TERRORIST FINANCE: SINGAPORE'S ABILITY TO COOPERATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SINGAPORE 000760 SIPDIS STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS DNELSON; S/CT TKUSHNER; IO/PSC JSCHWEITZER, EB/EPPD CTHOMPSON TREASURY FOR JZARATE OFAC FOR RWERNER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015 TAGS: KTFN KVPR EFIN PTER ETTC PREL CVIS SN SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: SINGAPORE'S ABILITY TO COOPERATE REF: A) STATE 32688 B) STATE 36867 C) SINGAPORE 724 D) 04 SINGAPORE 784 E) 04 SINGAPORE 3540 Classified By: Economic/Political Counselor Laurent Charbonnet. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This message responds to Ref A's questions concerning Singapore's ability to cooperate in disrupting terrorism financing. ¶2. (U) AMOUNT OF ASSETS FROZEN, FORFEITED OR SEIZED: To date, Singapore has not identified any assets in Singapore of persons pursuant to UNSCR Resolutions 1267 and 1373. ¶3. (C) IMPEDIMENTS TO CO-SPONSORING DESIGNATIONS: Singapore has yet to co-sponsor any designations of terrorists to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee, although Post recently submitted Ref B's request that Singapore consider doing so for certain Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members. As Ref C suggests, Singapore's willingness to co-sponsor designations may depend in part on what steps its neighbors -- particularly Malaysia and Indonesia -- are planning to take. Singapore has opposed past USG proposals to include JI detainees in Singapore on the UN list, claiming that such actions would undermine the government's strategy of gaining the trust and cooperation of the detainees in identifying, detecting and detaining additional JI terrorists, both in Singapore and abroad. It has, however, strongly supported designating senior JI leaders such as Bashir, Hambali, and others. ¶4. (U) USG TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: Singapore regularly accepts USG training and technical assistance, including assessments of its training needs. It has co-sponsored CT finance workshops with us, and hosts a number of annual CT-related conferences. As recommended in Ref D, we should encourage Singapore to take a more proactive approach by offering its training assistance to foreign enforcement authorities in the region. ¶5. (C) TERRORIST FUND RAISING/BANKING SERVICES RISK: Risk Level - Medium. As this year's INCSR submission (Ref E) notes, Singapore's position as a significant financial and investment center, coupled with bank secrecy laws and the lack of routine currency reporting requirements, make it an attractive destination for terrorist organizations. The risk that terrorists will use Singapore either for significant fund raising or banking services is mitigated by the government's implementation of a strong CT finance legal framework; the United Nations Act of 2001 and the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act and its implementing regulations provide the government adequate and effective tools to take action against terrorists. Singapore is currently considering revisions to its key AML/CFT regulations for banks (and, thereafter, for other financial institutions) that incorporate the revised FATF Forty Recommendations, and the FATF's Special Recommendation Seven on wire transfer reporting requirements. Once adopted, most likely by mid year, the regulations' coverage is expected to include terrorist financing activities. LAVIN