to recent actions on the part of the USG and AIT over the Lien/Soong visit. The China Times lead story on April 22 was the "s-e-c-r-e-t meeting" between the AIT Director and Lien Chen on April 20 (Ref A) over the upcoming KMT visit. KMT Spokesman and Mainland Affairs Director Chang Jung-kung "welcomed Washington's endorsement" of Lien's visit to the Mainland, citing comments by the State Department spokesman on April 20. PFP officials also told reporters that the AIT Director met with James Soong on April 19 (Ref B) to discuss the PFP's plans for an early May visit to the Mainland. In private, officials from the Presidential Office and National Security Council (NSC) have praised recent public USG statements, particularly those by EAP DAS Randy Schriver, as helpful in creating common ground between the government and KMT. Officials also expressed appreciation for AIT efforts to broker communications between the KMT and the Chen government ahead of Lien's visit. Comment: A Little Help from the Outside -------------- ¶5. (C) Deep Green anger notwithstanding, the April 21 announcements appear to signal an attempt by both the Chen and Lien camps to prevent recent public recriminations from spiraling out of control. Public and private messages from Washington appear to have played a critical role in giving both sides an excuse to back away from the extremes. USG statements urging Beijing to work with Taiwan's elected government gave the Chen administration more flexibility to endorse the KMT's initiatives. The Director's April 20 meeting with Lien appeared to also tip the balance within the KMT away from hard-liners like Chang Jung-kung, who had privately dismissed prospects for reaching out to the Chen government until hours before the announcement was made. Ironically, it was Chang who was tasked on April 21 with informing the press of Lien's decision to call the President, reinforcing our assessment that the decision was made by Lien himself. ¶6. (C) Beijing's April 18 invitation to James Soong was likely another major factor in reducing DPP-KMT friction. KMT officials were clearly dismayed with the Soong invite, since it dashed hopes among party hard-liners that Beijing planned to give the KMT a monopoly on cross-Strait relations. At the same time, the Soong invitation gave the Chen government an excuse to claim that Beijing had signaled its intention to work, perhaps indirectly at first, with the DPP government (Ref C). Whether this shift towards cross-partisan reconciliation can last long enough to resume rational deliberations in LY over the Special Defense Procurement Budget may depend on how Beijing and the KMT play Lien's visit next week and whether Lee Teng-hui's renewed offensive may pull Chen back towards confrontation. AIT will continue to seek channels to reinforce recent positive trends during and after the opposition trips. PAAL