CHEN SHUI-BIAN: RESILIENT, IN CONTROL, BUT BOXED IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 001407 SIPDIS STATE PLEASE PASS TO AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: CHEN SHUI-BIAN: RESILIENT, IN CONTROL, BUT BOXED IN REF: A. 2004 TAIPEI 3956 ¶B. TAIPEI 00019 ¶C. TAIPEI 00020 ¶D. TAIPEI 00130 Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In the three months since he led his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) into its December legislative election setback, President Chen Shui-bian has stepped back from the confrontational public rhetoric he brought to both the presidential and legislative campaigns last year. His change in behavior was personified in his January appointment of the more moderate Frank Hsieh as Premier and his willingness to compromise to achieve a lunar new year charter flight agreement with Mainland China. At the same time, Chen has continued to apply the divisive tactics of the campaign to his backroom political maneuvering within the DPP and with the opposition in the Legislative Yuan (LY). ¶2. (C) Belying predictions that he had been gravely weakened by the LY setback, Chen demonstrated extraordinary resilience, repositioning himself in full control of the DPP and its secession struggle and driving wedges into the Pan-Blue majority coalition, all the while maintaining ties with his fundamentalist, pro-independence base. In recent days, Beijing's Anti-Secession Law has challenged Chen's "conciliation" policy, but not his hold on the DPP, where he remains the final arbiter, ensuring that he will not soon become a lame-duck president and that he may be able to determine the issue that now concerns him most -- his own presidential legacy. End Summary. Conciliation and Cooperation -------------- ¶3. (C) Surprised and humiliated by the failure of his DPP to win a majority of seats in the December 11 LY election, President Chen Shui-bian resigned as party Chairman. He adopted a lower profile in sharp contrast to the supremely confident leader who relentlessly pushed his independence agenda in the campaign and kept the opposition reeling. Chen showed unaccustomed humbleness in his New Year's address, calling for the ruling party to show "humility" (Refs A,B,C). ¶4. (C) In January, Chen further shifted tactics and began calling for cross-partisan cooperation, urging Blue and Green camps to reconcile and begin working together for the good of Taiwan. In late January, he appointed Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting) to replace the more confrontational, inflexible Yu Shyi-kun as Premier. Hsieh brought a more moderate face to the Chen government, both domestically and cross-Strait, by working to build a &consultative and co-existence8 government style and to defuse cross-Strait tensions that had built up over DPP campaign issues, announcing he would not engage in precipitous &name rectification8 and would go slow on constitutional reform, while respecting the extant Republic of China constitution. The January 15 lunar new year charter flight agreement with Mainland China was made possible when Chen agreed not to insist that Taiwan government officials responsible for cross-Strait relations must be part of Taiwan,s negotiating delegation (Ref D). Chen in the Catbird Seat -------------- ¶5. (C) In January, Chen also moved to reassert unquestioned leadership of the DPP through an adroit set of personnel moves. Shunting the popular Su Tseng-chang into the DPP Chair and bringing Chen,s longtime nemesis Frank Hsieh back to Taipei as Premier left Chen squarely in the party driver's seat, with the two leading presidential successors now vulnerable to failure and wholly beholden to Chen. The other two contenders for the DPP presidential succession have been relegated to back seats. Former Premier Yu Shyi-kun was demoted to Presidential Office Secretary General, while Vice President Annette Lu (Hsiu-lien) has, either reading the writing on the wall or under instructions, played a more low key role over the past three months. ¶6. (C) Chen used a similar divide-and-conquer approach with the opposition, orchestrating a political courtship with the PFP, which sowed distrust between the PFP and its Pan-Blue coalition partner, the KMT, and effectively undermined the Pan-Blue coalition. When it became clear that no DPP-PFP alliance would materialize, Chen held a highly publicized meeting on February 24 with PFP Chair James Soong, announcing a &Ten Point8 agreement. The once-proud majority Pan-Blue coalition was left in tatters, with only ad hoc cooperation between KMT and PFP after the latter announced "equidistance" between the two major parties. Instead of two camps, green and blue, Taiwan now has three -- green, blue and the orange PFP. Fundamentalist Challenge -------------- ¶7. (C) The greatest challenge to Chen,s moderate tack on domestic politics and cross-Strait relations has come from pro-independence elements within the Pan-Green coalition. Independence advocate Yao Chia-wen, President of the Examination Yuan, told AIT that independence activists were holding back and giving Chen operating room for the time being, although they opposed his compromises with Pan-Blue, especially the Chen-Soong meeting, and with China. Pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) leaders told AIT they expect the pendulum will swing back in their direction in the aftermath of Mainland China,s Anti-Secession Law. TSU has announced plans to hold an "anti-annexation8 rally on May 8, which would double as a campaign rally for the May 14 National Assembly election. ¶8. (C) For their part, Chen and the DPP are seeking to re-take the initiative in the Green coalition with their March 26 rally, which its leaders hope will appease much of the Taiwan anger over the Law. Lo Chi-cheng, Executive Director of the pro-DPP Institute for National Policy Review (INPR),told AIT that the government is trying to avoid being forced to pass legislation retaliating against the PRC Anti-secession law. Protest rallies in Taiwan, Lo explained, typically prove the end of the matter, as participants departed with their anger expiated. The DPP government, he said, hoped the rally would leave it free to deal with cross-Strait issues. NSC Senior