CHINA WATCHERS' VIEWS ON KMT-CCP MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001753 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: CHINA WATCHERS' VIEWS ON KMT-CCP MEETING REF: A. TAIPEI 01436 ¶B. TAIPEI 01724 ¶C. TAIPEI 01572 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior China Watchers and former Taiwan government officials met with AIT on April 8 to discuss the late March KMT-CCP meeting and "Ten-point consensus." Despite the range of political views held by the academics -- from deep blue to medium green -- the China Watchers agreed that since March 2004 the CCP has been carrying out a new approach to cross-Strait relations. They also concurred that Taiwan's fragmented domestic politics was hindering progress toward a uniform Taiwan cross-Strait policy and that collaboration between the DPP and the KMT would remain essential but elusive. The China Watchers could not imagine a scenario where either the DPP or the KMT would be willing to compromise on what has become a highly partisan issue in order to achieve inter-party cooperation on cross-Strait issues. The PRC's new strategy and the bleak outlook for inter-party dialogue in Taiwan on cross-Strait policy pose a difficult challenge for President Chen and his plans for cross-Strait engagement. -------------- PRC Translating Ideas into Action -------------- ¶2. (C) A group of Taiwan's senior China Watchers told AIT on April 8 that Beijing's cross-Strait policy over the past month, exemplified by the passage of the Anti-Secession Law and the KMT-CCP meeting and "Ten-point consensus," represented a new approach. Professor Lin Chung-pin of Tamkang University, a former Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Vice Chair and Deputy Defense Minister, described the change as more sophisticated and complex, but not necessarily more moderate than the previous policy. The other academics concurred with this assessment, using the analogy of the game Weiqi (Go) to illustrate how the PRC had skillfully surrounded and increased pressure on Taipei, especially on the diplomatic and political fronts. The academics agreed that PRC cross-Strait policy was changing and that Beijing, which had previously implemented its policy in the shadows, now had brought its intentions and actions into the open. ¶3. (C) The China Watchers agreed that PRC President Hu Jintao was a central figure in the new policy formulation and implementation, but disagreed on the degree of control he �A;exercised. Professor Lin Chung-pin argued that Beijing's new approach represented a victory by Hu over the more hard-line factions within the CCP and the PLA. The PLA, he added, had become a minor player in cross-Strait relations, as its own internal issues and quest for modernization dominated its agenda. Conversely, National Taiwan University professor (and former Mainland Affairs Council Vice Chairman) Chen Ming-tong saw bureaucratic politics, rather than Hu's leadership, as the driving force behind the Anti-Secession Law. -------------- -------------- The KMT-CCP Agreement: Driving a Wedge into Taipei Politics -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The academics concurred that the KMT visit to the PRC and the "Ten-point consensus" had exacerbated problems between the DPP and KMT. The PRC, they concluded, had effectively driven a wedge between the parties. They also agreed that Taiwan political parties should refrain from driving the wedge in further. The DPP threat to pursue formal legal action against KMT delegation leader P.K. Chiang was one action, they asserted, that could worsen inter-party relations. Professor Alex Huang, Senior Vice President of the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies and former MAC Vice Chair, told AIT that the DPP conflict with the KMT over the visit was "political, not legal" and that it was important to resolve political differences without involving lawsuits. Even without legal action, the proposed visit to the PRC by KMT Chairman Lien Chan also could drive the wedge deeper. Professor Chen Ming-tong said that if Chairman Lien goes to the PRC and formally signs the March 30 "Ten-point consensus," along with a framework for peaceful engagement and a confidence building measure (CBM) agreement, this could worsen the political situation in Taiwan. Chen repeated a concern raised by other DPP officials to AIT, that a KMT presidential victory in 2008 would further complicate the situation because, from their viewpoint, it would undermine Taiwan's security as the CCP and KMT moved to implement the agreement. -------------- Creating Challenges for President Chen -------------- ¶5. (C) The China Watchers told AIT that the current PRC cross-Strait policy and the widening chasm between DPP and KMT poses difficult challenges for President Chen and his plans for cross-Strait engagement. There was a consensus among the academics that President Chen needs inter-party cooperation on cross-Strait issues, but disagreement about how to accomplish this. Professor Lin Bih-jaw, a Blue-leaning specialist on diplomacy, argued that the most important thing for Taiwan politics is to "form a true coalition", with which his colleagues agreed. The question remained, however, how such a coalition might be formed -- to which none of the academics had an answer. When AIT pressed the issue, remarking that politics is painful and that sometimes compromise is necessary to achieve the greater good, the China Watchers indicated that compromise is unlikely and that it would be difficult for the two political parties to set aside partisan differences for the greater good in the current heated political situation. ¶6. (C) The academics were also pessimistic on prospects that the two voices of moderation, Premier Frank Hsieh and KMT Vice Chairman P.K. Chiang, could facilitate inter-party dialogue. Professor Chen Ming-tong told AIT that, despite the media photographs of Hsieh and Chiang shaking hands, there is "no prospect" for such cross-partisan cooperation, nor for a meeting between President Chen and KMT Chairman Lien Chan. The PRC's wedge policy and the deep differences and suspicions among Taiwan's political parties, the China Watchers agreed, have left Chen with limited means for fixing the domestic political situation and for building a viable and sustainable cross-Strait policy. -------------- Comment: A Light But No Tunnel -------------- ¶7. (C) Chen's original hope that the March 26 rally would bring closure to the Anti-Secession Law has been set back, at least among politically active circles, by the CCP-KMT meeting and "Ten-point consensus," although the public mood appears to remain disinterested. Senior government officials told AIT that Chen would probably wait until after the May 14 National Assembly elections and the proposed Lien Chan visit to the PRC before initiating his plans for economic liberalization. (See Reftels). On April 11, President Chen repeated his April 9 offer to endorse Lien's visit if the KMT Chairman would first consult with Chen, softening somewhat the tone of his previous statement. Lien, however, has continued to reject this gesture as "insincere." While President Chen apparently still wants to move forward with his original agenda, his ability to implement this plan has been complicated greatly, if not derailed, by the PRC and the KMT. PAAL