BULGARIANS REACT TO IRAQ FOLLOW-ON MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001639

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL IZ BU NATO
SUBJECT: BULGARIANS REACT TO IRAQ FOLLOW-ON MISSION
PROPOSALS

Classified By: DCM Jeffrey Levine for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. A Washington engagement team presented
Bulgarian security officials September 21 with three possible
follow-on missions in Iraq. The expert-level Bulgarian
interagency group was receptive and positive, but repeatedly
noted the difficult political decision that awaits the
government. The group also outlined its understanding of the
most important criteria affecting the decision and reaffirmed
Bulgaria's commitment to remain engaged in Iraq. Earlier in
the day, Bulgarian CHOD General Kolev told the team he would
officially ask the government to extend the current Mission
until March 2006. Post will follow-up with government
leaders early next week. End Summary.


2. (C) The Bulgarian interagency group was led by MFA
Director for International Security Plamen Bonchev and
consisted of representatives of the MFA, MOD, General Staff,
Presidency and Prime Minister's Office. According to Bonchev,
the criteria most affecting the ultimate decision will be:

The Mission (i.e. a "non-combat" mission is preferred)
The risk faced by soldiers
The number of soldiers required to complete the mission
Public Acceptance of the mission (i.e. NATO Mission more
acceptable)


3. (C) Valentin Radomirski, security advisor to the Prime
Minister, explained that Bulgaria was seeking "an option to
show that we are a solid partner" while causing as few
political problems as possible. He feared a Parliamentary
struggle regarding the follow-on mission would divert
attention from urgent legislation required for EU membership.
He also raised the high number of Bulgarian casualties in
Iraq and said that any "combat-like" mission will give
government critics, the ultra-nationalist Ataka party in
particular, ammunition to undermine the three-party
government coalition.


4. (C) In a separate meeting with CHOD Kolev prior to the
team's presentation, Kolev said he would ask the government
to delay withdrawing the Bulgarian contingent for three
months. A morning newspaper headline reported that the
General's action was requested by the United States. The GOB
team stressed the likelihood that Bulgaria would meet the
December 31 withdrawal deadline mandated by Parliament.
While ruling out the extension of this mission beyond
December 31, they also ruled out an early withdrawal stating,
"There will be no repeat of the Spanish model" and that
leaving the coalition "was not an option." DCM and other
members of the U.S. team noted that an extension of the
Bulgarian contingent would be welcome, but it was not the
reason for the briefing.


MEK MISSION AT CAMP ASHRAF
--------------


5. (C) The Bulgarian working group responded to the MEK
mission with questions and concern. They were specifically
interested in the risks, the internal dynamics of the refugee
population in the camp and the security situation outside the
camp. The contact team noted that of the three missions, the
MEK mission was the lowest risk and stressed the humanitarian
nature of the operation and its scalability. The group was
concerned both by the appearance of the mission (i.e. still
providing a security force) and public response to Bulgarians
guarding a refugee camp maintained for a former Iranian
insurgency group.

NTM-I FORCE PROTECTION MISSION
--------------


6. (C) While agreeing that the NTM-I force protection mission
was potentially more dangerous than the MEK mission, the NATO
flag had appeal. The Bulgarians noted their current
participation in the training mission (one trainer presently
participating, four more on the horizon) and said this would
continue.

MNSTC-I TRAINING MISSION
--------------


7. (C) The Bulgarians were interested in the small numbers of
troops that this mission required, but were unfamiliar with
the risks associated with accompanying Iraqi security forces
on operations. The contact team also described options for
Bulgarians to train Iraqi headquarters units, which would not
involved accompanying Iraqi units into the field.


8. (C) The Bulgarians specifically asked about possible
training missions in the area they currently occupy. Bonchev
had previously noted to DCM their desire for a follow-on
mission that would allow them to benefit from their contacts
and experience in Diwaniya Province.


9. (C) Comment: The day's discussions highlighted the
delicate situation facing the new Socialist-led government.
There is no easy way to reconcile campaign commitments and
Parliamentary mandates with their desire to continue as a
credible coalition partner. The Bulgarians appeared
apologetic about their dilemma and noted the difficulty they
will have in making a fast decision. Members of their group
will be reporting back to their respective political leaders
immediately - although today begins a four-day holiday. Post
will follow up with decision makers early next week.
BEYRLE