Advisor Lin Jin-chang told AIT that the DPP was closely watching to make sure Green coalition partner TSU and its mentor Lee Teng-hui were not able to &hijack8 the March 26 rally and turn it into a launch vehicle for independence rage. Boxed In -------------- ¶9. (C) Having skillfully dealt with both the opposition Blue and his own Green independence fundamentalists, Chen now faces a new set of factors that constrain his options and reinforce his present moderation. The nascent DPP-PFP cooperation requires restraint to avoid alienating the DPP,s skittish new partner. In addition, public opinion poll after public opinion poll show that a majority of Taiwan people support the cross-Strait status quo. INPR's Lo showed AIT a copy of an island-wide public opinion poll his institute conducted last week, which showed just over 70% of respondents opposed a slowdown in exchanges with Mainland China -- 40% wanted exchanges to proceed unchanged and 30% wanted them to increase. The December 11 LY election, Lo noted, demonstrated the consequences for Chen of ignoring public opinion and pushing the line on independence. Search for a Legacy -------------- ¶10. (C) A number of DPP and Pan-Blue contacts have told AIT that Chen is now wholly focused on building his presidential legacy. Chen Wen-cheng, Special Assistant to Vice Minister of National Defense Michael Tsai (Ming-hsien),told AIT that Tsai had found his old friend, Chen Shui-bian, largely SIPDIS indifferent to the December city/county elections and wholly focused on his own legacy. As President Chen moved deeper into his second term as President, MND's Chen continued, he was determined both to avoid becoming a lame-duck president and to define and guarantee his own presidential legacy. At this point, MND's Chen noted, that legacy could still go either way -- cross-Strait peace and stability or Taiwan identity and separation. ¶11. (C) INPR,s Lo told AIT that the December LY election had made President Chen realize that support for independence was limited and that most Taiwan voters wanted to maintain the status quo. Now, Mainland China's Anti-Secession Law had effectively closed the independence option for the forseeable future. Chen, Lo concluded, had received this message and had moved into line with the majority of Taiwan voters who wanted to maintain the status quo and to continue and even improve cross-Strait relations. Comment: Can the Leopard Change His Spots? -------------- ¶12. (C) Has Chen Shui-bian changed, as his moderate supporters hopefully proclaim, or is this merely one more in a long line of course alterations by a master political chameleon? The fact that a number of Pan-Blue leaders and analysts, with their deep suspicions and inveterate skepticism of Chen, are seeing a shift and even urging the U.S. to help reinforce this positive direction, suggests there is more than just the wishful thinking of Chen,s moderate supporters. KMT legislator Su Chi and Blue-leaning commentator Emile Sheng separately told AIT that Chen Shui-bian,s behavior had significantly changed in recent months, but expressed concern that hard line DPP independence advocates might undermine Chen,s current stance. ¶13. (C) It would, however, be premature to pronounce Chen Shui-bian a changed man, suddenly turned practitioner of the Golden Mean. Pronouncements of Chen change have been legion and usually turn out to be nothing more than a brief hiccup. Certainly, Chen,s heart lies elsewhere, and he would love nothing better than to be the George Washington to a &Republic of Taiwan.8 However, Chen,s situation itself has altered, necessitating a shift in tactics and, perhaps, policy. Perhaps the December 11 election and numerous public opinion polls brought home to Chen the fact that a solid majority of Taiwan voters prefer the status quo over moves toward independence or unification. Mainland China,s detested Anti-Secession Law, spelling out in black and white the consequences for independence, moreover, completed the box in which Chen must now live and govern. ¶14. (C) These changed conditions have produced a Chen who is willing, at least for the time being, to pursue development of cross-Strait relations if and when the present Anti-Secession Law imbroglio can be surmounted. The longevity of Chen moderation will depend entirely on its fruitfulness. If cross-Strait relations can be stabilized around a status quo that many in Taiwan term &de facto independence,8 then Chen just might begin to secure his quest for a legacy. It will not likely bring him the Nobel Peace Prize that some of his moderate supporters half-jokingly envision, but it would be the long-term &status quo8 that most Taiwan people support. ¶15. (C) Close Chen aides tell AIT that the LY election setback has forced the President to postpone his second term agenda, including constitutional reform, by 12-18 months in order to give him time to regain full control of the political agenda. Given Chen's leadership style and track record in office, his actions in the current period are likely motivated more by the tactical objective of regaining his first term momentum than any long-term shift in policy priorities. Chen may appear to be weakened by the December LY election setback, but in reality he is in a stronger position now than he was during the immediate fallout from the LY's attempt to impeach him over the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant in 2001. In 2001, Chen convened the Economic Development Advisory Council (EDAC) to co-opt, and ultimately undermine, the Pan-Blue's perceived strength on cross-Strait issues. Chen's cross-Strait policy moves and cohabitation arrangement with the PFP appear to be in this same mold. Then, just as now, Chen tugged on internal contradictions among his political opponents to effectively drive the policy agenda, despite lacking a majority in the legislature. In 2001, Chen maintained a moderate course for nearly a year, before he reverted to a hardline stance on cross-Strait relations that ultimately won him the 2004 election. ¶16. Now, as then, it is clear Chen has changed, at least for the moment. How long that change lasts may depend as much on external circumstance, including U.S. actions, as it does on any change of heart. PAAL